

A Report on the Effectiveness of the Urban Area Security Initiative Program



August 2011

The National Urban Area Security Initiative Association

The National Urban Areas Security Initiative Association is a 501(c)(6) nonprofit composed of UASI Programs dedicated to furthering the preparedness and security of the nation's urban areas against threats and acts of terrorism and other major hazards.

Report on the Effectiveness of the Urban Area Security Initiative Program

Table of Contents

1.0 BACKGROUND	2
2.0 GRANT EFFECTIVENESS AND PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW	3
2.1 THE PREPAREDNESS CYCLE.....	3
2.2 MEASURING GRANT EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS MEASURING PREPAREDNESS	3
2.3 PREPAREDNESS TOOLS	4
3.0 KEY FINDINGS	5
3.1 REGIONAL COLLABORATION CAPABILITIES	7
3.2 INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES	8
3.3 CBRNE DETECTION, RESPONSE AND DECONTAMINATION CAPABILITIES	9
3.4 NIMS AND THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK.....	11
3.5 PLANNING AND CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITIES	13
3.6 INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION CAPABILITIES	14
3.7 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CAPABILITIES	16
3.8 MEDICAL AND HEALTH CAPABILITIES.....	17
4.0 SUSTAINING CAPABILITIES	18
5.0 GRANT PROCESS AND “FUNDING BACKLOG”	19
6.0 UASI VOICES ACROSS AMERICA	20
APPENDIX	
A – LIST OF URBAN AREAS	21
B – NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS.....	22
C – TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST	23

1.0 Background

Created in 2003 in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) is the **only** federal homeland security grant program that **requires** regional governance, strategic planning and investing involving all disciplines - law enforcement, fire service, public health and medical, public works, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and emergency management – in order to acquire the necessary plans, equipment, training and exercises to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from threats and acts of terrorism and other major hazards. From FY 2003 to FY 2011, approximately \$6.5 billion has been appropriated for this program.

The UASI program goes to the heart of one of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations: allocate homeland security grants based upon risk by funding high threat, high density urban areas where threats often begin and seek to materialize. The risk of terrorism against the U.S. today is more complex and diverse than it was on September 11, 2001. Since January 2009, Justice Department documents show that a case of homegrown terrorism, with links to an international group, has arisen every two to three weeks in the U.S.¹ The al-Qaeda network has become a franchise with affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and elsewhere that have trained or inspired foreigners and Americans to plot and commit acts of terror in numerous locations across America as diverse as:

- Fort Hood, Texas
- Little Rock, Arkansas
- Portland, Oregon
- New York City
- Columbus, Ohio
- Bridgeport, Connecticut
- Springfield, Illinois
- Dallas, Texas
- Fort Dix, New Jersey
- Seattle, Washington
- Washington, DC
- Boston, Massachusetts
- Denver, Colorado
- Detroit, Michigan
- Minneapolis, Minnesota



2011 is the tenth anniversary of 9/11

Today, there are 64 UASI regions across the United States based on a risk analysis of the 100 largest metropolitan statistical areas by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These UASI regions range from New York City to Columbus to Chicago to Sacramento. However, in FY 2011, DHS cut 33 UASI regions from the UASI list for future funding purposes based, in part, on funding reductions provided by Congress that year. A list of the 2010 and 2011 UASI regions is set forth in Appendix A.

This report is the National UASI Association's first attempt to outline the effectiveness of the UASI program. The report is based on a review of multiple data sources from 2001 to 2011, including Urban Area investment justifications, bi-annual strategy implementation reports, assessments, interviews of first responders, surveys conducted of UASI member regions and other data sources. However, this report should be viewed as preliminary. It delivers an *initial* review of the effectiveness of a subset of actual UASI grant expenditures covering FY 2003 - FY2009. It is *limited* by the scope of the available data and time to review such data.

Finally, the report (1) provides an explanation for how UASI funding actually works, (2) debunks the myth that UASI funds are simply sitting idle in federal coffers, and (3) outlines the need to sustain the capability gains made under the UASI program. The National UASI Association will produce more robust reports on UASI effectiveness in the future. For now, it is critical that the American people understand the value and role the UASI program plays in keeping our communities safe and secure.

2.0 Grant Effectiveness and Preparedness Overview

The term "preparedness" refers to capabilities necessary for providing the means to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events by performing critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance. Capabilities are developed and delivered by appropriate combinations of planning, personnel, organization, equipment, training, and exercises. For purposes of this report, unless otherwise noted, the terms "capability" or "capabilities" refer to the 37 capabilities outlined in the DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) version 2.0 discussed in more detail below.

For purposes of this report, the term "effectiveness" means the expenditure of funds and other resources that increase or sustain, in a measurable way, those **capabilities** needed in order to reduce the highest **risk** terrorism and other catastrophic incidents. When measuring or analyzing the effectiveness of the UASI program one is essentially analyzing the outcomes produced by the investments made by Urban Areas with UASI funds. Ultimately, whether an investment is effective is best measured by how the capability it was designed to build, enhance or sustain performs in a real world scenario. Therefore, whenever possible, this report will utilize real world incidents to help demonstrate the effectiveness of UASI funded investments and will do so in the context of the investments' implementing the National Homeland Security Priorities.

2.1 The Preparedness Cycle

Preparedness is a cyclical process as opposed to a linear endeavor in which there is a defined end. This explains why the term "preparedness cycle" is used by DHS and others to explain the preparedness process as set forth in Figure 1. When it comes to preparedness there is no "end state" as risks change, plans need updating, training for new personnel is required, and equipment is replaced or upgraded and so on. The need to prepare will no sooner end than the day all risks to the U.S. cease to exist and the U.S. military no longer requires new resources and state and local law enforcement, public health, emergency management and fire service agencies are no longer necessary.

FIGURE 1
The Preparedness Cycle



2.2 Measuring Grant Effectiveness versus Measuring Preparedness

Measuring the effectiveness of specific grant programs is different than measuring overall preparedness. The level of preparedness in a given Urban Area or State is influenced by numerous factors; most importantly, state and local resources. While the UASI grant and other homeland security grant programs are critical to enabling Urban Areas and States to achieve National Priorities, they represent but a small fraction of the billions of dollars spent by States and Urban Areas on public health and safety each year. Those expenditures plus grants, coupled with other available federal resources and assets, e.g., available military plans, equipment, etc. to support civilian authorities, account for the overall level of preparedness in a given Urban Area or State. In short, measuring the effectiveness of a preparedness grant program is a sub-set of understanding the overall level of preparedness in a given Urban Area or State.

Measuring effectiveness of a grant program or overall preparedness is not a scientific equation. Nor is either effectively measured by looking at the United States as a single operating entity. Rather, our nation is a vast network of independent actors - towns, villages, cities, counties, states, the private sector and federal departments and agencies - that must unify as best as possible to achieve homeland security priorities and perform critical operational tasks before, during and after an incident.

2.3 Preparedness Tools

In order for the nation to be better prepared, DHS developed a series of preparedness tools and guidance designed to assist States and Urban Areas in their use of homeland security grants and other resources. As part of an early risk assessment for the nation, in 2003, the federal government developed 15 National Planning Scenarios that describe the potential impact of plausible major terrorist attacks and natural hazards requiring coordination among various jurisdictions and levels of government. The scenarios serve as the foundation for the development of local, state and federal capability requirements in the areas of prevention, protection, response and recovery. A list of the scenarios is in Appendix B.

In 2007, DHS released the National Preparedness Guidelines, which included the National Homeland Security Priorities. These priorities represent broad goals that the Nation should strive to achieve in order to address the 15 planning scenarios and any other scenarios that States and Urban Areas may need to be prepared for based upon their own risk assessments. To help implement the National Priorities and prepare for the 15 National Planning Scenarios, DHS designed the TCL, a list of 37 capabilities needed to achieve the National Priorities and address the National Planning Scenarios. A list of the 37 Target Capabilities is in Appendix C. Within the 37 Target Capabilities are thirteen priority capabilities that link to specific National Priorities as outlined in Figure 2 below.ⁱⁱ

FIGURE 2
National Priorities and Target Capabilities


No.	National Priority	Associated Target Capabilities
1	Expand Regional Collaboration	Multiple capabilities
2	Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response Framework	Multiple capabilities
3	Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)	Multiple capabilities
4	Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination Counter-Terror Investigations and Law Enforcement
5	Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities	Communications Emergency Public Information and Warning
6	Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination Capabilities	CBRNE Detection Explosive Device Response Operations WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
7	Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities	Medical Surge Mass Prophylaxis
8	Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities	Planning Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) Community Preparedness and Participation

Projects implemented with UASI funds must support terrorism preparedness by building or enhancing capabilities that relate to the prevention of, protection from, response to or recovery from terrorism. However, the UASI program also acknowledges that many capabilities which support terrorism preparedness simultaneously support preparedness for other hazards. In fact, an analysis by the Government Accountability Office indicated that of the 37 capabilities included in the TCL, 30 of them were common to both terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. This is particularly true for response and recovery capabilities.ⁱⁱⁱ

3.0 Key Findings

The UASI program is implementing National Priorities. As demonstrated throughout this section, prior to the UASI program, Urban Areas either completely lacked certain capabilities or were deficient in vital capability areas necessary to mitigate the risks faced by the Urban Areas. The UASI program has provided the resources necessary for Urban Areas to act in a regional capacity to build, enhance and now sustain those capabilities across the homeland security mission areas of prevention, protection, response and recovery. This conclusion is based upon a review of investments by National Priority, Target Capabilities¹ and National Planning Scenarios to determine if the investments produced outcomes that were “effective” by building, enhancing or sustaining capabilities necessary to successfully address the scenarios as evidenced in real world events.


Figures 3 and 4 below demonstrate that 66% of all UASI funding from 2003 to 2009 has gone directly toward implementing the priority Target Capabilities attached to the National Priorities. While National Priorities 1-3 do not have specific Target Capabilities associated with them, by simply accounting for funding to support critical infrastructure protection capabilities for the Implementing the NIPP National Priority, the percentage of funds allocated toward National Priorities increases to 77% of total funding.



¹ Allocation of dollars among Target Capabilities is an inexact science. The available data are currently captured in different formats and reside in separate systems. Moreover, the 37 Target Capabilities are not isolated from each other. Rather, they overlap one another with elements of one capability present in another or even several others. This complicates but does not preclude a process of aggregating existing information and conducting a broader meta-analysis of grant effectiveness. Given the overlap of Target Capabilities, funded projects may enhance or impact more than one Target Capability. For example, hiring an intelligence analyst in a fusion center to monitor, link and report on suspicious activity would impact both the Intelligence Analysis and Production Target Capability and Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings, etc. While the results of the analysis of dollars to capabilities herein are directionally accurate, this challenge can be reduced in the future by enhancing current data collection tools so that they acquire more precise and explicit information on the alignment between projects and their expected impact on capabilities.

Figure 4 UASI Capability Funding FY2003 - FY2009

DHS Designated National Priority Capabilities are in Red



National Priority: *Expand Regional Collaboration*

Planning Scenario: *All*

Primary Target Capabilities: *Planning*

3.1 The UASI program is enhancing regional collaboration and coordination.

The expanded regional collaboration priority focuses embracing partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration allows for a multijurisdictional and multi-disciplinary approach to building capabilities for the four homeland security mission areas of prevention, protection, response and recovery; spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas.

Every UASI region must have a DHS approved regional homeland security strategy and governance structure designed around implementing National Homeland Security Priorities at the regional and local level. This mandated structure has transformed the way cities, counties, states, tribes and the private sector work together to enhance regional preparedness and security. In the past, each level of government and the public health and safety agencies within them, operated in a competitive environment when it came to acquiring funding to enhance capabilities. The UASI program has removed this stove-piped approach with a collaborative framework that saves time, money and leverages resources regionally. Urban Areas such as St. Louis and Kansas City regularly plan and share UASI funding across States lines.

The purpose of Urban Area homeland security strategies is to provide a blueprint for comprehensive, enterprise-wide planning and risk management for homeland security efforts and provide a strategic guide for the use of related Federal, State, local, and private resources within the Urban Area. These strategies serve as a foundation upon which all other homeland security efforts are built. Today, Urban Areas across the Nation are engaging in sophisticated terrorism and natural hazards risk assessments, determining which target capabilities are needed to mitigate the identified risk, understanding where the gaps are in those capabilities and using that data to drive their specific regional goals and objectives tied to the National Priorities and target capabilities. Those goals and objectives then lead to the acquired, plans, equipment, training and exercises necessary to produce the outcomes that support enhancing preparedness in the Urban Area. This process, as outlined in Figure 5 above, enhances regional collaboration and coordination to build and track regional capabilities.

**FIGURE 5
UASI Regional Planning Process**



3.2 The UASI program is strengthening interoperable communications capabilities.

Strengthening operable and interoperable communications has been not only a National Priority but was a recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report as well. The ability for public safety responders to communicate via voice, data or video is essential to operate in any public safety environment. Without this capability, operations can be slowed or even derailed resulting in the loss of lives and property. Urban Areas have made tremendous progress in this area utilizing UASI funds. From 2003 to 2009, Urban Areas spent an estimated \$1.2 billion on enhancing and sustaining communications capabilities. This is the largest single expenditure rate for any of the Target Capabilities during the history of the grant program.

National Priority: *Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities*

Planning Scenario: *All Scenarios*

Primary Target Capabilities: *Communications and Emergency Public Information and Warning*

The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) Goal 1 sets the target capability level for Urban Areas: "By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies."^{iv}

When New Orleans' Public Safety communications system was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, UASI funding replaced it with a state of the art regional 700/800mHZ Interoperable Communications System that serves the entire region's emergency response community.

According to the DHS Office of Emergency Communications, (OEC), which oversees the NECP and conducted assessments of 60 Urban Areas in 2010, **this goal has been met.** The UASI program has been instrumental in achieving this goal by funding, among other things, the development, implementation and testing of tactical interoperable communications plans across the country which are key to ensuring communications in a multi-jurisdictional emergency response. In addition, to achieving Goal 1, OEC has noted other communications improvements across Urban Areas^v:

Equipment: The NECP Goal 1 results showed an increase in the number of UASI regions using Project 25 (P25) digital radio standards-based systems, which are designed to allow interoperability regardless of equipment vendor.

Training: OEC offers a communications unit leader (COML) training program that has trained more than 3,500 responders, technicians, and planners to lead communications at incidents across the nation. This program began, in part, as a response to gaps identified in the 2007 DHS Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP) Scorecard assessment. During the NECP Goal 1 events, OEC found that a large majority of the UASI regions had assigned DHS-trained COMLs to handle planning and implementing multi-system communications for the event.

Exercises: Almost all UASI regions are now holding communication-specific exercises, and approximately half of them are holding these exercises on a regular basis. This represents significant progress over similar findings from the DHS TICP report in 2007, which concluded that "almost no [UASI] region had completed a communications-focused exercise before the TICP validation exercise."

3.3 The UASI program is strengthening IED attack deterrence, prevention, and protection capabilities.

Among the most common forms of terrorist attacks is the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From Iraq to Afghanistan, to Portland, Oregon to Times Square in New York, this attack method is relatively inexpensive and easy to deploy. From 1999 to 2009, 76% of all terrorist plots against the U.S. involved conventional attack plans with a focus on the use of explosives.^{vi}

National Priority: *Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities*

Planning Scenario: *Improvised Explosive Device*

Primary Target Capability: *Explosive Device Response Operations*

Strengthening capabilities to deter, prevent and protect against IEDs has been a key UASI program objective. From 2003 to 2009 Urban Areas spent approximately \$133 million in UASI funds to enhance explosive device response operations (EDRO) capabilities impacting no less than 43 bomb squads, 41 SWAT teams and numerous hazardous materials response teams across Urban Areas. The effectiveness of these investments has been demonstrated from coast to coast.

In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, drove into Times Square on a busy Saturday night and parked his SUV packed with explosives in order to kill hundreds. From 2006 to 2009 the New York Urban Area allocated \$1.2 million to increase EDRO. The following items of grant supported equipment were deployed and utilized by New York's first responders to save hundreds of lives and render safe Shahzad's IED:

- Response vehicle (bomb truck) used by the Bomb Technicians
- Bomb Squad supervisor's response vehicle
- Remote F6A robot
- Two IED PAN Disrupters
- Bomb Suits
- Rigging Kits
- The "frag bag" (kevlar cooler-sized container utilized to remove explosive components safely).^{vii}



Times Square, May 2010

In 2010, responders in the San Diego Urban Area successfully faced one of the most complex and dangerous situations involving explosives in U.S. history. In November of that year, police found a house in Escondido, California, just outside San Diego, packed with the largest stash of homemade explosives and bomb-making material ever discovered in the U.S.




The "Escondido Bomb House"

This included the same types of chemicals used by suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq. From 2006 to 2009 the San Diego Urban Area spent \$3.8 million in UASI funds to enhance or sustain EDRO. Those funds paid for, among other things, multiple bomb robots used to gather intelligence on the scene and render safe certain explosives, and a command vehicle that allowed for seamless communications between the multiple agencies on scene. The funds also paid for the interagency training that allowed for a well-coordinated response among law enforcement and fire service bomb technicians and commanders. As one local bomb squad commander said on the scene, "Thank God for the UASI program."^{viii}

From 2003 to 2006, 20 Urban Areas across the country used approximately \$18 million in UASI funds to acquire bomb robots and attachments to enhance bomb team safety and capabilities.^{ix} Figure 6^x below highlights where these resources have been deployed across the U.S.

FIGURE 6
Federal Support for Bomb Squad Robotic Enhancements as of 2010



Despite the significant improvements made in EDRO, gaps remain and the need to sustain capabilities achieved is always a looming issue. The DHS Office for Bombing Prevention in a 2011 report, highlighted EDRO gaps across the nation. While the scope of these findings is far larger than Urban Areas, what is listed is applicable in certain cases^{xi}:

- Public safety bomb squads need advanced render-safe tools and robotics, more effective communications and information sharing, as well as wider access to electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities.
- Explosives detection canine teams lack national standards for training and certification, as well as odor recognition of homemade explosives, including peroxide-based explosives.
- Public safety dive teams also lack national standards for training and certification and are in need of remote operated vehicles (ROV) and improved diver communication systems, including secure voice and data transfer.
- Guidelines for the employment, training, and equipping for SWAT teams and for bomb technicians supporting SWAT operations must be developed.

3.4 The UASI program has been essential to enhancing incident management capabilities across the country involving a wide array of hazards and emergencies. From 2003 to 2009 just over \$541 million was spent under the UASI program to enhance core incident management and response capabilities. The value and effectiveness of these investments can literally be measured in lives saved.

In 2001, Urban Areas across America had 21 Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams designed to conduct search and rescue operations during and after a disaster. With the help of the UASI program, the number of Urban Area US&R teams has more than doubled to 51 in 2011. Developing and enhancing search and rescue capabilities at the local level reduces the need for, and cost of, deploying federal teams and speeds up the deployment of critical assets to conduct life-saving search and rescue operations. This is highlighted in Figures 7 and 8^{xii} on the following page, which outline how the geographic and population coverage of Urban Area US&R teams has grown significantly since 2001. The importance of this fact was made evident in the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornado disaster where local search and rescue teams saved families with UASI funded equipment and training. Had the same disaster occurred in 2001, it is almost certain that federal assets would have been called upon to conduct search and rescue operations, increasing the cost to the federal government and decreasing the speed with which these life-saving resources could be utilized.

The Minneapolis/St. Paul or Twin Cities Urban Area allocated approximately \$21.7 million from 2006 to 2009 for enhancing incident management capabilities including EOC Management, On-site incident Management, WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination, Communications, Fire Incident Response Support and Emergency Public Safety and Security. Over 2,000 city employees in Minneapolis alone have received NIMS training. These investments would prove critical to responding to a catastrophic disaster.

On August 1, 2007, the 1,907 foot long Interstate 35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis collapsed killing 13 people and injuring 121 others. At the time of the collapse, there were approximately 120 vehicles, carrying 160 people on the bridge. Numerous vehicles were embedded in the river and its bank 115 feet below. Managing such a catastrophic incident is a major challenge, but as reported by the U.S. Fire Administration through its independent assessment of the response to the crisis, the use of UASI funds played a significant role in preparing the region for this major incident:



The 35W Bridge 2007

Years of investing time and money into identifying gaps in the [Urban Area's] disaster preparedness capabilities; acquiring radios for an interagency, linked 800 MHz system; and participating in training on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and on the organizational basis for that system (the Incident Command System (ICS) and Unified Command) paid off substantially during response and recovery operations.^{xiii}

National Priority: *Implement the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework*

Planning Scenario: *Multiple, including Major Earthquake and Major Hurricane*

Primary Target Capabilities: *EOC Management, On-site Incident Management, Urban Search and Rescue, Emergency Public Safety and Security, Fire Incident Response and WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.*

FIGURE 7
2001 Urban Area US&R Coverage – 4 Hour Drive Time





FIGURE 8
2011 Urban Area US&R Coverage – 4 Hour Drive Time



National Priority: *Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness*

Planning Scenario: *Major Hurricane*


Primary Target Capabilities: *Community Preparedness and Participation, Medical Surge, Emergency Public Information and Warning, Mass Care, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution, Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place*

3.5 The UASI program is strengthening emergency planning and citizen preparedness.

In an effort to measure Urban Areas' progress in strengthening emergency planning after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA conducted two major planning assessments, the Nationwide Plan Reviews in 2006 and 2010. These planning assessments evaluated Urban Areas' Emergency Operation Plans (EOPs), including the Functional Appendices. During the time frame between each assessment, Urban Area's spent approximately \$223 million on the core capabilities focused on as part of the review. Among the findings, the 2010 Nationwide Plan

Review found that Urban Areas' confidence in their Functional Appendices' to manage a catastrophic event doubled since 2006, see Figure 9.^{xiv} The assessment also found confidence in Urban Areas' Basic Plans to manage a catastrophic event more than doubled from 2006 to 2010.

FIGURE 9
Percent of Urban Areas that Indicated Confidence in the Functional Appendices Ability to Manage a Catastrophic Event



The Baton Rouge Urban Area has developed the Red Stick Ready Program for community preparedness using approximately \$635,000 in UASI funds. During the recent Mississippi River Flood Event, the Red Stick Ready's network of video monitors located at sites throughout the parish where there were large public gatherings, to include emergency rooms, municipal court buildings, and other public locations, were used to provide current and accurate information throughout the entire duration of the incident. Accurate and timely information, brochures, and safety materials were also presented at business and public town meetings to keep the community informed of necessary emergency protective measures that could and would be implemented in the event of a Mississippi River Levee breach or overtopping.



Baton Rouge 2011

3.6 The UASI program is maximizing information sharing and counter terrorism efforts via fusion centers and other mechanisms.

From 2003 to 2010, Urban Areas spent approximately \$623 million to support terrorism prevention capabilities. Much of this funding has focused on enhancing intelligence collection, analysis and sharing with fusion centers playing a key role in the process. According to DHS, a fusion center is a "collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."^{xv}

National Priority: *Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities*

Planning Scenario: *All Terrorism Scenarios*

Primary Target Capabilities: *Intelligence and Information Sharing Dissemination, Intelligence Analysis and Production, Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings, and Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement*


In 2001, fusion centers, terrorism liaison officers, counter terrorism divisions within state and local law enforcement agencies, national suspicious activity reporting programs, etc. simply did not exist. Terrorism was almost exclusively a federal issue. In 2011, with critical support from the UASI program, that paradigm has been transformed with state and local law enforcement, and the public, on the front lines defending the homeland from international terrorism and the growing threat of domestic radicalization.

In October 2010, the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions released a study indicating that from 1999 to 2009 of the 68 known thwarted terrorist plots, 51% were thwarted as a result of community member or local or state law enforcement finding the initial clues. The UASI program has been instrumental in building the capabilities necessary to discover, report and analyze those clues.

51% of foiled terrorist plots against the U.S. from 1999 to 2009 were the result of a community member or state or local law enforcement officer finding and reporting the initial clues.

In 2005, a series of gas station robberies occurred in the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area. Upon executing a search warrant at one of the robber's apartments, local police discovered suspicious materials including what appeared to be jihadist literature and potential target lists. One of the detectives at the apartment was a trained terrorism liaison officer (TLO). TLOs work with local fusion centers to serve as a conduit for homeland security information sharing from the field to the fusion center for analysis. The TLO immediately realized the significance of the items based upon his training and a massive federal investigation ensued; revealing a terrorist cell had formed in California's prisons and that the suspects involved were robbing the gas stations to raise money in order to attack targets in southern California. In the words of former LAPD Chief, Bill Bratton, "to most detectives this 'disturbing evidence' would have appeared as inconsequential to the robbery charge."^{xvi} It was the TLO training that proved indispensable to generating the initial clue and the UASI program has been instrumental in building and sustaining the TLO program in California and around the country.

Today, of the current 72 DHS recognized state and local fusion centers, 21 are in major urban areas. Most Urban Area fusion centers, such as the Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning Region, serve multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions and foster regional coordination and collaboration. The centers utilize UASI and other grant funding to support the acquisition of vital equipment, intelligence analysts, training, and to conduct exercises. In 2010, the first nationwide Baseline Capabilities Assessment (BCA) of fusion



centers was conducted. The BCA was conducted by the Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, in coordination with Fusion Center Directors, DHS, the FBI, and others. The 2010 BCA focused on the four Critical Operational Capabilities (COC). In 2011, DHS launched an effort to measure the effectiveness of federal resources, such as UASI funding, provided to assist fusion centers in building capabilities. The findings^{xvii} show significant progress from 2010 to 2011 across the four COCs:

1. Capability to receive classified and unclassified information from federal partners - 66.7% of fusion centers have a final approved plan, policy or standard operating procedure (SOP) for the receipt of federally generated time-sensitive threat information. This represents a **54.8% capability increase**.
2. Capability to assess local implications of threat information through the use of a formal risk assessment process – 54.2% of fusion centers have a final, approved plan, policy or SOP to assess the local implications of time-sensitive and emerging threat information, representing a **95% capability increase**.

3. Capability to further disseminate threat information to other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector entities within their jurisdiction – 65.3% of fusion centers have a final, approved plan or SOP identifying the dissemination of time sensitive and emerging threat information to all homeland security partners, including law enforcement and other disciplines. This represents a **62.1% capability increase**.

4. Capability to gather locally generated information, aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners. 61.1% of fusion centers have a final, approved plan, policy, or SOP to gather locally-generated information based on time sensitive and emerging threats, representing a **10% capability increase**.

COC number 4 directly supports the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). The NSI is designed to develop, evaluate, and implement common procedures and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about terrorism-related suspicious activities defined as “behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”^{xviii} The Institute for Homeland Security Solutions found the link between the investigation of criminal and “suspicious activity” and stopping terrorism was significant, with nearly one in three identified terrorist plots being stopped as a result of such criminal or suspicious activity investigations.^{xix}

The UASI program is a key element to supporting the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative

From 2006 to 2010, the San Francisco Bay Area allocated approximately \$27 million in UASI funds toward information sharing and collaboration and infrastructure protection capabilities with much of that funding supporting the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). In 2010, the FBI field office in San Francisco accepted 117 of the NCRIC’s Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) as having a potential terrorism nexus worthy of investigation. Of all the SARs with a terrorism nexus submitted to the FBI field office, 74% of them were provided by the NCRIC.^{xx} In 2009, the Indianapolis Police Department conducted over 50 investigations related to terrorism and the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center in Indianapolis received 128 tips and 1,182 requests for information pertaining to terrorism.

National Priority: *Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan*

Planning Scenario: *All Terrorism Scenarios*

Primary Target Capabilities: *Critical Infrastructure Protection*

3.7 The UASI program has been essential to strengthening security at critical infrastructure across the Nation.

Before the UASI program, CIKR protection programs did not exist in the vast majority of America’s urban centers. Today, virtually every Urban Area has some form of CIKR protection program built from the National Infrastructure Protection Plan framework. This involves thousands of sites including chemical facilities, water treatment plants,

transportation systems, commercial facilities, nuclear plants, etc., and includes: Identifying critical infrastructure, cataloging critical infrastructure, assessing the risk to that infrastructure, developing plans to reduce that risk, procuring the needed personnel, equipment and training to implement those plans and exercises to test implementation.

Figure 10

Top 5 Funded CIKR Protection Equipment Areas

CIKR Protection Activities	Funding Estimate	Rank
Physical Security Improvements	\$141,503,537	1
Surveillance Systems	\$53,189,717	2
Assessments	\$29,325,352	3
Security Teams	\$22,444,410	4
Credentialing and Access Controls	\$20,603,000	5

From 2003 to 2009 Urban Areas spent approximately \$585 million in UASI funds to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). 67% of Urban Areas surveyed said they currently use UASI funds to either conduct or sustain CIKR assessment programs with 65% saying they use their critical infrastructure protection programs to help with special event security planning including major sporting events and other large public gatherings that could be targeted by terrorists. Figure 10 above outlines the top 5 funded UASI equipment areas from FY 2006 to FY 2009 related to CIKR protection.

In 2004, Chicago began building a state-of-the-art unified video surveillance network known as Operation Virtual Shield (OVS). Under the OVS network, Chicago has integrated more than 1,000 miles of fiber optic, copper and wireless systems from city departments and agencies back into the city’s operations center. This includes the police, fire, aviation, streets and sanitation, transportation, the Chicago Public Schools, Chicago Housing Authority, Chicago Transit Authority, and Chicago Park District. These cameras provide first responders and homeland security officials with situational awareness at critical sites throughout the city to support operations before, during and after an emergency.^{xxi}



Chicago’s Operation Virtual Shield



Super Bowl XLIII in Tampa

In February 2009, for Super Bowl XLIII in the Tampa Urban Area, the incident command staff at the Tampa Police Department used a common operating picture based on its UASI funded commercial software investments to understand risks to the event as part of its planning process, integrate the roughly 60 local, state and federal agencies involved in securing the Super Bowl and monitor threats to facilities during the event.

3.8 The UASI program is a vital source of funding to increase medical and health preparedness. The terrorist attack on 9/11, the subsequent anthrax attacks later that year and the influenza pandemic (H1N1) of 2009 all highlighted the critical role of public health and medical agencies during emergencies and showed strengths and weaknesses in public health and medical's ability to respond during a potential crisis.

National Priority: *Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities*

Planning Scenario: *Pandemic Influenza*

Primary Target Capabilities: *Medical Surge, Mass Prophylaxis, Isolation and Quarantine, Medical Supplies Management and Distribution, Environmental Health, Laboratory Testing, and Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment*

While the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provides assistance to States and Urban Areas through multiple programs, such as the Cities Readiness Initiative, (CRI), the UASI program is the only federal preparedness program that requires multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional planning and investing, which directly integrates public health and medical agencies with public safety agencies in the homeland security mission. This is evidenced by the fact that from 2003 to 2009 Urban Areas spent roughly \$172 million in UASI funds on enhancing or sustaining medical and health capabilities. Those Urban Areas that invested UASI funding in medical and health capabilities often used risk and capability need data to make funding determinations and bypassed the temptation to view medical and health agencies as "taken care of" by other federal grant programs. Such an approach puts resources where they are needed as opposed to where they may be expected.



The combined resources of the UASI program, and other federal grants, have helped transform medical and health preparedness across Urban Areas. For example, in 2001 at the time of the anthrax attacks, major metropolitan areas did not have the ability to provide medicine to large portions of their population in the case of a bioterrorist attack. By 2007, those same major metropolitan areas, the vast majority of which are covered under the UASI program, are working to provide medicines to 100% of their population within 48 hours through planning, training and exercises.^{xxii}

The Indianapolis Urban Area has spent \$1.9 million on medical surge capabilities and developed an EMS software expansion project that began as a means of pre-hospital syndromic surveillance, but has evolved into a powerful tool for research, training, quality improvement, and disaster response. The region has also developed real-time epidemiological surveillance capabilities to monitor, track and interdict the spread of diseases and a mobile mass casualty forensics lab.

The Central Virginia Urban Area has procured mass-casualty response trailers and equipment which are strategically located throughout the region to respond to emergencies and trained 572 of the region's health and human services providers and volunteers in mass care operations. These and countless other investments in medical and health preparedness across Urban Areas continue to enhance capabilities and demonstrate the effectiveness of the UASI program as a cross cutting multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional homeland security program.



4.0 Sustaining Capabilities

The Nation must sustain the capabilities developed through the UASI program. It takes time and resources to build capabilities and ultimately to sustain them. The capabilities developed through the UASI program have clearly made a significant difference in preparedness and security across the U.S. As noted previously, however, the preparedness cycle is not linear. Therefore, as long as the preparedness cycle is turning, the need to invest in it will continue.

The responsibility to prepare our Nation’s Urban Areas, like the responsibility to protect this Nation, is a shared one. Urban Areas spend tens of billions of dollars each year to build and sustain the public health and safety infrastructure for much of the United States through law enforcement, fire service, public health, emergency medical and emergency management. This includes personnel, plans, equipment, training and exercises. The capabilities developed using UASI and other grant funds supplement local expenditures and allow Urban Areas to build toward capability levels designed to support federal missions, specifically, counter terrorism and catastrophic incident response. Without such funding, most Urban Areas would not have the resources to develop such high capability levels in the first place let alone sustain them.

In November 2009, FEMA made a major policy shift and explicitly allowed UASI and other grant funds to be used to sustain the capabilities developed by the grant funds. This was a wise decision and one supported by the congressionally mandated Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force in

The UASI program has consistently been funded below its authorized funding levels.

its 2010 report to Congress, which called for the removal of any limitations on sustainment funding.^{xxiii} There is no doubt that Congress and the Executive branch have an equity stake in the capabilities developed across Urban Areas that have been paid for by UASI funds. As such, sustaining these capabilities is clearly in the federal interest. However, in 2011, DHS removed 33 Urban Areas from the UASI program. The Department based its decision on the fact that Congress had reduced funding for the program by \$162 million (18%) compared to 2010. The FY 2012 budget is under even greater pressure for cuts. It is not in the Nation’s interest to see the capabilities built by the UASI program wither and eventually evaporate over time, which they will in the absence of a sustainment plan and funding. A national dialogue on sustaining the hard fought capabilities is critical to ensuring prior investments are not wasted.

As the Nation makes difficult fiscal decisions it’s important to understand how UASI has been funded thus far relative to its authorized funding levels.² As outlined in Figure 11 below, the UASI program has been consistently funded *below* authorized levels since its authorization legislation became law.

FIGURE 11
UASI Funding – Authorization versus Appropriations

Fiscal Year	UASI Authorized Funding Level	UASI Actual Funding Level	Amount Below
FY 2008	\$850,000,000	\$820,000,000	-\$30,000,000
FY 2009	\$950,000,000	\$837,500,000	-\$112,500,000
FY 2010	\$1,050,000,000	\$887,000,000	-\$163,000,000
FY 2011	\$1,150,000,000	\$725,000,000	-\$425,000,000
FY 2012	\$1,300,000,000	To Be Determined	To Be Determined

² Prior to FY 2008, the UASI program did not have an independent authorizing statute from which appropriations were based.

5.0 The Grant Process and “Funding Backlog”


The UASI grant funds are being used in a timely and rational manner. There is no backlog or stalled funding. There is a growing misconception in certain quarters that the UASI grants are “unspent” or simply sitting idle in the Federal Treasury. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The UASI program is a reimbursement program. UASI grants are awarded annually and Urban Areas have three years to spend the money. When funding is awarded, the process is often complex, with the award going from DHS to the State in which the Urban Area resides and then to the Urban Area, etc. However, an award is not a check deposited by the State or Urban Area in the bank. More often it’s simply a promise that funding is available and can be accessed once the Urban Area first spends its own money on the plans, equipment, training and exercises needed for homeland security. Once those purchases are approved and complete, the Urban Area can begin the process of seeking reimbursement. This overall process is outlined in more detail in Figure 12 below.

Even though Urban Areas are given three years by the federal government to seek reimbursement from FEMA, Urban Areas immediately obligate the funding “awarded” based upon their DHS approved regional security strategies. This means the funds are formally attached to projects through contracts and other mechanisms even if the money is not “spent,” similar to any long term contract. The funds actually attached in most cases are local funds floated by the fiscal agent in the Urban Area in anticipation of being reimbursed later by the UASI grant.

Given these federal rules it should be no surprise that one year’s funding cycle is still in the Treasury two years after it was awarded. Urban Areas should not and cannot pay millions of dollars for services or equipment not yet fully delivered, tested and installed. In fact, UASI dollars are spent faster than many other homeland security grant programs. When UASI funds are delayed it is often the result of federal policies, such as environmental and historic preservation regulations.

Figure 12



6.0 UASI Voices from Across America

“The UASI Program has made the difference in readiness for dozens of cities across the country, there is no question we are better prepared as a Nation because of this important program.”

- Bill Anderson, Twin Cities

“UASI has fostered regional planning and collaboration to an extent that simply did not happen before the program. Planning regionally means better use of limited taxpayer resources.”

- Julia Janka, Atlanta

“UASI is about giving First Responders – the police and firefighters and other emergency responders – the tools, equipment and training they need to meet the complex homeland security and public safety challenges we face in Twenty- First Century America.”

- Teresa Serata, San Francisco

“The Nation is facing an unprecedented year of disasters with tornados, floods and wildfires – the tools we have received from the UASI Program are allowing us to better respond at the local level because of the skills and equipment acquired through the program.”

- Captain Mike Corwin, Kansas City

“UASI is a relatively small part of the DHS and federal budget, but it has been critical to the ability of our metro areas to protect their populations, their economies and their infrastructure.”

- Rocky Vaz, Dallas

“In an era when budgets at all levels are being slashed, we need to remind ourselves that keeping people and property safe is the first responsibility of local, state and federal government. “

- Robert Williams, New Orleans

Appendix A

2010 UASI Funding List (Urban Areas in red were dropped in 2011)

Albany Area	Miami/Fort Lauderdale
Anaheim/Santa Ana Area	Milwaukee Area
Atlanta Area	Nashville Area
Austin Area	National Capital Region
Bakersfield Area	New Orleans Area
Baltimore Area	New York City Area
Baton Rouge Area	Norfolk Area
Bay Area	Oklahoma City Area
Boston Area	Omaha Area
Bridgeport Area	Orlando Area
Buffalo Area	Oxnard Area
Charlotte Area	Philadelphia Area
Chicago Area	Phoenix Area
Cincinnati Area	Pittsburgh Area
Cleveland Area	Portland Area
Columbus Area	Providence Area
Dallas/Fort Worth/Arlington	Richmond Area
Denver Area	Riverside Area
Detroit Area	Rochester Area
District of Columbia (NCR)	Sacramento Area
El Paso Area	Salt Lake City Area
Hartford Area	San Antonio Area
Honolulu Area	San Diego Area
Houston Area	San Juan Area
Indianapolis Area	Seattle Area
Jacksonville Area	St. Louis Area
Jersey City/Newark Area	Syracuse Area
Kansas City Area	Tampa Area
Las Vegas Area	Toledo Area
Los Angeles/Long Beach Area	Tucson Area
Louisville Area	Tulsa Area
Memphis Area	Twin Cities

Appendix B
National Planning Scenarios

Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device

Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax

Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza

Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Plague

Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent

Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent

Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion

Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake

Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane

Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices

Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device

Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination

Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)

Scenario 15: Cyber Attack

Appendix C Target Capabilities List

Common Capabilities

Planning
Communications
Community Preparedness and Participation
Risk Management
Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination

Prevent Mission Capabilities

Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning
Intelligence Analysis and Production
Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement
CBRNE Detection

Protect Mission Capabilities

Critical Infrastructure Protection
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
Laboratory Testing

Respond Mission Capabilities

On-Site Incident Management
Emergency Operations Center Management

Respond Capabilities Cont.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Volunteer Management and Donations
Responder Safety and Health
Emergency Public Safety and Security
Animal Disease Emergency Support
Environmental Health
Explosive Device Response Operations
Fire Incident Response Support
WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
Isolation and Quarantine
Search and Rescue (Land-Based)
Emergency Public Information and Warning
Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Medical Surge
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
Mass Prophylaxis
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services)
Fatality Management

Recover Mission Capabilities

Structural Damage Assessment
Restoration of Lifelines
Economic and Community Recovery

End Notes

ⁱ http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpps/news/domestic-terrorism-a-growing-threat-napolitano-warns-dpgonc-20110722-fc_14241928

ⁱⁱ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidelines* (2007), page 11.

ⁱⁱⁱ Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve*, GAO-05-652, July 2005, page 5.

^{iv} U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Emergency Communications Plan* (July 2008), page 7.

^v Statement for the Record of Greg Schaffer, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the United States Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (July 27, 2011), pages 6-7.

^{vi} Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, *Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009* (October 2010), page 6.

^{vii} City of New York, Office of Emergency Management (2011).

^{viii} Interview with the San Diego Office of Homeland Security (2011).

^{ix} Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Assessment Division (2011).

^x Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Assessment Division (2011).

^{xi} Office for Bombing Prevention, Maritime IED Preparedness, Mine Warfare Conference (May 11, 2011), slide 6.

^{xii} Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Assessment Division (2011).

^{xiii} U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series, *I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response, Minneapolis, Minnesota USFA-TR-166* (August 2007), pages 1, 3.

^{xiv} Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Nationwide Plan Review, Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress* (July 15, 2010), page 10.

^{xv} http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1296484657738.shtm

^{xvi} Statement of William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department, before the House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing on Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror (April 5, 2007).

^{xvii} U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Short Term Critical Operational Capabilities, Gap Mitigation Strategy, Progress Report* (April 2011).

^{xviii} Information Sharing Environment, Functional Standard, Suspicious Activity Reporting, Version 1.5, section 5i (May 2009).

^{xix} Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, *Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009* (October 2010), page 6.

^{xx} Bay Area UASI, *Preliminary Report on UASI Grant Effectiveness in the Bay Area* (June 2011), page 46.

^{xxi} http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/oem/supp_info/chicago_s_cameranetwork.html

^{xxii} *Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State By State*, A CDC Report on the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (February 2008), page 12.

^{xxiii} *Perspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11*, Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force (September 2010), page 46.