

Regional Emergency Coordination Plan

Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments

Task Force on Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness for
the National Capital Region



September 11, 2002



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Regional Emergency Coordination Plan

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
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Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) Executive Summary

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit association representing local governments in the District of Columbia, Suburban Maryland, and Northern Virginia. COG's members are the elected officials from 17 local governments in the National Capital Region, plus area delegation members from the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives.

This plan applies to the National Capital Region, which is defined as the District of Columbia, including the Supreme Court and the United States Capitol; Montgomery and Prince George's counties in Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William counties in Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area designated by the outer boundaries of the combined counties listed in United States Code [40 USC 71 (b)]. For the purposes of this plan, the term *region* is expanded to include Frederick County in Maryland and thus include all COG member jurisdictions.

COG provides a focus for action and develops sound regional responses to such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation.

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the Washington area, have highlighted the need for a regional coordination plan that has new policies, protocols, and procedures to improve coordination and communication in anticipation of potential future regional emergencies. Under the auspices of COG's Ad Hoc Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region, this Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) has been developed to facilitate coordination and communication for regional incidents or regional emergencies.

Purpose and Scope. The purpose of the RECP is to provide a structure through which the National Capital Region can collaborate on planning, communication, information sharing and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional emergency. The scope of the plan is deliberately broad, intended to include the activities and capabilities of all organizations, government, and business that might have a role in anticipating or responding to major threats or hazards in the region.

The plan is scalable, allowing for an appropriate level of coordination and information exchange to deal with a regional emergency.

Organization of the RECP. The RECP design is based on the functional structure of the Federal Response Plan. The first section is the Baseline Plan. The Baseline Plan covers the

purpose, scope, roles and relationships among member organizations as they relate to regional communication, coordination, and information sharing. The centerpiece of this planning effort has been the creation of the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), the Regional Incident Tracking System and Incident Impact Assessment System. The Plan also describes how the RICCS will facilitate this process.

To facilitate the sharing of information and coordination, 15 regional Emergency Support functional areas that may be needed during a regional emergency have been identified. These 15 Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs) will allow for the channeling of the large amount of information gathered in a regional emergency into discrete, definable areas with common terminology for jurisdictions to share information with others in the region. In addition to the Baseline Plan and 15 R-ESFs, the RECP also contains supporting annexes and appendices.

Content of the RECP. It is assumed that a regional incident or regional emergency could cause numerous fatalities and injuries, property loss, and disruption of normal life support systems. It may have a major impact on the regional economic, physical, and social infrastructures. A further assumption is that a large number of casualties, damage to buildings and basic infrastructure, and disruption of essential public services could overwhelm the capabilities of individual jurisdictions to meet the needs of the situation.

The RECP was developed as a tool to assist the local, state, federal, and private sector partners in coordinating their response to regional incidents and regional emergencies including a major regional incident or regional emergency. The RECP will not usurp or infringe on the authorities, plans, or procedures of any participating jurisdiction, agency, or organization. All necessary decisions affecting response, recovery, protective actions, public health and safety advisories, etc., will be made by responsible officials under their existing authorities, policies, plans, and procedures.

Establishing common terminology and structuring the plan for compatibility with accepted local, state, and federal emergency plans improve efficiency and effectiveness in regional communications and coordination. Emergency response decisions will be enhanced by the availability of timely and accurate information. The plan will focus on regional communication, to provide this timely and accurate information that facilitates regional coordination.

Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS). The RICCS provides a system for COG members, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the federal government, public agencies, the private sector and volunteer organizations, and schools and universities to collaborate in planning, communication, information sharing, and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

Based on the threat level, local, state, and federal agencies will implement appropriate protective measures. The RICCS is a tool that can be used to share information regionally about what protective measures have been taken. The RICCS is a virtual system with multiple capabilities that was designed to facilitate regional communication. Participating organizations will use multiple means of communication, including conference calling, secure websites, and wireless communication systems.

The RICCS is not intended to supersede, replace, or duplicate the existing communications and information sharing that routinely occurs among federal, state, and local emergency management organizations. Rather, it is intended to focus on information and coordination from the regional perspective.

Concurrent Implementation. The RECP will be implemented only at the call of its participants and can be applied before, during, or after a regional incident or regional emergency concurrently with other local, state, and federal plans. Operational authority will remain with the jurisdictions and appropriate operational authority will remain within state and Federal control.

Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESF). An R-ESF is a basic function shared by all jurisdictions. Individual R-ESFs identify organizations with resources and capabilities for a particular type of assistance or requirement frequently needed in a large-scale emergency or disaster. Each of the R-ESFs uses the same format to identify participant organizations, establish basic policies and planning assumptions that will guide activities, and explain how they will communicate and coordinate with each other and with other regional partners. A short synopsis of the content of each R-ESF to be used before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency follows:

R-ESF #1: Transportation—facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions and agencies concerning regional transportation issues and activities before, during, and after a regional incident or emergency.

R-ESF #2: Communications Infrastructure—ensures the coordination and communication of information concerning hardware and capacity for interoperability.

R-ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering—ensures an effective and timely response to regional public emergencies concerning regional water supply (including potable water and ice), wastewater (including wastewater treatment), and solid waste and debris management.

R-ESF #4: Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations—facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions

concerning regional firefighting and EMS, technical rescue, and hazardous materials operations issues and activities. Note: R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are structurally the same and are all contained in R-ESF #4.

R-ESF #5: Information and Planning—facilitates the collection, processing, and dissemination of information among regional jurisdictions and organizations. This function enhances substantive regional dialogue and communication by facilitating information sharing with all of the R-ESFs, and others as necessary, in an integrated and coordinated manner.

R-ESF #6: Mass Care—promotes and ensures a coordinated regional capability to provide mass care assistance to victims that have been impacted by a regional incident or regional emergency, including a weapons of mass destruction event.

R-ESF #7: Resource Support—facilitates communication and support among regional jurisdictions to assist in the effective and timely coordination of resources following an emergency.

R-ESF #8: Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services—facilitates communication, cooperation, and coordination among local and state jurisdictions and a vast array of hospitals, social workers, and private-practice physicians concerning regional health, mental health, and medical services issues and activities.

R-ESF #9: Technical Rescue—R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are structurally the same and are all contained in R-ESF #4.

R-ESF #10: Hazardous Materials—R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are structurally the same and are all contained in R-ESF #4.

R-ESF #11: Food—facilitates the procurement, storage, transportation, and distribution of food provisions and food stamps and also feeding assistance. R-ESF #11 works in conjunction with and in continuance of the mass-feeding activities performed under R-ESF #6: Mass Care.

R-ESF # 12: Energy—ensures an effective and timely response to public emergencies that affect the regional energy infrastructure (including the supply and delivery of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum fuels).

R-ESF #13: Law Enforcement—facilitates communication and information coordination among regional jurisdictions concerning law enforcement issues and activities.

R-ESF #14: Media Relations and Communications Outreach—provides accurate, authoritative, and timely regional information to news media representatives, thereby supporting other regional partners as they work to protect the health and safety of citizens.

R-ESF #15: Donations and Volunteer Management—facilitates the communications and coordination among regional jurisdictions and agencies regarding the need for and availability of donations and volunteer services.

Support Annexes. To augment the Baseline Plan, 11 Support Annexes will provide detailed information on specific topics. The Support Annexes include descriptive briefs on the following:

(1) **Animal Protection**—lists the governmental, private sector, and non-governmental agencies involved; the need and purpose for this function; the situations and conditions for this function; the planning assumptions, the coordination capability; and the responsibilities of the participant organizations.

(2) **Business Continuity**—identifies the impact of potential loss of services in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency; formulates and implements viable recovery strategies; develops recovery plan(s) to ensure continuity of organizational services; and administers a comprehensive training, testing, and maintenance program. This Support Annex will be developed at a later date.

(3) **Credentialing**—provides an overview of actions taken to date regarding credentialing protocols within the National Capital Region to ensure proper access to an incident or emergency site by authorized individuals.

(4) **Disease Surveillance**—discusses the governmental and private sector health organizations; purposes and policies; description of the situation, including regional emergency conditions and planning assumptions; concept of coordination; responsibilities of the participating and supporting agencies; the preparedness cycle; and an analysis of legal issues and recommended action. This Support Annex is currently in draft form.

(5) **Economic Recovery**—provides additional communication and coordination mechanisms that may be applied when the impact of an emergency requires a coordinated effort among member jurisdictions and other stakeholders for regional economic recovery. Work is ongoing on this Support Annex.

(6) **Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex**—addresses the transportation aspects of moving people out of affected areas of the region and moving required resources into affected areas in anticipation of, and following a regional incident or regional emergency that requires large-scale evacuation. Work is ongoing on this Support Annex.

(7) **National Pharmaceutical Stockpile**—lists the local governmental and private sector health organizations in the region; the purpose and scope of the stockpile; policies, regional situation, including emergency conditions and planning assumptions; concept of coordination; responsibilities of the participating and supporting agencies; and the preparedness cycle.

(8) **Solid Waste and Debris Management**—addresses detailed issues including staging areas; mutual aid agreements; review of available resources; review of contracts already in place; requirements of regulatory agencies; monitoring data; contamination implications (i.e., biomedical, radioactive, and identifying locations/facilities that can accept contaminated waste); and disposal infrastructure/waste stream capacity and who controls that capacity. This Support Annex will be developed at a later date.

(9) **Protective Actions**—identifies steps taken to preserve the health and safety of emergency responders and the public during a public emergency and provides a framework under which the COG jurisdictions can coordinate their decisions. This support annex will be developed at a later date.

(10) **Terrorism**—addresses the unique communication and coordination aspects of dealing with a terrorist act and the crisis and consequence management relationships involved.

(11) **Water Supply Emergency Plan**—describes the 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan and how it would effect communication and coordination regarding water supply in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency.

Appendices. In addition, there are six Appendices that provide detailed information on the following:

A: Definitions and Acronyms—a listing of the terms and organizations that are referenced in the RECP. Definitions are provided for unfamiliar terms and full organizational names as well as acronyms are listed.

B: Catalog of Agreements—a listing of mutual aid agreements developed among COG’s member jurisdictions. They include agreements related to public safety, fire/rescue, energy, transportation, weather, emergency alert system, water, and health.

C: Authorities—a listing of the various authorities that provide the legal basis for the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan. They are categorized as follows: Federal, Presidential Decision Directives, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, District of Columbia Codes Related to Emergency Planning and Operations, Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Laws, and Maryland Authorities.

D: References—includes citations and web site addresses, when available, for the various plans and organizations that are pertinent to the contents of the RECP.

E: Hazards Affecting the Region—a brief discussion of the type and nature of hazards and threats that have the greatest likelihood of affecting the region. A chart is also included.

F: Liability and Indemnification—includes key elements of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, as amended, and the Emergency Management Association Compact, which is an interstate mutual aid agreement that allows states to assist one another in responding to emergencies and disasters.

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Letter from Chair COG Board of Directors

September 2002

I am proud to present this Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) for the National Capital Region, prepared by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' (COG) Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.

The terrorist attacks on September 11 and the anthrax contaminations in the Washington area highlighted the need for regional coordination in the event of a future incident or emergency. This plan represents the collective efforts of local, state, regional and federal agencies and organizations, each of which has its own plan for managing emergency response. Yet, they all recognize the benefit of working in concert to improve our preparedness for the National Capital Region.

COG has a long history of creating partnerships to provide research, planning and leadership in the areas of transportation, health, environment, economic development, housing and public safety. That history makes COG the natural choice for mobilizing the array of government and private sector agencies and organizations in the region whose response activities would intersect in the event of an assault on or threat to the region's security. The RECP provides for an unprecedented level of communication and coordination among those entities by addressing gaps in policies, procedures and protocols.

The plan details the lines of authority in each functional area and outlines the relevant information that must be gathered for effective decision-making and for crafting public messages. It addresses many areas including evacuation plans, communications interoperability, notification systems, animal control, and safeguards for public utilities. The result will be improved regional coordination in all areas involved in emergency response: public safety and emergency management, transportation, health, water and energy infrastructures, and communications.

Building on the lessons learned on September 11, 2001, we are confident that this plan moves us a step closer to a more secure and more prepared region. It is my hope that we may never have to use the plan for anything more than a weather or traffic emergency. But if we must, we will be ready.

Sincerely,



Bruce R. Williams
Chair, Board of Directors
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

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Letter from Chair Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region

September 2002

The events of one fateful day in September exactly one year ago tested the National Capital Region's mettle like no other single event in history. Challenged as we were by the destruction of lives and property, and the economic and psychological effects, we emerged from the tragedy a stronger and more purposeful region and nation.

In the ensuing 12 months, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) and its federal, state and private sector partners have marshaled an unprecedented, collaborative regional program focused on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan that follows is the result of a process that has required us to look beyond our physical and mental boundaries toward common goals: protecting our citizenry and safeguarding the unique resources situated in this region. COG has served the region for 45 years as the venue for regional coordination and, thus far, it has performed no more important a task than ensuring that this area is better prepared for an attack or an emergency than we were on September 11, 2001.

I am extremely grateful to my colleagues on the Board of Directors who enthusiastically agreed to join me in leading COG's Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region. We have made enormous strides in ensuring the protection of our jurisdictions and our citizens, so much so that this regional effort has been viewed as a model of preparedness. Also, I want to thank members of the Task Force, representing every sector of our community, who spent countless hours working with us in developing this plan and whose participation was invaluable. I am also grateful to the COG staff for their professionalism and strong commitment to the success of this effort.

The plan now before you is an improved and strengthened emergency response tool. It builds upon existing procedures, policies and standards that have served the region well through anticipated and unforeseen emergencies and incorporates new strategies for enhanced communication and coordination. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan is a comprehensive, all hazards plan involving every level of government within the region and key private sector organizations.

It is an evolving document – a continuing work in progress – that must be tested, evaluated and, where needed, revised over time. Further, the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan is a

mechanism for maintaining relationships that have been strengthened this past year. I am confident the bonds that were built among the region's decision makers will sustain us through times of prosperity and challenge – both of which the future is certain to bring.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carol Schwartz". The signature is written in a cursive style and is set against a light yellow rectangular background.

Carol Schwartz
Chair, Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
for the National Capital Region

**List of Members, Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the
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FOREWORD

The Washington area quickly mobilized to improve emergency preparedness, coordination and response. In response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) Board of Directors created a "Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region." The Task Force was created in October 2001, and consists of representatives from the local, state, and federal governments, public sector agencies, and private and non-profit sector stakeholders. The Task Force and its subgroups have been meeting to establish and work on recommended actions, including the development of a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

The Task Force recommended approval of a framework for the RECP at the COG Board on April 10, 2002. The COG Board unanimously approved the framework by resolution for review by local governments and other stakeholders while the Task Force continued to develop the plan in cooperation with Federal agencies, state and local governments, and the business community. The Board also approved the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Development and Maintenance of a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) for the National Capital Region and for the utilization of the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS).

The RECP is consistent with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Federal Response Plan (FRP), and the District of Columbia's Disaster Response Plan (DRP). It addresses a broad spectrum of potential hazards from natural and human-induced hazards to terrorism. The National Capital Region is the first area in the country to prepare such a plan since the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The RECP identifies 15 areas of activity needed in the event of a regional emergency. The 15 areas divide vast amounts of information gathered in an emergency into discrete sections easily disseminated among regional jurisdictions. The functions are identified as Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs). This structure parallels that used in both the FRP and DRP, helping to ensure capability among local, state and federal efforts in the region.

On July 2, 2002, as part of its series of reports on homeland security, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report entitled "Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership will be Critical to Success" [GAO-02-900T] in which it gave special attention to the need to enhance the role and functions of regional organizations in emergency management. Two key paragraphs (with emphasis added) follow:

"Our fieldwork at federal agencies and at local governments suggests a shift is potentially underway in the definition of roles and responsibilities between federal, state and local

governments with far reaching consequences for homeland security and accountability to the public. The challenges posed by the new threats are prompting offices at all levels of government to rethink long-standing divisions of responsibilities for such areas as fire services, local infrastructure protection and airport security. **The proposals on the table recognize that the unique scale and complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector.**" (p.8)

"Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink roles and responsibilities to address the unique scale and scope of the contemporary threats from terrorism. Numerous local general-purpose governments and special districts co-exist within metropolitan regions and rural areas alike. **Many regions are starting to assess how to restructure relationships among contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale, promote resource sharing, and improve coordination of preparedness and response on a regional basis.**" (p. 9)

The RECP is on the forefront of such regional efforts, and therefore must remain a dynamic and flexible document that will change and mature with each update. In order for the plan to be effective, it must be challenged, tested and retested through real world operations and simulation exercises. It must reflect the knowledge gained from our experiences and lessons learned during disaster and emergency situations. I am confident that it will perform its function as a tool to improve communication and coordination among the 17 jurisdictions within COG and strengthen the region as a whole.



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Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

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The Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex was developed by The Louis Berger Group, Inc. with BMI, SG Associates, Travesky & Associates, and the Monterey Institute for Non-Proliferation Studies.

Acknowledgements

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments gratefully acknowledges the immeasurable contributions of dozens of public and private sector leaders who helped guide the preparation of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan. This work would not have been possible without their many hours of public service and abiding commitment to this project.

Michael C. Rogers
COG Executive Director

Local Government Elected and Appointed Officials

Gerry Connolly, Fairfax County; Robert Dorsey, City of Rockville; M.H. Jim Estepp, Prince George's County; Adrian Fenty, District of Columbia; Jay Fiset, Arlington County; Anthony Griffin, Fairfax County; Mary Hill, Prince William County; Margaret Kellems, District of Columbia; John Koskinen, District of Columbia; Charles Konigsberg, City of Alexandria; John Mason, City of Fairfax; Carol Schwartz, District of Columbia; David Snyder, City of Falls Church; Bruce Williams, City of Takoma Park.

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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Development and Maintenance of a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) for the National Capital Region and for Utilization of the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS)

September 11, 2002

WHEREAS, in response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the COG Board of Directors ("COG Board") convened a Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region ("Task Force"), consisting of representatives from the local, state, federal governments, public sector agencies, and private and non-profit sector stakeholders; and

WHEREAS, federal, state and local governments and other public and private sector stakeholders agree that the region must have a coordinated homeland defense and security program with the capacity to respond with dispatch to the full spectrum of regional emergencies, including natural disasters, human-induced hazards, and terrorism; and

WHEREAS, on April 10, 2002, the COG Board approved the Task Force's Regional Emergency Coordination Plan Framework as the interim Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, and committed to adopt the full Regional Emergency Coordination Plan by September 2002; and

WHEREAS, the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan must be a living and evolving document, that will be strengthened and enhanced over time as it is exercised and tested; and

NOW THEREFORE, the signatory parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) hereby agree to the following:

1. To use the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan agreed to by the COG Board of Directors on September 11, 2002, in the event of a regional emergency.
2. To appoint representative(s) to participate in the emergency support work groups of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan under the auspices of the COG Task Force on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for the National Capital Region (Task Force) or successor organization. The appointees to the Task Force work groups shall be senior individuals having policy or technical knowledge required for further plan development.

3. To cooperatively maintain, through the Task Force (or successor organization) and its work groups, a comprehensive Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, and update supporting annexes as required for implementing the Plan.
4. To incorporate the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) into agency/organization emergency response procedures to facilitate communication and coordination of the region's response to regional emergencies.
5. To cooperatively participate in exercises and drills to test and validate the Plan on a regular basis.
6. This MOU may be modified at any time with the written consent of authorized representatives of each signatory organization. Any signatory organization to this MOU may withdraw from it by providing COG a seven-day written notice of such action.
7. The MOU shall become effective immediately when it is executed by at least two participating jurisdictions each in Maryland and Virginia, and by the District of Columbia.

**SIGNATORIES TO THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
REGIONAL EMERGENCY COORDINATION PLAN
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**

Signatories to the RECP will be:

The Chief Elected Officials (CEOs) of the COG 17 member jurisdictions;

The COG Board of Directors;

The State Governors and/or State Emergency Management Directors;

Federal agencies;

Private sector organizations; and

Regional operating agencies.

Baseline Plan

I. Introduction

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit association representing local governments in the District of Columbia, Suburban Maryland, and Northern Virginia. COG's members are the elected officials from 17 local governments in the National Capital Region, plus area delegation members from the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives.

This Plan applies to the National Capital Region, which is defined as the District of Columbia, including the Supreme Court and the United States Capitol; Montgomery and Prince George's counties in Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William counties in Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area designated by the outer boundaries of the combined counties listed in United States Code [40 USC 71 (b)]. For the purposes of this Plan, the term *region* is expanded to include Frederick County in Maryland and thus include all COG member jurisdictions.

COG provides a focus for action and develops sound regional responses to such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation.

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the Washington area highlighted the need for a regional coordination plan that has new policies, protocols, and procedures to improve coordination and communication in anticipation of potential future regional emergencies. The Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) has been developed under the auspices of COG to facilitate coordination and communications for major emergencies and disasters affecting the region.

A. Purpose

The purpose of the RECP is to provide guidance for COG's members plus other state and federal governmental agencies, the private sector, volunteer organizations, and schools and universities to collaborate in planning, communication, information sharing, and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

Local Government Members of COG

- District of Columbia
- Alexandria, Virginia

- Arlington County, Virginia
- Bowie, Maryland
- College Park, Maryland
- Fairfax County, Virginia
- Fairfax, Virginia
- Falls Church, Virginia
- Frederick County, Maryland
- Gaithersburg, Maryland
- Greenbelt, Maryland
- Loudoun County, Virginia
- Montgomery County, Maryland
- Prince George's County, Maryland
- Prince William County, Virginia
- Rockville, Maryland
- Takoma Park, Maryland

B. Scope

1. This Plan applies to the National Capital Region, which is defined as the District of Columbia, including the Supreme Court and the United States Capitol; Montgomery and Prince George's counties in Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William counties in Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area designated by the outer boundaries of the combined counties listed in United States Code [40 USC 71 (b)]. For the purposes of this plan, the term *region* is expanded to include Frederick County in Maryland and thus include all COG member jurisdictions.
2. The scope of the plan is deliberately broad, intended to include the activities and capabilities of all organizations, government, and business that might have a role in anticipating or responding to major threats or hazards in the region.
3. A *regional incident* is any situation that occurs within or outside of the National Capital Region that has the **potential to disrupt** essential services or mobility, or jeopardize public health and safety on a regional basis.
4. A *regional emergency* is any situation that occurs within or outside of the National Capital Region that **has disrupted** essential services or mobility, or jeopardized public health and safety on a regional basis. This situation:
 - May occur without warning;
 - Has large-scale regional impacts;

- Has high regional consequences;
 - Has operations continuing over a protracted period of time; and
 - Necessitates all local, state, and federal emergency systems to be activated.
5. The RECP is always available for implementation.
 6. The plan is scalable, allowing for an appropriate level of coordination and information exchange to deal with a regional emergency.
 7. Three essential elements of the RECP are the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), the Regional Incident Tracking System, and the Incident Impact Assessment System.

The RICCS provides a system for COG's members and representatives of the Federal government, public agencies, private sector, volunteer organizations, schools and universities to collaborate regarding planning, communications, information sharing, and coordination before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

The Regional Incident Tracking System, which is currently under development, is a tool that RICCS will use. The plans are for a database management system that allows for the logging of incidents, summaries of data, and preparation of reports.

The Incident Impact Assessment System, which also is under development, is a geographically based database of information on infrastructure, structure, and populations that could be used by decisions makers to help assess the impacts of a regional incident or regional emergency.

C. Organization of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan

1. **Baseline Plan**—The Baseline Plan covers the purpose, scope, and roles and relationships among member organizations as they relate to regional communication, coordination, and information sharing. The plan describes how the RICCS will facilitate this process. Additionally, the Plan also describes the maintenance and revision processes as well as management matters. In addition to the Baseline Plan, the RECP contains 15 Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs), as well as 11 Support Annexes and six Appendices.

2. **Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs)**—In this plan a R-ESF is a basic function shared by all jurisdictions. Individual R-ESFs identify organizations with resources and capabilities for a particular type of assistance or requirement frequently needed in a regional incident or regional emergency. R-ESFs are a convenient way of grouping similar organizations and activities from participating jurisdictions. R-ESFs can include any organization with a supporting relationship to the specified function.

Each of the R-ESF annexes uses the same format to identify participating organizations, establish basic policies and planning assumptions that will guide activities, and explain how they will communicate and coordinate with each other and with other regional partners. The R-ESF structure of the RECP parallels the emergency support function (ESF) structure of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the District of Columbia District Response Plan (DRP).

3. **Support Annexes**—Each of these Annexes are basically “mini-plans” that are prepared and targeted to address very specific subject areas that may have unique considerations or span responsibilities of several organizations, such as dealing with the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Plan or terrorism planning.
4. **Appendices**—These provide general reference sources for information, background, or guidance when using the RECP.

II. Policies

- A. The RECP applies to the key stakeholders in the National Capital Region.
- B. The RECP does not supercede existing policies, authorities, plans, or procedures that member and stakeholder organizations currently have in place. Information on existing policies and procedures of member and stakeholder organizations can be found in the appropriate state and local emergency plans.
- C. Additional regional communications and coordination policies and procedures will be developed as necessary. At a later date, a RICCS protocol will be added as an appendix to this plan.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Conditions

A wide range of hazards and threats may occur in the region, including natural hazards, human-induced hazards, or terrorism incidents. They include the following.

1. Natural Hazards, such as:
 - Urban floods
 - Winter storms
 - Tornadoes
 - Thunderstorms
 - Hurricanes
 - Extreme heat or extreme cold
 - Virus or epidemic
 - Drought
 - Earthquakes
2. Human-induced Hazards, such as:
 - Special events
 - Hazardous materials
 - Workplace violence
 - Transportation accidents/incidents
3. Terrorism, such as:
 - Conventional weapons
 - Incendiary devices
 - Biological or chemical agents
 - Radiological agent
 - Nuclear agent
 - Cyber-terrorism
 - Weapons of mass destruction (one or more of the above)

The consequences of these emergencies have the potential to disrupt essential services or mobility or adversely affect public health and safety and regional infrastructure to varying degrees.

When assessing the need for regional notification or involvement, several factors must be taken into account:

- **Onset**—First, the detection of any regional incident is key to determining who must be notified and the amount of information available. Actual incidents can be fast-paced or slow to develop, and may be detected in several ways—by direct observation, chemical or biological detection, or

medical surveillance—and may be reported as they occur by authorities, private entities, the media, and/or the federal government.

- **Magnitude**—Once authorities are notified of a threatened, impending, or actual emergency, the magnitude of the event becomes the driving force behind decision making. The event may be limited to one functional area (e.g., major snowstorm that disrupts transportation) or extend to many (a weapons of mass destruction event impacting several functions). In addition, incidents may be of local concern, have regional impacts, and/or require a federal response.
- **Impact**—Another important consideration is the geographic area affected. The impacted zone may extend beyond the immediate disaster area to neighboring jurisdictions, and the incident may involve supporting jurisdictions, through mutual aid or other agreements. In such circumstances, inter-jurisdictional communication and coordination is key.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. RECP's Purpose/Intent/Coverage

- The RECP will not usurp or infringe on the authorities, plans, procedures, or prerogatives of any participating jurisdiction, agency, or organization.
- All necessary decisions affecting response, recovery, protective actions, public health and safety advisories, etc., will be made by responsible officials under their existing authorities, policies, plans, and procedures.
- A major regional emergency will cause numerous fatalities and injuries, property loss, and disruption of normal life support systems. It may have a major impact on the regional economic, physical, and social infrastructures.
- A large number of casualties, damage to buildings and basic infrastructure, and disruption of essential public services will overwhelm the capabilities of individual jurisdictions to meet the needs of the situation.
- Establishing common terminology and structuring the plan for compatibility with accepted local, state, and federal emergency plans improve efficiency and effectiveness in regional communications and coordination.

2. Relationship with Plans and Procedures of Signatories

- Emergency response decisions will be enhanced by the availability of timely and accurate information.
- The plan will focus on regional communication, to provide timely and accurate information that facilitates regional coordination.
- The signatories to the RECP will reference and incorporate relevant sections of the RECP in the plans and procedures of their primary organizations.

3. Relationships with External Organizations

- The Office of Homeland Security, Executive Office of the President, has developed a Homeland Security Advisory System to provide a comprehensive and effective way to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to federal, state, and local authorities and to the American people.
- The degree of state and federal involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event as well as a jurisdiction's need for external support.
- COG will create a Regional Emergency Preparedness Council, which will manage and maintain the RECP. This Emergency Preparedness Council will be composed of appointed representatives of COG member jurisdictions and organizations, and representatives of other stakeholder organizations.
- The COG Emergency Preparedness Council will be responsible for updating the plan and for incorporating all changes resulting from policy decisions of the signatories to the plan.
- The Council will convene quarterly in order to conduct its business related to the maintenance and management of the RECP. Among its duties will be to set objectives for exercises and to provide advice and guidance regarding training needed to support and enhance the RECP.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Most emergencies are handled by individual jurisdictions using standard operational plans and procedures. When the capabilities of a jurisdiction

are exceeded, the impacted locality may request additional help from regional partners to support emergency response efforts by means of mutual aid agreements. Inter-state assistance can also be engaged through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The federal government may be requested (by the state) to provide supplemental assistance when the consequences of a disaster exceed local and state government capability. If requested, the federal government can mobilize an array of resources to support state and local efforts. These resources are provided under the framework of the FRP. More specifically, federal response to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction, is outlined in the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN).

2. State and local operations plans employ a multi-jurisdictional coordination structure that uses the principles of the incident management/command system (IMS/ICS). The FRP also uses this structure. The IMS/ICS use common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, action planning, and pre-designated facilities.
3. Communication before, during, and after an incident facilitates effective relationships among member organizations and ensures that the exchange of accurate information occurs on a regular basis. The word **communication** is used here to mean the process by which information exchange takes place among members of the COG executive leadership, chief administrative officers (CAOs), state and federal agencies and other public-sector agencies, COG working groups, private-sector groups, schools, hospitals, and others as necessary to facilitate coordinated regional information sharing. The expectation is that there will be timely and accurate information to share with each other that will be used to make good decisions.

B. Organization

To facilitate the sharing of information, 15 functional activity areas that may be needed during a regional emergency have been identified. These 15 functions allow for channeling the tremendous amount of information gathered in a regional emergency into discrete, definable sections for jurisdictions to share information with the region. There are representatives from each COG member organization in the functions. These 15 R-ESFs are:

1. R-ESF #1—Transportation
2. R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure
3. R-ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering
4. R-ESF #4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and hazardous Materials Operations (includes R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10)

5. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning
6. R-ESF #6—Mass Care
7. R-ESF #7—Resource Support
8. R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services
9. R-ESF #9—Technical Rescue (included in R-ESF #4)
10. R-ESF #10—Hazardous Materials (included in R-ESF #4)
11. R-ESF #11—Food
12. R-ESF #12—Energy
13. R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement
14. R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach
15. R-ESF #15—Donations and Volunteer Management

A regional emergency may require the use of only one R-ESF or it may require the use of several or all of them. Each R-ESF is responsible for having the capacity to coordinate the aspects of any event that falls within its area of responsibility. Each R-ESF should be prepared at all times to provide information and recommendations to decision makers. There will be events that never require executive decision-making at the CAO's or elected officials' level, in which case, coordination can be handled within each R-ESF area. A regional emergency may also require the use of one or more Support Annexes and work by the Support Annexes workgroups.

C. Detection, Notification and Assessment

Key decision makers, subject-matter experts, and R-ESF members will be notified of an incident or emergency through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS).

If an incident takes place in a single jurisdiction, the responding entity will review the situation and address the event. The local Emergency Communication Center (ECC) will assess the event and, following its standard operating procedures, request regional notification about the event through RICCS, if the situation is judged to be of regional concern by the responding jurisdiction.

When an incident assumes the characteristics of a regional emergency (as defined on page 2), then R-ESF #5—Information and Planning will pertain and be used to collect and share information with affected parties. R-ESF #5 participants will receive all RICCS messages.

Depending on the significance and pace of the event, the local ECC or the local emergency management director/CAO will determine the need to notify R-ESFs and/or the CAOs. Incident assessment information will be provided to R-ESF #5 through RICCS from the local responder and potentially through R-ESFs.

Notification can also occur at the request of authorized parties (e.g., any CAO/designees or other members of functional area R-ESFs including state and federal authorities).

Homeland Security Advisory System - Created by the Office of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Advisory System is the national model for a comprehensive communications structure to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to all levels of government and the American people. This advisory system characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions. The protective measures that correspond to each threat condition will help the government and citizens decide what action they take to help counter and respond to terrorist activity.

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)	
Threat Condition	Protective Measures
<p>Low Condition Green</p> <p>Low risk of terrorist attacks</p>	<p>Refining and exercising preplanned protective measures Ensuring personnel receive training on HSAS, departmental, or agency-specific protective measures; and Regularly assessing facilities for vulnerabilities and taking measures to reduce them.</p>
<p>Guarded Condition Blue</p> <p>General risk of terrorist attacks</p>	<p>In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following may be applied: Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations; Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and Providing the public with necessary information.</p>
<p>Elevated Condition Yellow</p> <p>Significant risk of terrorist attacks</p>	<p>In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following may be applied: Increasing surveillance of critical locations; Coordinating emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions; Assessing further refinement of protective measures within the context of the current threat information; and Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.</p>

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)	
Threat Condition	Protective Measures
<p>High Condition Orange</p> <p>High risk of terrorist attacks</p>	<p>In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following may be applied:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinating necessary security efforts with armed forces or law enforcement agencies; Taking additional precaution at public events; Preparing to work at an alternate site or with a dispersed workforce; and Restricting access to essential personnel only.
<p>Severe Condition Red</p> <p>Severe risk of terrorist attacks</p>	<p>In addition to the previously outlined protective measures, the following may be applied:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning specially trained teams; Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; Closing public and government facilities; and Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs.

Based on the threat level, local, state, and federal agencies will implement appropriate protective measures. The RICCS will be used to share information regionally about what protective measures have been taken.

D. Coordination

The RICCS is a virtual system with multiple capabilities that was designed to facilitate regional communication. RICCS will facilitate coordination and communication of events that occur in the National Capital Region. Participating organizations will use multiple means of communication, including conference calling, secure websites, and wireless communication systems. (See details in R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure and R-ESF #5—Information and Planning and in the RICCS protocols.) Technology will be leveraged to the maximum extent possible by all jurisdictions to achieve optimum efficiency and effectiveness of the communications as well as the information-sharing features of the system. Whether CAOs and other leaders make decisions collaboratively or independently, RICCS serves as a vehicle for communicating regional information, helping decision makers respond in a coordinated, consistent manner with a common message. A Regional Incident Tracking System will be used to help manage the potential volumes of information and an Incident

Impact Assessment System will be used to quickly provide decision makers information with which to assess the impact of the incident.


If an incident affects multiple jurisdictions or the entire region, RICCS will be utilized to rapidly convene the appropriate R-ESFs, and potentially the CAOs, to discuss the regional implications of the incident and actions to be taken. The regional incident tracking system will be used to manage information flow. If a regional emergency is highly probable, information will be solicited from the affected jurisdiction and input will be sought from the appropriate R-ESFs. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning, which serves as the information broker, will gather and share key information with regional partners to facilitate decision making.

1. **Initial Actions**

Once incident detection has occurred, the R-ESF #5 function and the RICCS system provide the platform for interaction among R-ESFs. Figure 1 shows the Incident Information Exchange and provides an overview of the interaction among the R-ESFs.

- **Notification**—Key decision makers, subject-matter experts, and R-ESF members are notified via the RICCS when a regional incident or regional emergency takes place.
- **Conference-calling Capability**—RICCS conference-calling capability brings together R-ESFs members and decision makers as necessary for a given situation to discuss the event. The capability is available on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week.

Figure 1. Incident Information



- A conference call of R-ESFs and/or CAOs will be convened based on the request of any or all of the following:
- The local responding emergency communication center;
- The affected jurisdiction's CAO or designee;
- The CAO of any other jurisdiction within the region;
- Affected, or potentially affected, R-ESF members (i.e., local, state, federal, public, and private); or
- Executive Director of COG or designee(s).

The key initial actions of notification and conferencing usually originate at an existing 24/7 emergency communication center. Staff assigned to perform the RICCS functions are responsible for maintaining and managing the notification and conferencing systems. The District of Columbia's Emergency Management Agency (DCEMA's) Emergency Communications Center (ECC) is the primary host for RICCS and is responsible for RICCS notification and teleconferencing. The ECC will also maintain the Regional Incident Tracking System on an interim basis. COG will maintain the Regional Incident Tracking System and provide licenses for its use to the RICCS centers. COG will facilitate the establishment of additional RICCS sites in Maryland and Virginia.

As part of each R-ESF, Essential Elements of Information (EIs) are described. The EIs will vary for each R-ESF, although some basic information may be common to all. The EIs are what are reported to R-ESF #5 and will help in developing an initial impact assessment.

2. Continuing Actions

The RICCS will facilitate implementation of specified supporting functions as required during regional incidents and emergencies by R-ESF participants and COG staff. Pre-designated staff and back-ups will be trained and able to carry out these functions on an on-call basis.

- **Incident tracking and status reporting**—R-ESF #5—Information and Planning will maintain a regional incident tracking and situation status reporting system which will be available on a secure website available to authorized parties. Pre-designated staff will be assigned the job of continuously updating the information database.
- **Assessment**—R-ESF #5—Information and Planning will facilitate assessment of regional emergencies by bringing together “experts” from responding organizations/jurisdictions and R-ESFs. The assessment information will be available to authorized parties via conference calls, e-mail, or the secure website.

- **Coordination of decision-making**—Should a regional incident or emergency occur, RICCS facilitates the coordination of decisional outcomes such as early release of employees, evacuation, school openings or closings, health issues, etc.
- **Creation of common messages**—To ensure implementation of the “common message, many voices” objective, R-ESF #14 assists decision-makers by crafting a common message that is made available to the chief elected officials and other authoritative spokespersons.

3. **Stand Down**

As the regional effort in responding to an emergency diminishes, coordination across jurisdictions will return to normal levels. Depending on the needs of the situation, R-ESFs will scale back use of RICCS to share functional information.

4. **After-action Critique**

COG will facilitate the evaluation of any regional emergency coordination efforts. Using information captured in R-ESF #5 and a variety of facilitation tools, appropriate organizations will be brought together to determine lessons learned and areas for improvement. These lessons learned will be used to improve the RECP and the technology and protocols supporting RICCS.

E. Concurrent Implementation With Other Emergency Plans

The RECP will be implemented at the same time one or more local operations plans are implemented. Operational authority will remain with the jurisdictions. The RECP will also be implemented at the same time state and federal operations plans are implemented, with appropriate operational authority remaining within state and federal control.

The RICCS is not intended to supercede, replace, or duplicate the existing communications and information sharing that routinely occurs among federal, state, and local emergency management organizations. Rather, it intends to focus on information and coordination from the regional perspective.

F. Emergency Coordinating Facilities

Emergency operations centers of member jurisdictions may be activated and in operation during a regional event. The locations may facilitate information sharing on a regional basis through the RICCS.


V. Organizations Active in Regional Emergency Support Functions

The following groups will carry out activities associated with the 15 R-ESFs. (See specific R-ESFs for details on each group's roles and responsibilities.)

- Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
- Cities, counties, and states with membership in COG
- Federal agencies
- Public-sector organizations (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, water and wastewater utilities, etc.)
- Greater Washington Board of Trade
- Schools and universities
- Private-sector organizations
- Community associations
- Special-interest associations
- Voluntary organizations

VI. Preparedness Cycle

- A.** The RECP will be reviewed and updated via a preparedness cycle that includes the phases outlined in each individual R-ESF-Planning, Training, Exercises, Evaluation, and Corrective Action (see figure on next page). This interactive process will allow frequent refinements and ongoing training that will contribute to enhanced capability.
- B.** COG is the sponsor of the RECP and the RICCS. In this capacity, COG is responsible for coordinating overall planning, including review and revision of the RECP Baseline Plan, R-ESF annexes, support annexes, and supporting procedures. All agencies in the region (including federal, state, local, and private sector) will contribute to the development of supporting material to the RECP, including regional support annexes and appendices, as well as supplements describing specific policies and procedures for public emergency operations.
- C.** COG will create a Regional Emergency Planning Council (REPC) to coordinate interagency and intergovernmental issues related to emergency planning, training, exercises, and evaluation. Federal, state, local, and private sector organizations will designate representatives to serve on the REPC and participate in the regional preparedness activities.





Regional Emergency Support Function #1 Transportation

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments/National Capital Region
Transportation Planning Board

Federal Government Transportation Organizations

U.S. Department of Transportation

Transportation Operating Agencies

District of Columbia

District Department of Transportation

State of Maryland

Maryland Department of Transportation

State Highway Administration

Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA)—see entry under “Airports”
below

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)—see entry under “Maryland
Transit Services” below

Maryland Port Administration

Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA)

Motor Vehicle Administration

Maryland Local Jurisdictions

Maryland Transit Services

Maryland Transit Administration—administered by MDOT

Maryland Area Rail Commuter—administered by MDOT/MTA

Maryland Local Bus Transit Providers

Frederick County—TransIT Services of Frederick County

City of Laurel—Connect-a-Ride

Montgomery County—Ride On

Prince George’s County—The BUS

Commonwealth of Virginia

Virginia Department of Transportation

Virginia Local Jurisdictions

Virginia Transit Services

Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation

Virginia Railway Express

Northern Virginia Transportation Commission
Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission and
OMNIRIDE
Virginia Local Transit Providers
Arlington County—ART – Arlington Transit
City of Alexandria—DASH
City of Fairfax—CUE Bus System

Fairfax County
Fairfax Connector
RIBS (Reston Internal Bus Service)
Loudoun County—Loudoun County Commuter Bus

Regional Transit Operator

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

National Park Service

U.S. Park Police
National Capital Directors Office

Airports

Baltimore Washington International (BWI) Airport—administered by MDOT/MAA
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

Private Sector and Other Transportation Organizations

Amtrak
Commuter Connections
Commuter Transit Bus Companies
CSX Transportation Inc.
Norfolk Southern
Private and Commercial Bus Services
Trucking & Hauling Associations

Other Organizations**Federal**

Office of Personnel Management
Department of Health and Human Services
Military District of Washington
Department of Defense
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration

State

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Public Safety

R-ESF #4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations and
R-ESF #13— Law Enforcement public safety organizations will coordinate
and interact with R-ESF #1 on an as needed basis.

Private

Greater Washington Board of Trade (GWBOT)

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #1—Transportation facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions and agencies concerning regional transportation issues and activities before, during and after a regional incident or a regional emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF #1 focuses on disruptions of the regional transportation system requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing. Transportation disruptions can occur as a result of direct impacts upon the transportation infrastructure (e.g., disasters) or from surges in requirements placed upon the transportation system by emergencies in other functional areas, or by a “shelter in place” decision, which would require that all persons take shelter indoors.

An emergency evacuation support plan has been developed as an annex to the RECP. The plan addresses the transportation aspects of moving people out of the regional area and moving required resources into the area. In addition, other evacuation plans have been developed by individual regional jurisdictions.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #1 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Board of Directors, supported by the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board (TPB), will facilitate coordination among member organizations to insure that the R-ESF #1 procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C. COG/TPB and member jurisdictions will work to ensure that individual agency standard operating procedures and R-ESF #1 procedures coincide and are consistent.
- D. Agencies responsible for the transportation infrastructure will coordinate to the greatest extent possible with those federal agencies that may have transportation contingency plans and national security plans, such as the U.S.

Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

- E. During a regional incident or a regional emergency, local jurisdictions and transit agencies will use their internal processes to disseminate information provided by the state departments of transportation and WMATA to coordinate and formulate their respective response to transportation emergencies. (For example, MDOT, VDOT, WMATA, the Federal Highway Administration DC Division of USDOT, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration DC Division of USDOT, and COG signed a memorandum of understanding with DDOT for the development and coordination of a transportation emergency preparedness plan and communication system, which obligates the signatories to perform certain duties relating to handling transportation emergencies. These duties include integrating emergency operating centers, developing a data-sharing network, and updating mass evacuation plans.)
- F. In each situation, one Level A agency (see IV.B.) will be designated to consolidate information provided by the involved agencies and to provide this information through the RICCS, to the media and real-time public information resources. For example, WMATA has a website that provides important transportation status information to the traveling public on a real-time basis. Level B agencies will also be consulted as necessary, and apprised on public information advisories.
- G. Essential elements of information will be reported by a designated agency to R-ESF #5—Information and Planning through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the regional emergency.
- H. An R-ESF #1 liaison to R-ESF #5 will be provided as necessary.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A wide range of incidents and emergencies may occur that may adversely impact the transportation infrastructure throughout the region. Such events could be the result of natural disasters, catastrophic system failures, technological events, traffic accidents, or other human causes.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. During such events, the region may experience localized or widespread disruptions to the regional transportation system or infrastructure. Access

to areas of the region will improve as routes are cleared and repaired and as detours or workarounds are provided.

2. Surges in requirements will be placed upon the transportation system by emergencies in other functional areas.
4. Infrastructure damage and communications or power disruptions will inhibit efficient coordination of transportation support during the immediate response and post-disaster period.
5. Transportation disruptions will impact the movement of relief supplies throughout the region. Gradual clearing of access routes and improved communications will permit an increased flow of emergency relief, although localized distribution patterns might remain unusable for a significant period.

IV. Concept of Coordination


A. General

Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #1 may be convened at the request of participating agencies or other participants in the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan such as Chief Administrative Officers or the Duty Officer at the RICCS center. The supporting regional agencies that comprise R-ESF #1 will coordinate and execute their respective transportation authorities and program responsibilities during the regional emergency. The R-ESF #1 function will establish a capacity to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional transportation-related issues with the RICCS. Participants in R-ESF #1 shall designate an R-ESF #5 liaison to participate in communications with R-ESF #5. In an emergency situation, requests for information about emergency regional transportation issues from R-ESF #5 will be referred for response to the designated R-ESF #5 liaison.

B. Organization

In addition to the overall RECP protocols addressed in R-ESF #5 and the RICCS, the following process will be used to exchange information within R-ESF #1. This organization will be used to coordinate in a fashion similar to those overall contacts in transportation-only events where no other contacts will be made, or to cover transportation-specific gaps in the overall contacts. A two-level chain of communication will be used to coordinate transportation operation decisions by those agencies with operational decision making responsibilities in the event of an emergency involving communications among Level A agencies and Level B agencies.

Interim Incident Communications Process for the National Capital Area



Participants

1. Level A will include representatives from the following agencies:

USDOT will perform national level administrative and funding roles in regional emergency preparedness.

MDOT will manage transportation infrastructure in Maryland during an emergency.

VDOT will manage transportation infrastructure in Virginia during an emergency.

DDOT will manage transportation infrastructure in the District of Columbia during an emergency.

The U.S. Park Police and the National Capital Region Director’s Office of the NPS will manage the NPS’s transportation infrastructure during an emergency.

WMATA will manage the Metrorail, Metrobus, and other transit services during an emergency.

OPM, GSA, and FEMA have developed a Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol and will coordinate and communicate the early release of federal employees with regional partners as necessary.

GWBOT will coordinate communication with and between private-sector organizations on an as needed basis, particularly regarding the early release of private employees.

MDW will communicate changes in transportation facilities because of military action as necessary.

Public safety organizations will coordinate with the region especially in terms of road use for rescue vehicles, closures due to rescue operations, and any other disruptions in transportation facilities due to public safety activity.

Other involved agencies will be contacted as needed for information sharing purposes.

2. Level B agencies will include the local jurisdictions of the metropolitan area, local transit agencies, MARC rail service, Virginia Railway Express, AMTRAK, freight railroads, and perhaps private tour and inter-city bus operators.
3. Any agency in Level A can initiate a conference call among Level A agencies. The initiator most likely would be the agency or jurisdiction most directly impacted by the incident or emergency.
4. Secondary communications will occur between Level A and Level B agencies in their sector: MDOT with local Maryland agencies/jurisdictions, VDOT with local Virginia agencies/jurisdictions, and WMATA with local and other transit providers.
5. In each situation, one of the Level A agencies will be designated as the central point of communication with the media and other real-time public information resources. This process will be coordinated and reconciled with protocols developed in R-ESF#14 and with the RICCS PIO concept.
6. All Level A agencies will have a representative designated 24 hours a day, seven days a week to be available for such collaboration. Each agency's 24-hour, seven-day operations centers will be the primary point of contact.

C. Notification

RICCS protocols can be followed to notify appropriate R-ESF#1 partners of a regional incident or a regional emergency requiring transportation support. R-ESF#1 supporting agencies can participate in conference calls with the affected jurisdictions and with federal agencies if necessary. If R-ESF#1 Partners become aware of a regional incident or a regional emergency from any source, involving transportation infrastructure they can utilize the RICCS. In addition to the RICCS protocols, R-ESF #1 can also use the following methods to share information during a regional incident or a regional emergency.

1. Unilateral Messaging

In addition to the RICCS, members of the R-ESF #1 communicate with each other on a regular basis. They communicate on matters that may have specific interest to individual members or collective interest to a group of members as appropriate and necessary. The emphasis is on sharing information with each other regularly in order to keep all members informed. These exchanges of information may have transportation ramifications or may be general advisories on such matters as weather, heat, and drought issues. Normally, text messages, e-mail messages, telephone calls, and voice messages are the standard methods of communication currently being utilized for unilateral messaging.

2. Conference Calling

When a representative of one of the Level A agencies wants to initiate a conference call in response to an incident or emergency, the initiator agency will first notify the other agencies through the RICCS, of the need to convene a conference call. This notification can occur by telephone, cellular phone, digital radio, cellular telephone, pager, e-mail, or other means if necessary through the RICCS. The notified agencies will be asked to join a conference call on a pre-arranged, permanently established Call To number at a specified time shortly after the notification through the RICCS.

Each agency center will be responsible for maintaining a contact list for its personnel and for calling those people who may need to participate in a conference call initiated by a Level A agency.

The conference call in most emergencies will include the participation of one or more key public safety agencies.

Level A transportation operating agencies may also invite the participation of one or more other involved agencies that may be key to a given situation. A partial list of these potential other involved agencies includes the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA), Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI), a number of federal or military agencies such as OPM, the Secret Service, MDW, FEMA, or other entities to be identified.

Any Level B entity may also be invited to participate in the Level A conference call if necessary in the situation.

A Level B agency may request of its associated Level A agency that a conference call be initiated. In such cases, the Level B agency or jurisdiction that is experiencing a primary impact of the incident or emergency would be a participant in the conference call with the Level A agencies.

3. Communications Technology

In addition to protocols established by R-ESF #2, the following communications tools will be used by R-ESF #1. The goal is to establish a process whereby critical conference calls between R-ESF #1 member organizations can take place either through landline or cellular networks even if the telephone system is experiencing overloads.

Conventional landline telephones will be the primary communications technology for the system. A permanent dial-in conference telephone number will be established. When one of the agencies wants to initiate a conference call, using the RICCS, that agency will notify the other Level A agencies, as well as any other agency to be included, via landline telephone (or by other means if necessary). Representatives of those agencies will then call into the conference line by landline or cellular telephone.

If available, priority telephone codes from landline and cellular telephone providers will be used.

If landlines are not available, digital radio cellular telephones will be used as primary backups.

E-mail will be used as a secondary backup method of communications.

Fax will be used as a tertiary backup method of communications.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

The impacted agency should rely on its internal processes to respond initially, and as it may determine, through the RICCS, to convene a conference call with other affected agencies, and to maintain a lead role for coordination and communication.

2. Continuing Actions

Regional support and impact on Level B agencies will depend on the severity and duration of the regional emergency.

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, a notification will be made through the RICCS and a stand-down debriefing conference call will take place.

4. After Action Critique

Within two weeks of stand down of the regional emergency, information for an after action critique will be gathered by COG/TPB and the critique will be discussed at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #1 Participating and Supporting Agencies and Entities

The following agencies and entities will participate in a response to a regional incident or a regional emergency, or will participate in preparedness planning for regional incidents or regional emergencies. Participating agencies or entities will contribute Essential Elements of Information (EIs) to the RICCS based on the regional emergency:

1. COG and Government Transportation Agencies

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG)—COG is the regional organization of Washington, D.C., area local governments. COG's members are the elected officials from 17 local governments in the National Capital Region, plus area delegation members from the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives. COG provides a focus for action and develops sound regional responses to such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation.

Transportation Planning Board (TPB)—The TPB is the federally designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for transportation for the region, composed of representatives of local governments, the District of Columbia, the departments of transportation of the states of Maryland and Virginia and the District of Columbia, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority plus area members of the Maryland

and Virginia legislatures. The TPB provides the regional forum for transportation planning, and transportation emergency preparedness coordination in support of the COG Board of Directors and the RECP.

United States Department of Transportation (USDOT)— USDOT is the oversight and administrative organization for the Federal Highway Administration (including units such as the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and Motor Carrier Safety Divisions), the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other federal transportation agencies. The USDOT may play national-level administrative and funding roles in emergency preparedness.

District of Columbia Department of Transportation (DDOT)— DDOT manages and maintains the majority of the roads, streets, bridges, traffic signals, and related transportation infrastructure within the District of Columbia. DDOT is responsible for the management and response to regional emergencies regarding streets and roadways in the District of Columbia.

Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT)—MDOT is the administrative and oversight organization for five Maryland state-level transportation agencies: the Maryland State Highway Administration, the Mass Transit Administration, the Maryland Aviation Administration, the Maryland Port Administration, and the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration. MDOT provides funding and coordinates emergency preparedness and response for its member agencies.

State Highway Administration (SHA)—SHA is responsible for a large number of the major highways and associated bridges, traffic signals, signage, and other infrastructure in the State of Maryland, including Frederick, Montgomery, and Prince George's counties and local jurisdictions in the Washington metropolitan area. (Note that some roadways within those counties are under county or local jurisdictional responsibility.) SHA operates the Coordinated Highways Action Response Team (CHART) and its traffic operations centers (TOCs) statewide, including its main hub the Statewide Operations Center (SOC) located in Hanover, Maryland, near BWI Airport. The CHART SOC and TOC staffs provide primary support for transportation emergency preparedness and response in Maryland.

Maryland Local Jurisdictions—The City of Bowie, the City of College Park, Montgomery County, the City of Gaithersburg, the City of Greenbelt, the City of Takoma Park, Prince George's County, the City of Rockville, and Frederick County are local government members of the TPB in Maryland. These local jurisdictions own and maintain a variety of local roadways and streets, and in some cases provide local transit

services. There are a number of small local jurisdictions within Frederick, Montgomery, and Prince George's counties that are not TPB members, but with which the counties may need to coordinate in emergencies.

Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT)—VDOT is responsible for building, maintaining, and operating state roads, bridges, and tunnels. VDOT owns and operates most major and local streets and roadways in the counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William in the Washington metropolitan area, as well as major highways in Arlington County and the cities and towns in Northern Virginia (See separate entry for Virginia local jurisdictions). VDOT operates the Smart Traffic Center (STC) and Smart Traffic Signal System (STSS) operations centers (located in Arlington, Virginia) that manage major roadways in Northern Virginia, as well as the traffic signal systems of the counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William.

Virginia Local Jurisdictions—The City of Alexandria, Arlington County, the City of Fairfax, Fairfax County, the City of Falls Church, Loudoun County, the City of Manassas, and Prince William County are local government members of the TPB in Virginia. These local jurisdictions own and maintain a variety of local roadways and streets, and in some cases provide local transit services. There are a number of small local jurisdictions within the Northern Virginia region that are not TPB members, but with which major R-ESF #1 participating agencies may need to coordinate in emergencies.

National Park Service/United States Park Police (NPS/USPP)—The United States Park Police is a unit of the Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Capital Region, with jurisdiction in all National Park Service areas and certain other federal/state lands. NPS owns and polices some major roadways in the Washington metropolitan area, including the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, the Clara Barton Parkway, Memorial Bridge, Rock Creek Parkway, the Suitland Parkway, and the George Washington Memorial Parkway, as well as major portions of Constitution Avenue, Independence Avenue, and other roadways in and around the National Mall in Washington.

2. Transit Services

Nationwide

- **Amtrak**—Amtrak trains provide service in more than 500 communities in 45 states throughout a 22,000-mile route system. In the Washington region it runs frequent service from Union Station in Washington, D.C., to New York via Baltimore and

Philadelphia. Amtrak owns and maintains the tracks on this northeast corridor, but uses freight rail tracks on all other routes. Amtrak runs less frequent service from Union Station towards Pittsburgh and Richmond. Union Station is the hub of the Amtrak system in the Washington region. Other Amtrak stations within the Washington metropolitan region include Alexandria, Woodbridge, and Quantico to the south, and New Carrollton and Rockville to the north, as well as points beyond the Washington metropolitan area.

Regionwide

- **Washington Metro Area Transit Authority (WMATA)**—WMATA operates the Metrorail transit system (subway) and much of bus network in the Washington metropolitan area. Metrorail includes five rail lines and 83 stations, including links to Union Station and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

Maryland—Statewide

- **Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)**—MTA provides a network of transit and rail and freight services to customers throughout Maryland. MTA operates (or contracts to private providers who operate) commuter bus services that connect Washington-area employment areas to Baltimore, southern Maryland, and other areas outside metropolitan Washington. MTA also administers the MARC train service (see separate entry).

Maryland—Rail

- **MARC**—MARC Train Service is a commuter rail service that extends from Washington, D.C., northeast to Cecil County along the Northeast Corridor railroad owned by Amtrak (designated as the Penn Line), north to Baltimore on the CSX railroad (designated as the Camden Line), and northwest to Frederick County and West Virginia on another branch of the CSX railroad (designated as the Brunswick Line).

Maryland—Bus

The following agencies provide regular, scheduled bus transit services within their local jurisdictions, and may in some cases connect to nearby jurisdictions or transit systems:

- Frederick County—TransIT Services of Frederick County

- City of Laurel—Connect-a-Ride
- Montgomery County—Ride On
- Prince George’s County—The BUS

Virginia—Statewide

- **Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (VDRPT)**—VDRPT undertakes funding and administrative activities regarding transit throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Virginia—Rail

- **Virginia Railway Express (VRE)**—VRE is a transportation partnership of the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission (NVTC) and the Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (PRTC). VRE provides commuter rail service from the Northern Virginia suburbs to Alexandria, Crystal City, and downtown Washington, D.C., including Union Station and L'Enfant Plaza Station in Washington. Origin jurisdictions include Stafford County, Prince William County, and Fairfax County and the cities of Fredericksburg, Manassas, and Manassas Park.

Virginia—Bus

The following agencies provide regular, scheduled bus transit service to their local jurisdictions, and may in some cases connect to nearby jurisdictions or transit systems, or provide longer distance commuter services:

- Arlington County—ART—Arlington Transit
- City of Alexandria—DASH
- City of Fairfax—CUE Bus System
- Fairfax County
 - Fairfax Connector
 - RIBS—Reston Internal Bus Service
- Loudoun County—Loudoun County Commuter Bus
- Prince William County, City of Manassas and City of Manassas Park—PRTC OmniRide and OmniLink (see separate entry for Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission)

Northern Virginia Transportation Commission—The Northern Virginia Transportation Commission works as a planning and coordinating body for transportation in Northern Virginia and, with PRTC, owns the Virginia Railway Express.

Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (PRTC)—PRTC provides an express bus service (OmniRide) between eastern Prince William County and the Manassas area and Washington, DC, the Pentagon, Crystal City, Franconia/Springfield Metro, and West Falls Church Metro. PRTC also provides ride-matching services (OmniRide) for these areas as well (this service is part of the regional Commuter Connections program). Local bus service (OmniLink) is provided within eastern Prince William County and the Manassas area, too. PRTC co-owns the Virginia Railway Express with the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission (NVTC).

Commuter Transit Bus Companies—Commuter transit bus companies are either owned by public agencies or private contractors and generally service long-distance commutes with limited, express services. Contacts of these commuter transit bus companies will be made through the public agency or private contractor.

Public, Private and Commercial Bus Services—

- Greyhound Bus service provides an extensive nationwide bus route network for passenger travel and provides services for business and group travel. Greyhound bus routes extend from a number of terminals in the Washington area to many areas of the northeast and across the country.
- Other private transportation bus services such as airport/hotel limousines, charter bus services, and taxi companies serve the Washington metropolitan area, and may be contacted on an individual basis in relevant situations if needed.
- School bus services are owned by public agencies as well as private contractors. Contacts in dealing with these buses will be done through the public agency or private contractor on an as-needed basis.

Commuter Connections—The Commuter Connections network at COG provides regional support and coordination to users and providers of alternative modes of transportation, notably carpooling, vanpooling, bicycling, transit, and telework (telecommuting). In

emergencies, as needed, Commuter Connections will exchange information as necessary with its affiliated local government and transportation management agency representatives to coordinate action and recommendations for the users and providers of alternative commute modes. Commuter Connections will also coordinate information in emergencies with transit providers on an as needed basis, supplementary to information coordinated by the transit providers themselves.

CSX Transportation, Inc.—CSX Transportation, Inc. operates 42,700 miles of track and serves every major population and industrial care center east of the Mississippi. CSX is based in Richmond, Virginia. CSX runs freight service from Baltimore through Washington to Northern Virginia and points south and west. Amtrak and Virginia Railway Express passenger services utilize portions of the CSX system.

Norfolk Southern—Norfolk Southern is a Virginia-based holding company with headquarters in Norfolk. It controls a major freight railroad, Northern Southern Railway Company, which runs a freight service from Baltimore through Washington to Northern Virginia and points south and west. Virginia Railway Express passenger services utilize portions of the Norfolk Southern system.

Trucking & Hauling Companies—Trucking and hauling companies may play an important role in an emergency situation and will be treated as the general public and contacted as needed.

3. Airports

Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI)—BWI, located outside the geographic boundaries of the Washington metropolitan area near Linthicum, Maryland, serves many residents of the Washington metropolitan area for their air transportation needs. BWI is administered by the Maryland Department of Transportation/Maryland Aviation Administration.

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA)—MWAA owns and operates Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in Arlington and Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) near Sterling, Virginia.

4. Private Sector

Greater Washington Board of Trade (GWBOT)—The Greater Washington Board of Trade is the region’s private sector representative whose role is to involve the business community in the emergency planning process by sharing information and providing input on behalf of the region’s private sector employers.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #1—Transportation, the participating agencies are responsible for providing the following essential elements of information to R-ESF #5 through the RICCS concerning incidents involving regional transportation functions, including:

- Location of the transportation incident;
- Expected duration of the incident;
- Jurisdictions involved;
- Description of significant disruptions in the transportation system in any jurisdiction that has the potential for regional impacts;
- Status of resources, personnel, equipment, and facilities impacted by the incident/threat of incident;
- Actual/potential (social, economic, political) impacts on the function and/or jurisdiction;
- Other R-ESFs potentially impacted;
- Overall resource shortfalls, response needs, and priorities;
- Relevant historical and demographic information;
- Short, medium, and long-term response and recovery plans; and
- Recommendations for emergency ingress/egress for responders.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been

trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans and the cycle repeats. COG is responsible for maintaining the Preparedness Cycle.

A. Planning

1. In support of the COG Board of Directors, COG/TPB is responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #1, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #1. All participating transportation agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #1.
2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the transportation sector and identification of unfunded regional transportation emergency response and coordination needs.

B. Training

There will be ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and R-ESF #1 responsibilities as directed by COG.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of transportation simulations/exercises are conducted regularly both within the realm of R-ESF #1 as well as in a multifunctional environment combining R-ESFs of the RECP. The exercise series is composed of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to assure continuous improvement in the transportation function and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #2 Communications Infrastructure

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Northern Virginia Transportation Council
Capital Wireless Integrated Network (CapWIN)

Local Government Communications Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State Government Communications Organizations

District of Columbia, Office of the Chief Technology Officer
State of Maryland, Department of Budget and Management Wireless Office
Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Information Technology

Federal Government Communications Organizations

National Communications System
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration

Private-sector Communications Organizations

Hardwire Telephone Service Providers
Dedicated Line Circuit Providers

Cellular Service Providers
Internet Service Providers
Systems Integration Companies
Emergency Broadcast Network

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #2—Communications Infrastructure ensures the coordination and communication of information concerning hardware and capacity for interoperability. This function supports regional response efforts before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

R-ESF #2 will facilitate coordination and communication regarding technical communications requirements across the emergency continuum, including the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), among R-ESF members, between R-ESF members, and with other key players in regional coordination and communication.

B. Scope

R-ESF #2 facilitates the coordination and communication of information concerning regional actions to be taken to provide the required technical communications support to regional emergency coordination elements. This R-ESF will coordinate the establishment of required temporary communications and the restoration of permanent communications so that RECP communications can take place. R-ESF #2 covers hardware and technical communications procedures between jurisdictions, agencies, regional emergency support functions, the RICCS and within R-ESFs. However, communications within local jurisdictions are the responsibility of that jurisdiction. R-ESF #2 does not include the development of a message, but only the transport and delivery of the message. The primary point of coordination for R-ESF #2 is the Communications Infrastructure Work Group.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #2 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the R-ESF #2 procedures are maintained and are in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C. Essential elements of information (EIs) regarding communication infrastructure will be reported to the RICCS as required by the regional incident or regional emergency.

- D. R-ESF #2 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as required.
- E. Communication tools currently in use or being developed throughout the region include but are not limited to the Washington Area Warning Alert System (WAWAS), Capital Wireless Integrated Network (Cap WIN), Project Agile, Cell on Wheels/Cell on Light Truck (COWS/COLT), and secondary hardwire and cellular services support capabilities. (See *Attachment 2-1* for details on these tools.)
- F. The following list includes communication tools that could be used to facilitate regional communications before, during and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
 - 1. Hardwire “plain old telephone service” (POTS) is available for the normal user. Users will compete with the balance of the regional population and will likely experience severe competition for dial tone. COG, as well as RICCS, can also provide conference bridging.
 - 2. Voice/text messaging cellular service provided by wireless carriers. Users compete with other subscribers for dial tone.
 - 3. Two-way, combination cellular and digital two-way radio service provides private network cellular service and point-to-point two-way radio service.
 - 4. Two-way pager service is a pager service capability combined with a wireless e-mail solution.
 - 5. Switch Redirect (SR) relocates government telephone numbers and subscribed services to local government incident command centers and other emergency locations. SR telephone numbers must be predesignated, and “unused” phones must be available to use at the incident command centers or emergency locations.
 - 6. GETS (Government Emergency Telecommunications Service) land line services, provided by the NCS (National Communications System) using commercial circuits/lines. Provides high-priority, long-distance circuits to complete local calls. Also provides long-distance calling. Local and long-distance calls will compete on the national security emergency preparedness federal government long-distance network. Users compete with other high-priority National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) government users. Call completion depends on first obtaining local dial tone, which GETS does not provide.
 - 7. FTS (Federal Telecommunications System) 2001 land line services, provided by commercial vendors, through the General Services Administration. Provides high-priority, long-distance circuits to complete

local calls. Also provides long-distance calling and allows audio teleconferencing bridge services.

8. Essential Service Protection (ESP) is a service provided by commercial providers that allows for priority local dial tone. ESP can be set up for business, government, or residential phones of critical users.
9. Regional/jurisdictional government dedicated lines. Provides a discrete set of super users with non-competing local service throughout the government telephone network.
10. WAWAS and the National Warning System (NAWAS) provide dedicated line service to over 70 users. The Fire Mutual Aid Response System (FMARS), the Police Mutual Aid Response System (PMARS), and the Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System (HMARS) can also be used.
11. Satellite voice and data communications for either point-to-point communications or connection to networks to and from remote locations. This service can be for voice communications for meeting purposes or data connection for shared information traffic over commercial service providers.
12. High Frequency (HF) and/or Single-Side Band (SSB) radio communications for coordination of sites throughout the metropolitan area. This communication can be through equipment maintained within the jurisdictions, or through volunteer organizations that can coordinate communications for all member jurisdictions. Volunteer organizations, such as REACT and Civil Air Patrol, have extensive radio networks that can provide equipment as well as operators at all necessary locations.
13. The on-line regional tracking system* will provide real-time information concerning a regional incident or regional emergency such as planned evacuation routes, locations of emergency relief shelters, etc. This software will be implemented at COG and licensed to each emergency management facility within the COG jurisdictions, as well as to state emergency management agencies. (*Note: At this time, the e-Team software is being tested on a pilot basis for consideration as the regional tracking system.)
14. 1-800 numbers that allow users to access less compatible federal government long-distance circuits to complete local calls.

15. NSEP priority cellular service provides priority, non-encrypted service for emergency use over commercial cell networks.
16. HMARS, the Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System, is to maintain connectivity to health care facilities during times of emergencies.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency may result from a significant natural or man-made disaster, technological emergency, or any other regional event that causes extensive damage and/or results in a high volume of requests from all regional/local authorities for services required to save lives and alleviate human suffering. These authorities require accurate and timely information on which to base decisions and guide response actions. Examples of the types of events that could impact the member jurisdictions communications could include, but are not limited to:

- Electrical outage;
- Electromagnetic pulse radiological incidents;
- Cyber-terrorism;
- Infrastructure collapse;
- Snow/ice storms;
- Hurricanes;
- Flooding;
- Tornadoes;
- Earthquakes; and
- Urban fires.

During such catastrophic events, commercial communications facilities may sustain widespread damage. During these times, when the need for real-time electronically processed information is greatest, the capability to acquire it may be seriously restricted or nonexistent. In such situations, all surviving communications assets of the various government agencies, augmented by extra assets, will be needed immediately to ensure a proper response to the needs of victims of the event.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Initially, regional and local officials will focus on coordinating lifesaving activities concurrent with re-establishing control in the disaster area. Working with the communications industry, officials will restore and reconstruct communications facilities as the situation permits.

2. Initial damage reports may be fragmented and provide an incomplete picture concerning the extent of damage to communication facilities.
3. Conditions may restrict the ability of suppliers to deploy mobile or transportable communications equipment into the affected area.
4. The affected area's ability to communicate with the rest of the region may be impaired. Some key individuals may be isolated from their offices and/or operational centers.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. If COG or any other affected jurisdiction determines that an incident or emergency is of regional significance, they may implement R-ESF #2.
2. An R-ESF #2 representative from the affected jurisdiction will act as the R-ESF #2 lead.
3. The supporting regional agencies in charge of communications infrastructure will coordinate and execute their respective communication authorities and program responsibilities during the regional emergency.
4. R-ESF #2 will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate regional information concerning regional technical communications, hardware, and communications-related issues to the RICCS, the R-ESFs, and the COG work groups.
5. R-ESF #2 will establish the capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate regional information and regional recommendations concerning technical communications, hardware, and communications-related issues to the individual jurisdictions.
6. R-ESF #2 will coordinate the upkeep of call-down lists to foster regional communications in the course of a regional emergency and develop a list of chief technical officers who can provide communications advice and troubleshooting in the event of a regional emergency.
7. R-ESF #2 will develop an inventory of technical communications hardware and systems to facilitate communication in the course of a regional emergency.

B. Organization

Operations for a regional incident or regional emergency will normally begin when the RECP is used. R-ESF #2 will selectively activate specific support activities based on the nature and scope of the event, the types of service disruption (e.g., voice, data, e-mail, Internet), and other regional resources required to support coordination and communication efforts.

C. Notification

If COG or any other R-ESF #2 communications infrastructure organization, agency, or jurisdiction determines that an event is of regional significance, they may contact the RICCS concerning the regional incident or regional emergency and ask that the CAOs, Communications Work Group, and/or the Communications Infrastructure Work Group be notified of the incident. There will be RICCS centers in Maryland, Virginia, and the District within the respective emergency operations centers. Regional notification can originate from any one of these centers depending upon the location of the emergency incident. Aside from regional incident notification, these RICCS centers will also be responsible for organizing coordination conference calls and facilitating regional decision-making.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

Prior to a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #2, through the Communications Infrastructure Work Group, will develop and make accessible call-down lists and technical communications hardware resources to the RICCS and the jurisdictions. In addition, R-ESF #2 will make recommendations to the RICCS and to the jurisdictions as to what types of communication technical systems and hardware should be in place to ensure effective and redundant communications throughout the region in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency.

R-ESF #2, through the Communications Infrastructure Work Group, will work to ensure interoperability among communication systems used in the region. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, it is necessary that the local entities be able to talk with state entities and states with local entities. As a regional incident or regional emergency occurs, first responders will be state and/or local public safety officials. These officials, within their jurisdictions, should have the capability to notify state emergency managers who can then utilize the RICCS.

If necessary, upon receipt of information concerning a possible regional incident or regional emergency, the RICCS will contact the Communications Infrastructure Work Group (or the RICCS Protocol once developed) for information and guidance on the situation and ongoing response planning.

2. Continuing Actions

As needed, the Communications Infrastructure Work Group can be convened or a conference call can be held to find additional solutions to technical or hardware-related communications problems or to assist with other communications-related issues.

R-ESF #2, using the RICCS through R-ESF #5, will continue to provide updated information concerning the event(s) on a regular basis with information coordinated through the initiating organization or jurisdiction.

R-ESF #2 will provide an online Regional Incident Tracking System during all phases of the regional incident or regional emergency, from response to recovery and mitigation. This system, like RICCS, will aid in providing continuing updated information concerning the event(s) on a regular basis. This software will be implemented by COG as well as licensed to COG jurisdictions. (Note: As a pilot program, COG has entered into a contract with E-Team, Inc., to provide a regional incident tracking system. The pilot program is being tested at the Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia emergency communication centers, in counties in Maryland and Virginia, and by key federal agencies.)

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional incident or regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, a notification will be made through the RICCS and a stand-down debriefing conference call will take place. It will be the responsibility of the initiating jurisdiction or organization, with coordination of all impacted jurisdictions, to make this determination and contact the RICCS.

4. After-action Critique

Within two weeks of the stand down from the regional incident or regional emergency, the chairperson of the Communications Infrastructure Work Group will gather information for an after-action critique. Once the chairperson gathers the initial information, it will be summarized into a report format and provided to all involved jurisdiction work group members for review and comment to create a final document. The final document will be provided to the full working group before the next

meeting to allow for prior review and a more informed and detailed discussion at the scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #2 Participating and Support Agencies

Jurisdiction emergency support function leads and emergency communications center coordinators participating in a regional response will, to the best of their ability, contribute information to RICCS as required by the incident and RECP policy.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning, is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. The R-ESF #5 Annex to the RECP contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #2—Communications, the agencies are responsible for providing the following EEs concerning regional public emergencies involving regional communications functions:

- Major communications equipment needed;
- Location of alternate EOCs;
- Status of key contractor support;
- Status of regional incident tracking software;
- List of working phone numbers/lines/systems;
- Status of communication systems;
- Status of operating facilities;
- Status of key personnel;
- Resource shortfalls;
- Overall priorities for response;
- Status of R-ESF activation;
- Historical and demographic information;
- Status and analysis of initial assessments (needs assessments and damage assessments, including preliminary damage assessments);
- Status of efforts under federal emergency operations plans; and
- Logistical problems.

3. It will be the responsibility of the initiating organization or jurisdiction to provide regular updates for the RICCS to distribute. These updates should

take into account information gathered from all jurisdictions and organizations impacted by the event.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performances of the respective organizations are evaluated as a means of refining the plans and the cycle repeats.

D. Planning

The Communications Infrastructure Work Group and COG are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #2, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #2. All participating communications agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #2.

Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the communications sector and identification of unfunded regional urban communications emergency response and coordination needs.

E. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and R-ESF #2 responsibilities will be developed by the Communications Infrastructure Work Group. Training courses will involve familiarization with RICCS and other communications systems and will be available to all COG jurisdictions. This training will be both concept and practical in nature, so that not only will the ideas behind these systems be taught but also the actual operation of the individual components that make up these systems will be addressed. The RICCS training sessions are recommended for anyone who can or might possibly utilize or update the system from the jurisdictions, as well as the centers that support the RICCS system in the three jurisdictional locations. These courses could include but are not limited to, the:

1. RICCS protocol;
2. RICCS standard operating procedures;
3. RICCS equipment and operating system awareness training; and
4. Regional Emergency Coordination Plan awareness training.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of communication simulations/exercises are conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercises should provide emergency simulations that promote preparedness; improve the coordination capability of individuals and organizations; validate plans, policies, procedures, and systems; and determine the effectiveness of the system. Specifically these exercises will consist of scenarios involving incidents relevant to communications infrastructure, such as events in which communication systems are disabled. Examples of emergency exercises include:

1. Tabletop exercises, which are designed to elicit constructive discussion as participants examine and resolve problems based on existing plans.
2. Drills, which are designed to provide training with new equipment, to develop new policies and procedures, or to practice and maintain current skills.
3. Functional exercises, which are used to validate the capability of a system and focuses on policies, procedures, roles and responsibilities during and after any emergency.
4. Full-scale exercises, which are designed to evaluate the operational capability of a system when some or all the jurisdictions are involved and participating. This type of exercise would be carried out during a concurrently scheduled regional exercise, to get the best results and not impact upon the jurisdictions normal operations.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the communications function and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

Attachment 2-1—Regional Communication and Coordination Technologies

Capital Wireless Integrated Network (CapWIN)—A project managed by the University of Maryland, Engineering Center for Advanced Transportation Technology, demonstrating interoperability related to data sharing among public safety agencies in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia.

Project Agile (Interoperability Strategies for Public Safety)—Suite of communications and data interoperability projects funded by the National Institute of Justice, specifically the Alexandria Police Department ACU-1000 project.

National Warning System (NAWAS)—A dedicated telephone circuit connecting federal, state, and county emergency operations centers (EOCs) and emergency communications centers (ECCs).

Washington Area Warning System (WAWAS)—Local region version of NAWAS including telephones at most federal agencies, local 911 centers, and EOCs.

Cell on Wheels (COW)—Mobile, self-contained cell site to add extra capacity to a cellular carrier's system in a given area.

Cell on Light Truck (COLT)—Self-contained cell site mounted on a small truck.

COG Channels, COGMARS Channels, Washington RINS Channels—Three different names for the same set of six additional 821 Mhz NPAPAC frequencies set aside by Region 20 for interoperability among COG agencies.

E-Team—An online incident management tracking system software with the capability to provide real-time incident information, and updates during a regional emergency. This system is currently being pilot tested.

Police Mutual Aid Radio System (PMARS)—A primary regional communications system that is a dedicated 800 Mhz radio channel, that provides a voice circuit among area government/agency police departments.

Fire Mutual Aid Radio System (FMARS)—Dedicated VHF radio channel that provides a voice circuit among COG jurisdictions' fire departments.

Hospital and Mutual Aid Radio System (HMARS)—A system designed to maintain connectivity to healthcare facilities during times of emergencies. The network includes all acute care hospitals and some others (but at this time not psychiatric hospitals) in DC as well as Fairfax Hospital, The Navy Medical Center in Bethesda, and some DC government agencies.

Lo-Band, VHF, UHF, UHF-T Band, 800 Mhz, 821 Mhz NPSPAC—Frequency ranges assigned to different federal, state, and local government public safety agencies.

800 Mhz Trunked Radio System—Type of radio system operated by a number of COG jurisdictions that allows many users to share a limited number of radio channels yet operate as if they have a dedicated channel for their own use.

National Public Safety Advisory Committee (NPSAC)—FCC-sponsored group of volunteers that assisted with the assignment process for a separate band of public safety frequencies authorized after the Air Florida disaster.

Region 20 (MD, VA, DC)—One regional volunteer committee of 55 regional committees established by the FCC to assist in the orderly assignment of public safety channels from the 821 Mhz NPSAC frequency pool.

I-CALL, I-TAC1, I-TAC2, I-TAC3, I-TAC4—821 Mhz NPSPAC channels set aside nationally and internationally to permit mutual aid operations on common channels by all agencies that have 800 Mhz portable and mobiles.

ACU-1000—Manufacturer's trade name for an audio patching device that is used to connect separate radios, telephones, and/or cell phones together to permit seamless voice communications between users of different radios.


Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN)—Joint Department of Justice and Department of Treasury program that promotes federal and local government communications interoperability and sponsors innovative pilot projects.

Instant Messenger—Software that once downloaded on to a computer, PDA, or cell phone allows the user to communicate with other users through instantaneous text messaging.

Web hosting—A host website developed by the COG Communications Infrastructure Work Group with an internet service provider, and in an emergency, is willing to be called upon to help shift and direct traffic so that websites can handle extra user load.

Service Keyword—An internet service provider is willing to add a keyword or post a specific area on their internet service under the Government guide section that will connect users to regional emergency information.

Satellite-based Technology—Communications systems that are not prone to the same outages as terrestrially based systems.



Regional Emergency Support Function #3 Public Works and Engineering

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
Northern Virginia Regional Commission

Local Jurisdictions' Public Works

Alexandria
Department of Transportation and Environmental Services, Division of
Solid Waste

Arlington County
Department of Public Works
Department of Environmental Services, Solid Waste Division

Bowie
Department of Public Works

Brunswick

College Park
Department of Public Works

District of Columbia
Department of Public Works
Office of Property Management
Solid Waste Management Administration

Fairfax
Department of Utilities
Department of Public Works

Fairfax County
Department of Public Works and Environmental Services, Division of
Solid Waste Disposal and Resource Recovery

Falls Church
Department of Public Utilities
Department of Environmental Services

Frederick

Frederick County
Division of Utilities and Solid Waste Management, Department of Solid
Waste Management/Recycling
Department of Public Works

Gaithersburg

Greenbelt
Department of Public Works

Leesburg
Loudoun County
 Office of Solid Waste Management
Montgomery County
 Department of Public Works and Transportation, Division of Solid
 Waste Services
Mt. Airy
Poolesville
Prince George's County
 Department of Environmental Resources, Waste Management Division
Prince William County
 Department of Public Works, Solid Waste Division
 City of Manassas Department of Utilities
Purcellville
Rockville
 Department of Public Works
Round Hill
Thurmont
Takoma Park
Walkersville

State Government Organizations

District of Columbia Department of Health
Maryland Department of the Environment
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
Virginia Department of Health

Federal Government Organizations

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Geological Survey
General Services Administration

Independent Water/Sewer Agencies/Authorities

Alexandria Sanitation Authority
District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority
Fairfax County Water Authority
Loudoun County Sanitation Authority
Prince William Service Authority
Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority
Virginia-American Water Company

Washington Aqueduct Division (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

Private-sector Solid Waste and Debris Removal Organizations

AAA/Republic

BFI

COVANTA Energy

CSX

Waste Management, Inc.

Other local waste hauling, processing, and disposal organizations

Private construction and demolition debris organizations

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #3—Public Works and Engineering facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions to ensure an effective and timely response to regional incidents and regional emergencies concerning regional water supply (including potable water and ice), wastewater (including wastewater treatment), and solid waste and debris management before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF #3 is intended to focus on the communication and coordination related to the following situations:

1. Potential or actual disruptions of water supply, wastewater management, and service of solid waste and debris management systems that have regional impacts requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing;
2. Coordination of emergency restoration of critical public facilities, including the temporary and permanent restoration of water supplies, wastewater treatment systems, and waste management facilities;
3. Coordination of emergency contracting to support public health and safety, such as providing for potable water, ice, power, and/or temporary housing; and
4. Coordination of monitoring, tracking and modeling of water, wastewater, and solid waste stream events that may affect water supply and waste systems.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #3 will not usurp or override the authority, policies or inter-jurisdictional agreements of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the R-ESF #3 procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

- C. Jurisdictions agree to respect the existing contractual arrangements between jurisdictions and their contractors so that there will not be competition for resources that are already under contract to a jurisdiction.
- D. Essential elements of information (EIs) will be coordinated through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the regional incident or regional emergency.
- E. R-ESF #3 will provide liaisons to R-ESF #5 as needed.
- F. The Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement will be implemented as required during extreme low flow regional incidents or regional emergencies.
- G. COG's 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan for the metropolitan Washington region will be implemented in the case of water supply or wastewater regional incidents or regional emergencies in all or part of the metropolitan Washington area. This emergency plan incorporates the 2002 Metropolitan Washington Water Supply and Drought Awareness Response Plan.
- H. The Water Supply Coordination Agreement to coordinate the region's reservoirs in cases of drought and other regional incidents and regional emergencies will be implemented as needed.
- I. Wastewater management conditions that do not fall under a regional plan will be handled by existing sewer service agreements.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency, or threat of disruption in service, may adversely impact water supply and water distribution systems, wastewater collection and treatment plants, and solid waste and debris management infrastructure throughout the region. Regional incidents or regional emergencies severely impacting all or most of the region, as well as smaller regional incidents or regional emergencies, would both warrant appropriate attention.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. General Planning Assumptions

Primary agencies and support agencies under R-ESF #3 will perform tasks under their own authority, as applicable, in addition to coordinating their activities with other R-ESFs.

Assessment of the regional incident or regional emergency area is required to determine critical needs and to estimate potential workload or requirements for federal assistance. Early damage assessments will be general and incomplete and may be inaccurate.

Basic needs such as water, wastewater, refrigeration, and emergency electrical power may not be available with the loss of public services. R-ESF #3 would be responsible for facilitating communication and coordination of emergency temporary restoration of these services.

The water supply, wastewater management, and local solid waste and debris management activities may be hampered by damaged facilities, equipment, and infrastructure, as well as disrupted communications, transportation, and infrastructure.

Disruptions in water supply, wastewater management, and local solid waste and debris management may hamper other response activities.

Access to the regional incident or regional emergency area may be dependent upon the reestablishment of ground and water routes. In many locations, debris clearance for access and emergency road repairs will be given top priority to support immediate lifesaving emergency response activities.

Operational information will be coordinated between the impacted jurisdiction and the federal government through established channels. Mission taskings will be made in the same manner. The RECP does not provide for operational interface between federal agency programs and individual jurisdictions. These relationships are described in the Federal Response Plan.

Resources including equipment, materials, and skilled personnel are available within the region or can be obtained from outside the Washington metropolitan area.

Environmental reviews may be necessary; and there must be compliance with environmental rules and regulations, administered by federal, state, and local agencies. State and local authorities and private organizations are responsible for obtaining required waivers and clearances. The Solid Waste Managers Group will help to coordinate and facilitate this process wherever possible. The Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management Annex will address this issue further.

2. Water and Wastewater Planning Assumptions

There may be increasing and conflicting demands for water for firefighting, potable water, and sanitation that exceed available resources.

Due to a need for severe water use restrictions, the public may need to be informed on ways to conserve water. These restrictions will require vigilant enforcement to ensure compliance.

Local governments may need to coordinate hygienic measures due to impaired wastewater systems.

Emergency water supply points may need to be established and supported for the distribution of potable water.

Lack of water may be so severe and sustained that temporary relocation of some communities may be required.

The water supply or wastewater treatment infrastructure may be temporarily or permanently inoperable, causing raw sewage to run into receiving waters, including the Potomac River.

A lack of water entering the water and/or wastewater treatment plants may significantly impair or shut down these plants.

3. Solid Waste and Debris Management Planning Assumptions

Debris management includes the emergency clearance of debris for access in and out of the region and longer-term removal, processing, permits and waivers, handling, reduction, sorting, transporting, disposal, and all other associated activities.

Debris needs to be cleared to enable reconnaissance of the damaged areas and passage of emergency personnel and equipment for saving lives and protecting property. Public works employees may be exposed to an unsafe and unhealthy environment in the early response phase.

Because there is potential for a shortage of transfer facilities, long-haul trash trucks, disposal and incineration facilities, and adequate bypass contracts to address high volumes of waste, the Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management Annex will address alternative facilities.

There are regulations and prohibitions that may inhibit acceptance of certain types of debris; therefore the Regional Solid Waste and Debris

Management Annex will address alternative facilities for disposal of waste.

The Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management Annex will address alternative methods and sources for mission accomplishment should existing regional capacities be exceeded or disrupted including transportation structures.

In a regional incident or regional emergency where waste/debris results, it may not immediately be known whether the waste is hazardous. This determination is a local responsibility; however, assistance may be requested from appropriate state or federal agencies.

Traditional methods of processing and sorting waste/debris may be modified due to the magnitude or degree of the waste/debris.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Both regional incidents or regional emergencies involving water supply, wastewater, and/or solid waste and debris removal will be cause for convening R-ESF #3.
2. The convening of R-ESF #3 entails making the first notification call to needed members of the Water Utility, Wastewater Utility, and/or Solid Waste Managers' Group(s).
3. The R-ESF #3 function will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional water supply, wastewater management, and solid waste and debris management related issues with R-ESF #5 and the RICCS.
4. The supporting regional agencies that comprise R-ESF #3 will coordinate and execute their respective water supply, wastewater management, and solid waste and debris management existing jurisdictional authorities and program responsibilities during the regional incident or regional emergency.
5. R-ESF #3 will need to develop short-mid-and long-term strategies for water supply, wastewater management, and solid waste and debris management, to include information about economic impacts, pricing, and regional priorities. These strategies are or will be developed in the Water Supply and Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management annexes, respectively.

6. The R-ESF #3 representative within the RICCS will handle all information requests regarding emergency regional water supply, wastewater management, and solid waste and debris management issues.
7. To facilitate coordination among R-ESFs, the RICCS will monitor the activities of R-ESFs involved in the regional incident or regional emergency and will report all gathered information back to the R-ESFs involved.
8. R-ESF #3 will provide damage information to R-ESF #5—Information and Planning for overall damage assessment, the damage situation reporting, and R-ESF activities.

B. Organization

Coordination of regional water, wastewater, and solid waste and debris management issues in a regional incident or regional emergency will be initiated by the appropriate following coordinating agencies:

1. Water/Wastewater Utility Group; or
2. Solid Waste Managers' Group, which is composed of the public and private agencies in the current Waste and Debris Management Working Group.

The R-ESF #3 lead will be the member of the appropriate group and affected jurisdiction, and will facilitate any conference calls and report key essential elements of information.

C. Notification

Upon the request of any participating R-ESF #3 organization, agency, or jurisdiction, the RICCS will:

1. Notify R-ESF #3 appropriate regional supporting agencies;
2. Identify support agencies who may need to supply subject-matter expertise to the RICCS;
3. Establish communication with appropriate state agencies; and
4. Establish communication with appropriate federal agencies.

If any participating R-ESF #3 organization, agency, or jurisdiction is made aware of a regional incident or regional emergency, communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and R-ESF #2.

D. Coordination

1. General

There will be coordination with other regional emergency support functions:

R-ESF #1—Transportation

- Fuel suppliers
- Transportation facilities—U.S. Department of Transportation
- Transportation contractors

R-ESF #4, #9, and #10—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operation

- Coordination of water supplies for firefighting
- Coordination of extrication of victims with debris removal operations
- Coordination of spills involving hazardous materials

R-ESF #5—Information Planning

- Coordination and communication with RICCS

R-ESF #7—Resource Support

- Coordination of needed resources

R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services

- Federal, state, and local health organizations' involved with first responder safety and health, and with potable water supply quality.

R-ESF #12—Energy

- Coordination of energy supplies

R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement

- Perimeter control
- Coordination of debris removal and urban search and rescue with evidence collection

R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach

- Coordination of the common message

2. Water and Wastewater Groups

Initial Actions

- Upon detection of a water supply or wastewater incident, COG or any participating R-ESF #3 water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction will first make an internal assessment of the situation. The affected jurisdiction(s) will serve as the lead for the Waste/Wastewater Group. If that organization, COG, or any other R-ESF #3 water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction determines that the event is of regional significance, they may contact the RICCS concerning the regional incident or regional emergency and ask that the CAOs, Water/Wastewater Utility Group be notified of the regional incident or regional emergency. R-ESF #5 will receive every RICCS message.
- Based on the nature and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, COG or any participating R-ESF #3 water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a conference call to be convened through the RICCS to discuss the regional incident or regional emergency.
- The conference call would be used to determine the type and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, ongoing actions, responses and public messages, identify the next steps, and discuss any other key regional issues.

Continuing Actions

- Additional conference calls may be scheduled by conference call participants or may be requested by COG or any participating R-ESF #3 water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction as required by the ongoing regional incident or regional emergency.
- There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, communication, and response for each incident with information facilitated through the RICCS.
- Subject-matter experts from any participating R-ESF #3 water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis of the regional impact of the regional emergency to the CAOs, Water/Wastewater Utility Group through the RICCS to facilitate the regional response.

Stand Down

- The CAO or Water/Wastewater Utility Group will determine when the regional incident or regional emergency will be terminated. With their consensus as appropriate, a formal declaration of termination will be issued through local government, state government, utility, or COG public information officers (PIOs).

After-action Critique

- Once the regional incident or regional emergency has been terminated, the Water Utility Cluster or Wastewater Utility Cluster will prepare an Incident Assessment Summary Report on the lessons learned and will present this at a regularly scheduled meeting.

3. Solid Waste Group

The Solid Waste Managers' Group will evolve into a standing regional solid waste committee to support R-ESF #3. The Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management Annex is being developed, which will address detailed issues, including:

Staging areas;
Mutual aid agreements;
Review of available resources;
Review of contracts already in place;
Requirements of regulatory agencies;
Monitoring data;
Contamination implications (i.e. biomedical, radioactive) and identifying locations/facilities that can accept contaminated waste; and
Disposal infrastructure/waste stream capacity and who controls that capacity.

When an incident occurs that may have regional solid waste and debris management implications, the Solid Waste Managers' Group will follow the conference call protocol as directed below:

Initial Actions

- Upon detection of a solid waste or debris management incident, COG or any participating R-ESF #3 solid waste or debris management organization, agency, or jurisdiction will first make an internal assessment of the situation. The affected jurisdiction(s) will serve as the lead for the Solid Waste Managers' Group. If that

organization, COG, or any other R-ESF #3 solid waste or debris management agency or jurisdiction determines that the event is of regional significance, they may contact the RICCS concerning the regional incident or regional emergency and ask that the CAOs and Solid Waste Managers' Group be notified of the regional incident or regional emergency.

- Based on the nature and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, COG or any participating R-ESF #3 solid waste or debris management organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a conference call to be convened through the RICCS to discuss the regional incident or regional emergency.
- The conference call would be used to determine the type and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, ongoing actions, responses and public messages, identify the next steps, and discuss any other key regional issues.
- The Solid Waste Managers' Group has identified three meeting locations, to ensure redundancy, at which they will physically convene and meet to discuss and coordinate issues, if necessary. These locations are at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' offices in the District of Columbia, at the Fairfax County government offices in Virginia, and at the Montgomery County government offices in Maryland.

Continuing Actions

- Additional conference calls may be scheduled by conference call participants or may be requested by COG or any participating R-ESF #3 solid waste or debris management organization, agency, or jurisdiction as required by the ongoing regional incident or regional emergency.
- There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, communication, and response for each incident with information facilitated through the RICCS.
- Subject-matter experts from any participating R-ESF #3 solid waste or debris management organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis of the regional impact of the regional incident or regional emergency to the CAOs and the Solid Waste Managers' Group through the RICCS to facilitate the regional response.

Stand Down

- The CAOs and the Solid Waste Managers' Group will determine when the regional incident or regional emergency will be terminated. With their consensus as appropriate, a formal declaration of termination will be issued through local government, state government, utility, or COG public information officers (PIOs).

After Action Critique

- Once the regional incident or regional emergency has been terminated, the Solid Waste Managers' Group will prepare an incident assessment summary report on the lessons learned and will present this at a regularly scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #3 Participating and Supporting Agencies

Agencies participating in a regional response will contribute EEIs to R-ESF #5 and the RICCS based on the regional emergency:

1. Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments—COG is the regional organization of Washington, D.C., area local governments. COG's members are the elected officials from 17 local governments in the National Capital Region, plus area delegation members from the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U. S. Senate, and the U. S. House of Representatives. COG provides a focus for action and develops sound regional responses to such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation.

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB)—ICPRB is an interstate compact created by the U. S. Congress to enhance, protect, and conserve the water and related land resources of the Potomac River Basin through regional and interstate cooperation.

Northern Virginia Regional Commission—A regional council of local governments in Northern Virginia created to encourage and facilitate local government cooperation addressing regional issues.

2. Independent Water/Sewer Agencies/Authorities

Alexandria Sanitation Authority—The Alexandria Sanitation Authority was created by the City Council in 1952 to acquire, construct, improve, extend, operate, and maintain a sewer system and sewage disposal system.

District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority—Multi-jurisdictional regional utility that provides drinking water, wastewater collection, and treatment to more than 500,000 residential, commercial, and government customers in the District of Columbia, and also collects and treats wastewater for 1.6 million customers in Montgomery and Prince George’s counties in Maryland and Fairfax and Loudoun counties in Virginia.

Fairfax County Water Authority—The largest water utility in Virginia, serving 1.2 million customers in the Northern Virginia communities of Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, and Alexandria, this Authority operates four water treatment plants with a combined capacity of 262 million gallons per day.

Loudoun County Sanitation Authority—Created in 1959 by the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors as a non-profit authority to provide water and wastewater services to households in Loudoun County.

Prince William Service Authority—Chartered by the State Corporation Commission, the Authority is an independent public body responsible for providing a comprehensive countywide water and sewer system.

Virginia-American Water Company—Largest publicly traded U. S. corporation exclusively in the business of water. Through its Northern Virginia Division, the company provides water to the City of Alexandria and Prince William County.

Washington Aqueduct—A division of the Baltimore District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Aqueduct is a federally owned and operated facility that treats and produces an average 180 million gallons of water per day to residents and visitors in the District of Columbia, as well as Arlington County and City of Falls Church in Virginia.

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission—Serving a 1,000-square-mile area embracing most of Montgomery and Prince George’s counties, the Commission designs, develops, maintains, and operates the public water supply and sanitary sewage systems, as well as regulates plumbing and gas fitting in the suburban Maryland area.

3. Private-sector Solid Waste and Debris Removal Organizations

AAA/Republic—AAA/Republic is a national solid waste hauling company.

BFI—BFI fields a large fleet of construction and demolition debris removal vehicles in the metropolitan DC area. It has the capability to field 50+ vehicles in the event of an emergency need for removal of demolition debris. In addition, it can field 100+ compaction vehicles for the removal of municipal solid waste.

COVANTA Energy—This national company operates solid waste-to-energy plants in Fairfax County, the City of Alexandria, and Montgomery County.

CSX—CSX is a national rail and freight hauling and infrastructure corporation integral in hauling waste by train and providing the use of its rail system for passenger service.

Waste Management, Inc.—In the event of an emergency response action, Waste Management can offer any number of hauling vehicles (roll-off trucks, front load, rear load and tractor trailers), manpower and disposal needs (seven landfills and seven transfer stations in Virginia; four landfills and three transfer stations in Maryland). Waste Management can accommodate municipal solid waste, construction/demolition debris, and nonhazardous waste.

B. Essential Elements of Information

Participating agencies are responsible for providing information concerning water, wastewater, and solid waste and debris management activities to RICCS and to their respective group, in regional incidents or regional emergencies as stated in the planning assumptions for R-ESF #3.

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional incidents or regional emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs across the R-ESFs and with RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering, the agencies listed are responsible for providing the following EEIs

concerning regional incidents or regional emergencies involving regional water, wastewater, and solid waste and debris management functions:

- Status of transportation network;
- Location and status of potable water supplies;
- Status of key contractor support;
- Communication process and procedures;
- Location of the water, wastewater, and/or solid waste and debris management regional emergency;
- Jurisdictions involved;
- Description of significant disruptions in the water, wastewater, and/or solid waste and debris management system in any jurisdiction that has the potential for regional impacts;
- Status of resources, personnel, equipment and facilities impacted by the regional incident or regional emergency;
- Other R-ESFs potentially impacted;
- Relevant historical and demographic information;
- Recommendations for emergency ingress/egress for responders;
- Access points to emergency areas;
- Hazard-specific information;
- Overall priorities for response;
- Status of R-ESF activation;
- Status of energy systems;
- Status and analysis of initial assessments (needs assessments and damage assessments, including Preliminary Damage Assessments);
- Injuries and medical emergencies; and
- Logistical problems.

3. Additional considerations for solid waste and debris management issues:

Private solid waste and debris removal organizations field a large fleet of construction and demolition debris removal vehicles in the Washington metropolitan area. They have the capability to field vehicles in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency's need for removal of demolition debris. In addition, these agencies can field compaction vehicles for the removal of municipal solid waste. Existing by-pass agreements and contracts for removal and disposal of debris will be referenced in the Regional Solid Waste and Debris Management Annex.

In addition, the following specific EEIs may be required in situations where regional waste handling capacity is reduced or when the volume of waste is increased:

- Status of debris removal and management plans;
- Magnitude of incident;
- Duration of incident;
- Volume of debris;

Type of debris;
Removal options;
Disposal options;
Presence and or potential for contamination;
Existence of a crime scene; and
Responsibility for cleanup.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performances of the respective organizations are evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

1. Representatives from the Water/Wastewater Utility Group, Solid Waste Managers' Group, and COG are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #3, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #3. All participating public works supporting agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #3.
2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the water, wastewater, solid waste and debris removal management sector and identification of unfunded regional water, wastewater, solid waste and debris removal management emergency response and coordination needs.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and R-ESF #3 responsibilities will be developed and carried out as directed by representatives from the Water/Wastewater Utility Group, Solid Waste Managers' Group, and COG.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of water, wastewater, solid waste and debris removal management simulations/exercises are to be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series is composed of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to assure continuous improvement in the water, wastewater, solid waste, and debris management function and in the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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R-ESF #4, #9 and #10: Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Northern Virginia Regional Commission

Local and Regional Coordinating Jurisdictions and Organizations

Alexandria
Arlington County
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Frederick County
Loudoun County
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County

State Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations Coordinating Agencies

Maryland Department of Natural Resources
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Maryland State Fire Marshal's Office
Virginia State Fire Marshal's Office
Virginia Department of Fire Programs
Virginia Department of Forestry
Virginia Department of Emergency Management
Virginia Office of Emergency Medical Services
District of Columbia Office of Emergency Health Services

Federal Government Fire, Technical Rescue and Hazardous Materials Operations Agencies and Organizations

Andrews Air Force Base Fire Department
Fort Belvoir Fire Department
Fort Myers Fire Department
National Institutes of Health Fire Department
National Institute of Standards and Technology Fire Department

Naval District Washington Fire Department
U.S. Fire Administration
Walter Reed Army Hospital Fire Department

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Functions (R-ESFs) #4, #9, and #10 — Fire Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations – facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions concerning regional fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations issues and activities before, during, and after a major potential or actual regional emergency.

Note: R-ESF #4, #9 and #10 are structurally identical and are all contained in this R-ESF.

B. Scope

1. R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are intended to focus on enhancing existing communications and coordination processes about potential or actual fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations events in the National Capital Region (NCR) necessitating inter-jurisdictional information coordination.
2. Major activities of R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 include the communication and coordination of information relating to firefighting activities including fire containment and suppression, coordination of evacuation in the hazard areas, delivery of emergency medical services, hazmat response and technical rescue.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESFs #4, # 9, and #10 will not usurp or override the policies of any local government or jurisdiction, state government, federal agency, or mutual aid agreements.
- B. The Incident Command System (ICS) will be the organizational structure used during a response, organized and recognized during any incident in the region as outlined in the Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Fire/Rescue Services Mutual Aid Operations Plan.
- C. COG will facilitate information coordination among member organizations to ensure that the missions and objectives of R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 and the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) are appropriately followed.

- D. Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) may be reported, using protocols consistent with R-ESF #5, to the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) consistent with RECP policy. (For more information see the RICCS protocols section of this plan.)
- E. R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 for conference calls as needed.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

1. A regional incident or regional emergency may adversely impact firefighting, technical rescue and hazardous materials capabilities or critical infrastructure throughout the region. Such an event could be the result of natural disasters, technological events, or human causes. Most local fire, technical rescue, and hazardous materials operations activities could be hampered by damaged facilities, equipment, infrastructure, and disrupted communications. At the same time, the regional incident or regional emergency could create significant surge demands for regional fire, technical rescue, and hazardous materials operations resources.
2. Available fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations resources may be difficult to obtain and utilize due to massive disruption of communications, transportation, and utility and water systems.
3. Fires have the potential to spread rapidly, cause extensive damage, and pose a serious threat to life and property.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations disruptions can occur as a result of direct impacts upon the fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations infrastructure (e.g., disasters) or from surges in requirements placed upon the systems by emergencies in other functional areas.
2. Infrastructure damage and communication disruptions may inhibit efficient coordination of fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations support during the immediate response and post-emergency period.
3. The Fire Chiefs Committee of the COG Public Safety Working Group is the primary point of contact for R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Upon a regional incident or regional emergency requiring inter-jurisdictional information-sharing, R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 will be sent notification by the RICCS as directed by the affected jurisdictions' Fire Chief or his designee.
2. Fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations organizations and each jurisdiction will implement their routine incident management/ICS processes, as necessary.
3. The R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 function will establish a capability to collect, and disseminate information concerning regional fire, technical rescue, and hazardous materials related issues with RICCS consistent with R-ESF #5—Information and Planning.
4. Communications regarding specific public regional incidents or emergencies will follow normal jurisdiction practices.
5. Coordination with Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) of surrounding jurisdictions will follow normal jurisdiction operations.
6. Participating agencies in R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 may utilize RICCS to share EEIs.

B. Organization

The Fire Chiefs' Committee is the primary point-of-contact for R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10.

C. Notification

(Note: Units should not respond without a proper request for assistance per normal jurisdiction practices.)

1. RICCS notification is for informational purposes only. Operational decisions are the responsibility of the jurisdiction's chief officer.
2. The EOC/ECC of the primary jurisdiction and the District or state EOCs will not be notified of every incident. The Incident Commander or the lead jurisdiction will determine if the local EOC/ECC and R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 planning group need to be notified.

3. Upon the request of any participating R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 organization, agency, jurisdiction, or any jurisdiction's ECC/EOC, RICCS may be used to notify the senior operations officers, jurisdictional fire chiefs, and/or jurisdictional CAOs of a potential or actual regional emergency requiring fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations support, depending on the notification level. Communications will be made in accordance with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure. The three notification levels are:

Level 1 to the senior operations officers and/or his designee;

Level 2 to the jurisdictional fire chiefs; and

Level 3 to the jurisdictional CAOs.

4. If any participating R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 organization, agency, or jurisdiction is made aware of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency, communication will be made in accordance with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

D. Coordination


1. Initial Actions

The responding jurisdiction may initiate an initial informational notification through the RICCS to the R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 Regional Level 1 members via the Level 1 Notification process (see Figure 4-1: Level 1 Notification and Coordination), informing them of the regional incident or regional emergency. Level 1 Notification is for information only, and does not require implementation of the RICCS conference mechanism. Receivers of the notifications will obtain additional information by directing inquiries to the responding jurisdiction's EOC or ECC.

The following flow chart represents Level 1 notification.

The unbroken lines represent the required notification as required by existing requirements. Dotted lines represent possible notification depending on the event.

Figure 4-1: Level 1 Notification and Coordination




Jurisdictional fire chiefs will be notified of incidents that affect other jurisdictions beyond the bounds of the primary responding agency, or which involve cross-boundary mutual aid activities, or which may impact other R-ESF activities, such as Transportation via Level 2 Notification (see Figure 4-2: Level 2 Notification and Coordination).

The following flow chart represents Level 2 notification.

The unbroken lines represent the required notification as required by existing requirements. Dotted lines represent possible notification depending on the event.

Figure 4-2: Level 2 Notification and Coordination



For those incidents where full implementation of the RICCS at the CAO or elected official level is needed, Level 3 Notification will be initiated (See Figure 4-3: Level 3 Notification and Coordination). These incidents are those that require interagency operations beyond the scope of existing mutual aid agreements or that involve significant operations on the part of other R-ESFs.

The jurisdiction in charge under Incident Command/Unified Command will provide periodic updates to RICCS.


2. Continuing Actions

For major regional incidents or regional emergencies, RICCS will be the primary communication network for ongoing inter-jurisdictional communication at the CAO and elected official level.

The following flow chart represents Level 3 notification.

The unbroken lines represent the required notification as required by existing requirements. Dotted lines represent possible notification depending on the event.

Figure 4-3: Level 3 Notification and Coordination



3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional incident or regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, nor requires inter-jurisdictional communication and coordination, a notification will be made through RICCS and a stand down debriefing conference call may take place, at the discretion of the Incident Commander.

4. After-action Critique

An after-action summary may be generated after the regional public emergency. This information may be discussed at the next regularly scheduled COG Public Safety Working Group meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #4, #9, and #10 Participating and Supporting Agencies

Organizations participating in a regional response will be able to exchange EEIs through R-ESF #5 and the RICCS consistent with overall RECP recommendations as defined by R-ESF #5—Information and Planning.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. The primary purpose of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during potential or actual emergency situations in the NCR. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.
2. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10—Fire, Technical Rescue and Hazardous Materials Operations, as well as local, state, regional, and federal agencies will be able to exchange information. Examples of information that may be exchanged include:

- Resources or assistance wanted by a jurisdiction;
- Resources a jurisdiction requested and are no longer available for subsequent incidents;
- How long resources are likely to be unavailable;
- Location of the regional emergency incident;
- Type of incident (e.g. Hazmat, derailment, building fire);
- Jurisdictions involved;
- Overall priorities for response;
- Status of communication systems;
- Restrictions to access points and security procedures;
- Logistical problems;
- Injuries and medical emergencies;
- Hospital status;
- Other R-ESFs potentially impacted; and
- Status of specialized teams (HAZMAT, technical rescue, and emergency medical services).

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The preparedness cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement of plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. Plans and procedures are then tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. Successes and areas for improvement are identified, and the cycle repeats. The Fire Chiefs Committee and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle for R-ESFs #4, # 9, and #10.

A. Planning

The Fire Chiefs Committee and COG are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations sectors.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and R-ESFs #4, # 9, and #10 will take place at least once in a calendar year.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of fire, technical rescue and hazardous materials operations simulations/exercises will be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series will be composed of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises coordinated by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

To ensure continuous improvement in this R-ESF and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #5 Information and Planning

Regional Coordination Organization:

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Emergency Management Agencies From COG Member Jurisdictions:

District of Columbia
Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

Liaisons From All Regional Emergency Support Functions:

#1—Transportation;
#2—Communications Infrastructure;
#3—Public Works and Engineering;
#4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations (includes R-ESF #4, #9 and #10);
#6—Mass Care;
#7—Resource Support;
#8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services;
#9—Technical Rescue (included in R-ESF #4);
#10—Hazardous Materials (included in R-ESF #4);
#11—Food;
#12—Energy;
#13—Law Enforcement;
#14—Media Relations and Communications Outreach; and
#15—Volunteer and Donation Management.

State Government Coordinating Organizations

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Federal Government Organizations

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of Personnel Management
General Services Administration
Architect of Capitol
U.S. Capitol Police
U.S. Supreme Court

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #5—Information and Planning facilitates the collection, processing, and dissemination of information among regional jurisdictions and organizations before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency. This function enhances substantive regional dialogue and communication by facilitating information sharing with all of the R-ESFs, and others, as necessary in an integrated and coordinated manner.

B. Scope

1. R-ESF #5 is the Information and Planning element of the regional communication and coordination effort.
2. A large number of situations occur daily throughout the metropolitan Washington region that may have emergency characteristics. Most of these are handled locally through existing operational systems and procedures within public- and private-sector individual and community organizations. Some require intervention of police, fire, emergency services, emergency management, and other public safety organizations.

The threats/hazards may include natural hazards, such as droughts and severe storms, as well as human-induced hazards, such as accidents and explosions. The consequences of these events can affect one jurisdiction, multiple jurisdictions, or the entire region. It is very difficult to scientifically categorize events in a way that would lead to a conclusion in each and every case that the event is regional in nature. Incidents may range from minor to catastrophic, but most in the middle require a high degree of subjectivity and judgment. For additional guidance, please refer to the Baseline Plan for a definition of regional incidents and regional emergencies.

3. The efforts required to gather, assess, and share information about potential threats and hazards are directly related to the speed of onset, magnitude, and severity of impact on people and structures. In most cases, existing local systems, procedures, incident logs, and situation reports will be adequate. Most incidents will not have regional implications. It is expected that existing procedures and reporting requirements between local and state governments and federal agencies, especially as they relate to requesting assistance from higher levels, will be followed.

4. Situations that have potential or actual demonstrated regional consequences will require information collection and sharing from a regional perspective. R-ESF #5 will use existing local, state, and federal information systems and capabilities as necessary to develop regional information. A regional incident tracking system will be used to augment these existing systems to help collect, summarize, and disseminate this information.
5. The Regional Information Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) will be used to facilitate this process. Refer to RICCS protocols for more on this subject.
6. The Regional Incident Impact Assessment System. This system, consisting of a series of analytical impact assessment tools, will be provided by COG and subject matter experts to R-ESF #5 to assist during regional incidents and regional emergencies.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #5 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. R-ESF #5 engages as needed before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
- C. R-ESF #5 facilitates information and planning activities in support of COG members and regional leadership.
- D. R-ESF #5 coordinates information and planning activities with R-ESF liaisons to R-ESF #5, and other R-ESF group members as necessary.
- E. R-ESF #5 coordinates information and planning activities with local emergency communication centers (ECCs) and emergency operations centers (EOCs) when they are activated.
- F. R-ESF #5 will facilitate a regional assessment of the situation by bringing together representatives from affected jurisdictions and knowledgeable experts from appropriate R-ESFs.
- G. R-ESF #5 will collect, track, and disseminate information that is relevant to one or more R-ESFs or jurisdictions, and in so doing it contributes to the overall perspective of the regional incident or regional emergency.
- H. R-ESF #5 shares information with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies, and other regional partners.

- I. R-ESF #5 will provide information for use by R-ESF #14 for informing the media and the general public about the regional incident or regional emergency.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency may be of such severity and magnitude as to require a special set of actions to facilitate communication and coordination among regional decision makers. R-ESF #5 will provide timely and appropriate incident information before, during, and after an incident to support local jurisdictions and organizations in determining appropriate actions based on the collective regional knowledge of the situation. R-ESF #5 will also support information sharing across jurisdictions related to the need for regional, state, or federal assistance.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Sharing information before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency will add value to the response and recovery efforts.
2. In a regional incident or regional emergency, there is a need for a process, whereby situational information can be received, compiled, and assessed by the impacted jurisdiction, and distributed for use by other potentially affected jurisdictions, R-ESF functional members, and other partners across the region.
3. A regional incident tracking system will be established.
4. There are needs for accurate, reliable, and credible information to be received in a timely manner and on a continuous basis.
5. Initial detection and reporting of a regional incident or regional emergency can come from any source, but must be validated and assessed by responsible officials.
6. Existing local and state 24-hour ECCs will be used to the fullest extent possible for initial reporting, assessing, and tracking of regional incidents and regional emergencies.
7. Ongoing information and planning activities will require 24-hour operations capability.
8. Redundant capabilities are needed to ensure R-ESF #5 functional capability.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Initial notification of an incident may come from any source, including the media, individual citizens, the general public, private sector bodies, as well as governmental organizations. Ultimately, most incidents will have little or no regional significance. However, if the potential for regional consequences exists, it is critical that information about that incident be systematically collected and assessed. R-ESF #5 facilitates this information coordination process.

R-ESF #5's primary responsibility resides within the local and state emergency management community, which has ECCs operating on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis. They have monitoring capability and standardized systems and procedures for dealing with emergencies. They are a part of the federal, state, and local emergency management community that exists nationwide. In order to augment this capability from a regional perspective, a regional incident tracking system will be used.

2. Every R-ESF has a mutual information-sharing responsibility and relationship with R-ESF #5. To maximize awareness opportunities and insure effective coordination of responding agencies, R-ESF #5 will receive all RICCS messages and should be copied on all messages pertaining to a regional incident or regional emergency that may originate within a functional R-ESF. The R-ESF liaisons will be responsible for insuring that information and messages from their R-ESF are provided to R-ESF #5. Each R-ESF has appointed a liaison to R-ESF #5 for information management purposes. This liaison is responsible for assuring that information from and about their R-ESF is included in the regional incident tracking system.
3. R-ESF #5 will begin tracking the incident and gather, record, and share essential elements of information (EIs) to facilitate coordinated activities. Critical information will be reported to R-ESF #5 as it develops, and initial reports will include such information as follows:

- Originating entity;
- Type of event;
- Location of the event;
- Time of event;
- Scope of the event;
- Affected jurisdictions;

Affected populations;
Affected facilities;
Activities under way;
Potential Impacts; and
Recommendations (conference calls, etc.).

4. R-ESF #5 has the ability to convene liaisons from R-ESFs to provide advice and information from their respective functional areas related to a developing or ongoing situation. In some cases it may be necessary to bring together “experts” in a particular functional area to develop an accurate assessment and analysis of potential regional impacts and provide recommendations.
5. These local and state emergency management agencies impacted by the event and engaged in response activities will provide information about the situation to R-ESF #5. R-ESF #5 will use this information to develop composite regional situation reports as required.
6. R-ESF #5 shall work in close coordination with the local, state, and federal ESF #5 communities as necessary. In circumstances where the situation involves or has the potential to involve the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal agencies under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), R-ESF #5 will facilitate information-sharing relationships as required.
7. R-ESF #5 will make information available to local jurisdictions on a regular basis, using any and all modes of available communications, so that accurate and timely information is available to regional decision makers. The regional incident tracking system and the RICCS will be the primary systems used for this purpose.
8. Actual duration of R-ESF #5 activities will be determined by the situation and the need for collection and dissemination of relevant information. If required, R-ESF #5 operations can continue in shifts for an extended period of time.

B. Organization

1. The primary R-ESF #5 organization consists of the 17 local COG member jurisdictions’ emergency management agencies and the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) and Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).

2. The support organization consists of liaison members from each of the other R-ESFs who will provide for information sharing, technical advice, assessment, and expertise.
3. The specific organizational structure for R-ESF #5 during any event will be determined by the type and size of the event and the extent of information-sharing requirements. Impacted jurisdictions can request augmentation from other jurisdictions to assist them with regional information collection and dissemination responsibilities.
4. It may be necessary to have R-ESF #5 perform additional functions or services, in order to fulfill the regional aspects of the information and planning function. However, R-ESF #5 will not duplicate federal, state, or local ESF #5 organizations' capabilities to provide these services.
5. Traditional information and planning organizational structures and capabilities (federal, state, and local) that would usually be available in a catastrophic regional event may include:

Situation status updates, including collecting, analyzing, and displaying information; preparing situation reports; and preparing status briefings;

Planning support, including daily action planning; contingency planning, and long-range planning;

Documentation, including collecting all reports, maintaining archival records, and preparing after-action reports; and

Technical services, including GIS and mapping support; subject-matter expertise; and information technology systems and support.

C. Notification

1. The notification of a regional incident or regional emergency to R-ESF #5 can come from any source. Since R-ESF #5 is resident within the 24-hour ECCs at the local and state level, the function is always activated.
2. If a particular R-ESF or jurisdiction is engaged in any non-RICCS dialogue about a regional incident or regional emergency that impacts, or appears to impact, only its own area of responsibility, it must be sure to copy R-ESF #5 on these communications. This may be accomplished by placing every ESF #5 member on RICCS alerts.
3. R-ESF #5 will follow standard RICCS protocols, as appropriate for the incident, to notify R-ESF #5 primary members and supporting liaison members from other R-ESFs and jurisdictions, to facilitate information sharing.

4. R-ESF #5 notifications will be accomplished using the most expedient and appropriate means possible. Normally this will be a RICCS Alert.
5. Sensitive information will be transmitted with an appropriate degree of security, and use of such information may need to be restricted.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

R-ESF #5—Information and Planning activities begin with the initial notification of a regional incident or regional emergency. In some instances, this could precede the onset of a regional incident or regional emergency (e.g., during an approaching hurricane), when R-ESF #5 may operate a small monitoring function as part of existing local and state monitoring operations. In extreme cases, with the sudden occurrence of a catastrophic event, the demands placed on R-ESF #5 for initial information may be extraordinary. When state and local emergency operations centers (EOCs) are activated or when disaster field offices (DFOs) are established, as a result of a state or federal disaster or emergency declaration, the federal ESF #5 becomes operational. R-ESF #5 should coordinate with operational ESF #5 activities whenever possible.

Information and planning activities may be taking place in one or more jurisdiction and/or at the state level;

Incident logs and situation reports will be developed and regional assessments will be taking place during this period; and

Information will be shared with jurisdictions and/or R-ESFs through conference calls arranged through the RICCS, or by postings on the Regional Incident Tracking System, or by meetings convened as necessary.

2. Continuing Actions

Information and planning activities continue as long as necessary to support the need for regional information, which means that R-ESF #5 must have sustainability over a long period of time. R-ESF #5 must develop an iterative capability to maintain current and accurate information during a dynamic emergency situation, where conditions change frequently. When there no longer is a need for regional information sharing and coordination, a transition to local jurisdictional

response should occur. This transition does not change the mission of R-ESF #5, nor does it affect the basic functions of information gathering, processing, dissemination, and planning. As the tempo of disaster operations slows, the level of effort for the R-ESF #5 function is gradually reduced, but support will continue as necessary.

The focus shifts to the economic impact of the regional emergency, the effectiveness of program delivery, and the identification of recovery issues. Normally, there will be an increased need for specific economic and demographic information;

The emphasis in planning during the recovery phase shifts from the daily action plan to long-range management plans. R-ESF #5 will assist in regional coordination and communication related to this planning. The information and planning function collates the information and facilitates the process;

Situation reporting and formal briefings should continue through the recovery phase, although the frequency of both should be gradually reduced; and

The scope and nature of the overall regional incident or regional emergency, current conditions, and potential concerns will dictate the level of R-ESF #5 organization and staffing.

3. Stand Down

Once the critical aspects of the regional incident or regional emergency have passed and regional information sharing is no longer necessary, the incident will be officially closed and R-ESF #5 will disengage.

4. After-action Critique

R-ESF #5 members will conduct an after-action critique to determine lessons learned and areas for improvement. This critique will be conducted as part of the RECP evaluation process explained in *Section VI Preparedness Cycle*.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #5 Participating and Supporting Agencies

COG will serve as the coordinator for R-ESF #5, providing such support as necessary and required. It will facilitate coordination and communication among

R-ESF #5 and all other R-ESFs, COG member jurisdictions, and other regional partners. COG will ensure that current technologies and systems are made available and maintained.

R-ESF #5 membership will consist of the 17 local COG member jurisdiction emergency management agencies (includes DCEMA), Virginia DEM and Maryland EMA.

R-ESF #5 membership includes liaison members from all of the other R-ESFs. Basically all R-ESFs have information and planning responsibility; they are all members of R-ESF #5 by virtue of their respective liaisons.

B. Essential Elements of Information

Participating agencies are responsible for providing information about regional incidents or regional emergencies that relate to their functional areas of responsibility. This information sharing will be accomplished through RICCS to R-ESF #5. General EEIs have been selected, across R-ESF lines, as the information categories necessary to describe the regional incident or emergency in a coordinated manner. The general EEIs follow:

- Location of alternate EOC;
- Status of key contractor support;
- Availability of critical support resources; both in times of availability and amount of personnel and equipment;
- Location of the impacted area;
- Social, economic, and political impacts;
- Jurisdictional boundaries involved;
- Status of transportation systems and critical transportation facilities;
- Status of communications systems;
- Major equipment needed;
- Access points to the disaster area;
- Status of operating facilities;
- Hazard-specific information;
- Weather data affecting operations;
- Seismic or other geophysical information;
- Status of critical facilities and distribution systems;
- Status of remote sensing and reconnaissance activities;
- Status of key personnel;
- Status of R-ESF activation;
- Status of disaster or emergency declaration;
- Major issues and activities of R-ESFs;
- Resource shortfalls and status of critical resources;
- Overall priorities for response;
- Status of upcoming activities;
- Donations;

Historical and demographic information;
Status of energy systems;
Estimates of potential impacts based on predictive modeling (as applicable);
Status (statistics) on recovery programs (human services, infrastructure, Small Business Administration);
Status and analysis of initial assessments (needs assessments and damage assessments, including preliminary damage assessments); and
Status of efforts under federal emergency operations plans, if known.

More specifically, each R-ESF has agreed upon certain specific EEIs as they affect its area of responsibility. Please refer to each R-ESF annex for that function's specific EEIs.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats. The COG-sponsored Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Committee (DEPC), which includes emergency managers from COG member jurisdictions, VDEM, MEMA, and regional public safety representatives, is responsible for maintaining the Preparedness Cycle for R-ESF #5.

A. Planning

1. The COG Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Committee is responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #5, including review and recommending revisions of the R-ESF #5 Annex. Liaisons from all regional emergency support functions will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #5.
2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities for collecting, assessing, and sharing regional information.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the overall RECP, specific R-ESF #5 staff responsibilities, and R-ESF #5 interactions with other RESF liaisons will be developed and carried out.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of information and planning simulations/exercises are to be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the information and planning function and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures that support proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #6 Mass Care

Regional Coordinating Organization

Metropolitan Washington Council of Government

Local Coordinating Agencies

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Rockville
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Takoma Park

Potentially Responsible Government Service Organizations

Department of Recreation
Emergency Management
District/County Public Schools
Mental Health Services
Fire and Rescue Department
Health Department
Office of the Sheriff
Park Authority
Police Department

Private-sector Organizations

American Red Cross—Washington Metropolitan Area Consortium
DC Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
VA Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
MD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

The Salvation Army
The Southern Baptists
Lutheran Disaster Response
Greater DC Care
Private Food Service Providers

State Coordinating Agencies

DC Department of Human Services
MD Department of Human Resources
VA Department of Social Services

Federal Coordinating Organization

Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Department of Veteran Affairs

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The purpose of Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #6—Mass Care is to promote and ensure a coordinated regional capability to provide mass care assistance to victims that have been impacted by a regional incident or regional emergency, including a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. (*See Terrorism Annex.*)

B. Scope

1. Initial response activities will focus on meeting urgent needs of disaster victims (this includes special populations’—elderly, children, and the disabled) on a mass care basis. Initial recovery efforts may commence as response activities are taking place. These services could include, but are not limited to, providing shelter, food, and emergency first aid assistance to those impacted by a regional incident or regional emergency. R-ESF #6 also covers other basic needs, such as drinking water, temporary sewage/waste management receptacles, basic medical and hygiene needs, and related services.

Additionally, R-ESF #6 supports the establishment and maintenance of systems to provide bulk distribution of emergency disaster relief supplies to disaster victims and response personnel and the collection of information to operate a Family Well-Being Inquiry system for the purpose of reporting victim status and assisting family reunification.

As recovery operations are introduced, close coordination will be required between those organizations responsible for recovery operations and voluntary organizations, such as the American Red Cross (ARC) and other national voluntary organizations, local church and civic groups, and other entities providing recovery assistance, including federal government agencies.

2. Mass care encompasses the following:

Shelter—Emergency shelter for disaster victims includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in existing structures, creation of temporary facilities or the temporary construction of shelters, and the use of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area, as needed, in cooperation with communities and adjacent local governments, should evacuation be necessary. As appropriate and in coordination with all support agencies, temporary services, such as portable toilets, decontamination tents, and showers, will be provided to victims.

Food—Food will be provided to disaster victims and emergency workers through a combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding units, and bulk distribution of food and potable water. Such food operations will apply sound nutritional standards and will, to the extent possible, meet requirements of disaster victims with special dietary needs.

Emergency First Aid—Emergency first aid will be provided to victims and emergency workers at mass care facilities and at designated sites within the regional incident or regional emergency area. This service will be supplemental to, or in conjunction with, emergency health and medical services established to meet the needs of disaster victims under R-ESFs #4 and #8.

Family Well-Being Inquiry—Information regarding individuals residing within the affected area will be collected and provided to immediate family members outside the affected area through the use of a Family Well-Being Inquiry. The Family Well-Being Inquiry will also be provided to aid in the reuniting of family members within the affected area who were separated at the time of the public emergency. The local coordinating agency will coordinate the dissemination of Family Well-Being Inquiry through R-ESF #5—Information and Planning, R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach, and R-ESF #15—Donations and Volunteer Management to both inform the public and receive inquiries.

Bulk Distribution of Emergency Relief Items—Sites will be established within the affected area for bulk distribution of emergency relief items to meet the urgent needs of disaster victims. These items may include clothing, blankets, basic medicine, food, dietary supplements, etc .

3. R-ESF #6 will be used in transitioning from basic mass care services to longer-term recovery services.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #6 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the mission and objectives of R-ESF#6, R-ESF #11, and the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) are appropriately followed and procedures are maintained and are in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the RECP.
- C. Essential elements of information (EIs) will be conveyed through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) as required by the regional incident or regional emergency.

- D.** R-ESF #6 will provide liaisons to R-ESF #5 as necessary.
- E.** Potential hazards, such as flooding and hazardous materials incidents, may require the evacuation or sheltering in-place of selected areas.
- F.** The actual regional incident or regional emergency situation will, of course, determine the scope of the evacuation, the number of evacuees who will use a shelter, and/or sheltering in-place.
- G.** The emergency management agency for the jurisdiction affected will select the shelter site(s) in coordination with the primary response agency and the agency that is the provider of that site.
- H.** Many jurisdictions designate the local human or social services department as the primary agency for R-ESF #6 Mass Care, with the local chapter of the Red Cross as the primary support agency, performing most mass care and shelter operations. However, in some jurisdictions, the local chapter of the American Red Cross is designated as the primary agency.
- I.** Should the regional incident or regional emergency be significant enough to be declared a federal disaster operation, the Red Cross will be the primary agency for R-ESF #6 Mass Care as directed by the terms of the Federal Response Plan and the Stafford Act.
- J.** Regional incidents and regional emergencies will generally be defined by one of two conditions from a mass care perspective:
 - 1. A local emergency exceeding the capacity of the local emergency management agency, and its provisions for mass care and shelter operations;
or
 - 2. The area affected by the emergency condition covers more than one local jurisdiction.
- K.** In the event of a small-scale evacuation, temporary shelter and care can normally be provided at the nearest public safety facility and only limited mass care need be provided.
- L.** In the event of a large-scale evacuation/displacement of residents, or when the appropriate authorities (including the on-scene commander) determines that a larger facility is required or long term event is inevitable, he/she will coordinate with the local superintendent of public schools, the American Red Cross, or the local department of human/social services.

- M.** Authorized officials will determine the need to evacuate large areas or shelter in-place and will issue orders for evacuation or other protective action as needed. However, the On-Scene Commander may order an immediate evacuation prior to requesting or obtaining approval, if in his/her judgment this action is necessary to safeguard lives and property.
- N.** Local fire and rescue departments will coordinate evacuation of the area.
- O.** Any evacuation will be coordinated with R-ESF #1 traffic and transit managers.
- P.** Local police departments (and other law enforcement agencies coordinating through the RECP) will assist with the evacuation and coordinate security for the evacuated area.
- Q.** In the event of a hazardous materials incident, the local fire chief or the representative on the scene should implement immediate protective actions to include evacuation and sheltering in-place.
- R.** Should protective actions (e.g., evacuation or shelter in place) be necessary, warning and protective action guidance will be transmitted through all available means including the Emergency Alert System and other communication mechanisms utilized by the authorities providing the protective actions guidance.
- S.** During an evacuation in which a large number of evacuees are in the shelters,

 - 1. Local fire and rescue departments will coordinate emergency medical services;
 - 2. Local police departments will coordinate security; and
 - 3. Local health departments will coordinate food safety, general sanitation, and active disease surveillance and investigations, if warranted, at each shelter.
- T.** Local departments of human/social services will coordinate with other agencies and other volunteer organizations to provide for special-needs populations in time of regional incident or regional emergency.
- U.** In addition to the health professionals who staff managed shelters, the county mental health agency will provide additional trained mental health and substance abuse professionals.
- V.** Shelter managers will provide daily situation reports to the R-ESF #5 through the RICCS and local department of human/social services regarding the status of evacuees and of operations in general at the shelters. Adequate records must be maintained for all costs incurred in order to be eligible for post-disaster assistance.

- W. The emergency management agency for the jurisdiction affected will select the shelter site(s) in coordination with the primary response agency and the agency that is the provider of that site.
- X. All mass care activities and services will be provided without regard to color, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, familial status or responsibilities, disability, matriculation, economic status or racial, religious, political, ethnic, or other affiliation.
- Y. The Family Well-Being Inquiry is established and operated by the local coordinating agency with assistance from the ARC. The Family Well-Being Inquiry will be populated with the names of those persons identified on shelter lists, the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), casualty lists, and any other information made available by state or federal emergency operations center (EOCs) and hospitals. This information will be collected, verified, and made available to immediate family members upon the consent of the sought person, if possible, within or outside the affected area. Information on those injured and remaining within the affected area will be limited to that provided by local medical units to the Family Well-Being Inquiry. Information on casualties evacuated from the affected area to other medical facilities will be restricted to that provided by NDMS tracking capability. The listing of public emergency-related deaths will be limited to officially confirmed fatalities. The Family Well-Being Inquiry operation will be discontinued as soon as it is practical.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

1. The magnitude of the regional incident or regional emergency will be such that the regional response capabilities will be too overwhelmed to assess the regional incident or regional emergency and respond effectively to basic human needs using routine operations. Damage to roads, airports, communication systems, and so forth will hamper emergency response efforts. The movement of emergency supplies may be seriously impeded. People's homes may be destroyed or damaged to the point that entry will not be safe.
2. Hundreds or thousands of public emergency victims will be forced from their homes, depending on such factors as time of occurrence, area demographics, building construction, and existing weather conditions. There may be large numbers of dead and injured, which will leave large numbers of specialized population groups (e.g., elderly, children, house-bound) without support. Families may be separated and unable to reunite. Communication systems may be damaged or destroyed such that individuals will not be able to locate their friends or families or be able to identify alternative housing, feeding, emergency medical care, or other basic needs. Hundreds or thousands of

transients such as tourists, students, foreign visitors, and homeless persons may be involved.

3. Even if the regional incident or regional emergency is small in nature, some limited mass care may be required.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. A regional incident or regional emergency occurs that produces significant casualties and widespread damage. Individuals may develop serious physical, emotional, or psychological problems requiring specialized medical services.
2. Mass care facilities will receive priority consideration for structural inspections to ensure safety of occupants.
3. Mass care operations and logistical support requirements will be given high priority by state and federal agencies.
4. Primary shelter facilities will be available, and/or alternative, secondary sites will be identified in cooperation with government counties and states.
5. It is anticipated that many individuals will be prepared and self-sufficient for a minimum of 72 hours after an incident; however, it is likely that a significant portion of dislocated citizens and guests will not be self-sufficient during the initial 72 hours. Primary and support agencies, in conjunction with local voluntary organizations, will need to be able to coordinate the evacuation and registration of victims, administer emergency first aid treatment and mental health counseling, and provide other initial mass care needs for at least the first 72 hours after the regional incident or regional emergency.
6. The restoration of basic infrastructure (e.g., communications, roads, transportation services, and electricity) may take days, weeks, even months. Ongoing assistance under R-ESF #6 may be required as the response stage transitions to the recovery stage.
7. Some percentage of the sheltered population will require shelter for an extended period of time.
8. Individuals will be anxious to identify the location and health/condition of friends, family, and loved ones. The makeup of the dislocated will likely be diverse and will require attention to cultural, ethnic, language, and other related needs.
9. The designated lead and support agency staff will be trained and certified by the ARC in shelter management and emergency relief and support services.

10. There are agreements in place between the local coordinating agency and the agents of the governments for the administration of shelter care, including shelter registration and the implementation of a Family Well-Being Inquiry.
11. Initially, regional and local officials will focus on coordinating lifesaving activities concurrent with re-establishing control in the disaster area.
12. Initially the focus of R-ESF #6—Mass Care will be to provide temporary feedings and sheltering operations to the affected community and relief workers.
13. Over the long term, officials will work with the feeding, hotel, and housing industry to restore and reconstruct normal living facilities as the situation permits.
14. Initial damage reports may be fragmented and provide an incomplete picture concerning the extent of damage to communication facilities.
15. Conditions may restrict the ability of suppliers to deploy mobile or fixed feeding and sheltering equipment into the affected area.
16. The affected area's ability to communicate with the rest of the region may be impaired. Some key individuals may be isolated from their homes, offices, and/or operational centers.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. The shelter management team will maintain liaison with and coordinate requests for assistance through the EOC for food, clothing, and medical assistance; provide assistance in the dissemination of regional incident or regional emergency assistance information; provide an evacuees-locator service for family members and public officials; maintain and submit records of shelter operations and resource expenditures; and close the shelter(s) when they are no longer needed. (Shelters operated by the ARC will follow ARC guidelines and policies.)
2. If COG or any other R-ESF #6 Mass Care infrastructure organization, agency, or jurisdiction determines that a regional incident or regional emergency is of regional significance, that entity may use R-ESF #6.
3. The supporting regional agencies in charge of mass care will coordinate and execute their respective care agencies and program responsibilities during the regional incident or regional emergency.

4. R-ESF #6 will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate regional information concerning regional mass care-related issues through the RICCS to R-ESF #5 and other relevant R-ESFs.
5. R-ESF #6 will establish the capability to provide temporary feeding and sheltering operations to the affected community and relief workers.
6. R-ESF #6 will create call-down lists and an inventory of shelters to foster regional mass care in the course of a regional incident or regional emergency.
7. R-ESF #6 will develop an inventory of mass care supplies, equipment, and vendors to facilitate deployment in the course of a regional incident or regional emergency.
8. R-ESF #6 will explore the possibility of creating agreements between service providers and COG/jurisdictions to provide technical assistance, supplies, and equipment not otherwise available in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency.
9. R-ESF #6 will develop a list of mass care and human/social service experts who can provide mass care advice and support in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency.
10. R-ESF #6 will coordinate with R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services as needed.

B. Organization

1. The local coordinating agency, with support agencies' assistance, will coordinate all R-ESF #6 activity. Since each support agency will be represented, ARC will maintain contact with those representatives as necessary at those locations for the duration of the emergency response period. Primary agency representatives will have sufficient knowledge of the capabilities and resources of their agencies, with appropriate authorities to commit resources to the response effort.
2. There are designated shelters in case of major disruptions impacting citizens' safety. In coordination with support agencies, the ARC, and the Salvation Army will coordinate the delivery of food, cots, blankets, and other supplies for sheltered individuals. If the situation warrants, R-ESF #6 will coordinate and communicate with the National Guard (NG) to deploy mobile food kitchens to assist with the food programs, as well as to help with shower facilities and decontamination if needed.

3. Coordination of response operations will be carried out through the RECP as required. R-ESF #6 will convene and coordinate specific coordinating activities based on the nature and scope of the event, the types of mass care required (e.g., mobile feeding, fixed feeding, daytime safety, overnight sheltering), and other regional resources required to support response efforts.

C. Notification

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a potential or actual emergency, RICCS will provide a communication platform to support the coordinated response of the participating agencies. RICCS provides for the multi-directional flow of communication.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

Prior to a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #6, through the Mass Care Working Group, will develop and make accessible call-down lists and mass care resources to the RICCS and the jurisdictions.

In addition, R-ESF #6 will make recommendations through the RICCS to the appropriate parties and to the jurisdictions as to what types of resources should be in place to ensure effective mass care throughout the region in the event of a regional incident or regional emergency.

If necessary, upon receipt of information about the regional incident or regional emergency and upon notification, RICCS will contact the Mass Care Working Group for information and guidance on the situation and on going planning.

R-ESF #6 will provide EEIs and/or liaisons for conference call purposes to R-ESF #5 as the situation requires.

2. Continuing Actions

The local coordinating agency and ARC will continue to operate the shelters once recovery operations commence and families and individuals can return to their homes, find temporary housing, or seek alternative arrangements.

The local coordinating agency and ARC will continue to coordinate the relocation and reunification of families until all displaced conditions are resolved.

This effort will include continued assistance to non-residents (e.g., tourists, visitors, etc.) caught in the regional incident or regional emergency and housed in the shelters until they are able to return to their homes or next destination.

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional incident or regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, a notification will be made through the RICCS and stand-down debriefing conference call will take place.

4. After-action Critique

Within two weeks of the regional incident or regional emergency, information for an after-action critique will be gathered by the Mass Care Working Group chairperson and discussed at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional incidents or regional emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. The R-ESF #5 Annex to the RECP contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #6—Mass Care, the agencies are responsible for providing the following essential elements of information for regional incidents and regional emergencies involving regional mass care functions:

- Status of transportation system and facilities;
- Status of food supply and distribution schedule;
- Location of useable mass care facilities, including shelters and feeding stations;
- Availability of medical and first aid support;
- Status of bulk distribution networks;
- Evacuation locations and routes;
- Location of hazardous areas;

Status of volunteer organizations and health professionals;
Status of Family Well-Being Inquiry;
Estimated time for return to normal operations and for people to return home/work;
Status of potable water supply;
Status of communications network;
Status of mass care requirements (e.g., number of people requiring feeding/sheltering);
Status of operating facilities;
Status of key personnel;
Major issues/activities of R-ESFs;
Resource shortfalls; and
Overall priorities for response.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performances of the respective organizations are evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats. R-ESF #6 and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle.

A. Planning

The local organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions involved in R-ESF #6-related response are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #6, including review and recommending revisions of this R-ESF. All participating supporting agencies and organizations will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #6.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to RECP and R-ESF #6 responsibilities will be developed and carried out.

C. Exercises

For the RECP to be effective, a series of simulations/exercises will be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the coordination of food supplies and/or resources under R-ESF #6 and the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.



Regional Emergency Support Function #7 Resource Support

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (1)

Multi-Jurisdictional Agencies

Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning Commission (1)

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (1)

Washington Dulles International Airport (1)

Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (1)

Regional Authorities

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (1)

Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (1)

DC Water and Sewer Authority (1)

Alexandria Sanitation Authority (1)

Fairfax County Water Authority (1)

Loudoun County Sanitation Authority (2)

Prince William County Service Authority (2)

Local Coordinating Agencies

Alexandria (1)

Alexandria Public Schools (2)

Arlington County (1)

Arlington County Public Schools (1)

Bowie (2)

Charles County Public Schools (2)

College Park (2)

Culpeper County (2)

District of Columbia (1)

DC Courts (2)

DC Office of Contracting and Procurement (1)

DC Department of Corrections (2)

DC Public Schools (2)

DC Department of Public Works (1)

(1) Level 1 Agency—Reference Section IV C. Notification for explanation

(2) Level 2 Agency—Reference Section IV C. Notification for explanation

Fairfax (2)

Fairfax County (1)

Fairfax County Public Schools (2)

Falls Church (2)

Fauquier County Schools and Government (2)

Frederick County (2)

Gaithersburg (2)

Greenbelt (2)

Herndon (2)

Leesburg (2)

Loudoun County (2)

Loudoun County Public Schools (2)

Manassas (2)

Manassas Regional Airport (2)

Montgomery College (2)

Montgomery County (1)

Montgomery County Housing Opportunities Commission (2)

Montgomery County Public Schools (2)

Prince George's County (1)

Prince George's County Public Schools (2)

Prince William County (2)

Prince William County Public Schools (2)

Rockville (2)

Stafford County (2)

Takoma Park (2)

Vienna (2)

State Coordinating Agencies*

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency

Maryland Emergency Management Agency

Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Federal Coordinating Organization

Federal Emergency Management Agency (1)

General Services Administration (2)

* Role is to provide information through RICCS

(1) Level 1 Agency—Reference Section IV C. Notification for explanation

(2) Level 2 Agency—Reference Section IV C. Notification for explanation

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #7—Resource Support, facilitates communication and support among regional jurisdictions to assist in the effective and timely coordination of resources following an emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF #7 is designed to provide a framework for incidents that require resource assistance from the surrounding jurisdictions.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #7 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member jurisdictions, organizations, and agencies to ensure that the missions and objectives of R-ESF #7 and the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) are met.
- C. Essential elements of Information (EIs) will be conveyed through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the emergency.
- D. R-ESF #7 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as necessary. (Please see *Annex R-ESF #5—Information and Planning*.)

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency may adversely impact the availability of resources. This could include—but is not limited to—the availability of resources, damaged facilities, equipment, infrastructure, and a disruption of communications. A number of critical activities could be adversely affected by damage to or excessive demand placed upon key components of the regional resource infrastructure. Potentially affected activities include communications and transportation, both of which are essential to emergency response and evacuation. At the same time, the regional incident or regional emergency could create significant demands for resources.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. An emergency has been declared.
2. Member jurisdictions, organizations, and agencies under R-ESF #7 will perform tasks under their own authority, in addition to coordinating their activities with other R-ESFs.
3. Assessment of the emergency is required to determine critical needs and to estimate potential workload or requirements for mutual aid or federal assistance. Early damage assessments will be general and incomplete and may be inaccurate.
4. There may be an increased demand or shortage of specific resources in the event of an emergency.
5. Disruptions in resources may hamper other response activities.
6. Resource capabilities and contracting capabilities differ across the jurisdictions.
7. Taking advantage of COG's cooperative purchasing program provides the effective and timely coordination of resources.
8. When required, jurisdictions utilizing equipment or supplies of another jurisdiction will reimburse the jurisdiction providing the equipment or supplies.
9. The RECP does not provide for operational interface between federal agency programs and individual jurisdictions. These relationships are described in the Federal Response Plan.

IV. Concept of Coordination**A. General**

1. Upon the occurrence and/or threat of an emergency requiring out-of-jurisdiction resources, the R-ESF #7 would be used.
2. The use of R-ESF #7 entails making the first notification call to needed members of the Chief Purchasing Officers Committee (CPOC) through the RICCS.
3. Information regarding resource support during a regional incident or regional emergency will be coordinated with the appropriate Incident Commander of the jurisdiction involved.
4. RICCS will facilitate communication between R-ESF #7 and other R-ESFs.

B. Organization

R-ESF #7 is composed of members of the CPOC representing the COG member jurisdictions and other organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, the jurisdiction where the response is located will notify the CPOC of the circumstances through RICCS, which will then trigger the use of R-ESF #7. A purchasing official from the affected jurisdiction will be designated as lead. The lead will facilitate all conference calls, and report any necessary information through the RICCS.

C. Notification

1. Jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations have been categorized as Level 1 and Level 2 according to the following criteria:

Proximity to the District of Columbia;
Procurement resources and personnel; and
Accessibility to resource network.

Designation of Level 1 and Level 2 are flexible and subject to change contingent on location and type of emergency. Level 1 designees will receive notification of an emergency through the RICCS and will participate in the R-ESF #7 conference call. Level 2 designees will be notified of an emergency through the RICCS and may participate in the R-ESF #7 conference call as needed based upon the criteria above, the jurisdiction's request, or at the discretion of any Level 1 designee.

2. Upon the request of any participating R-ESF #7 organization, agency, or jurisdiction, the RICCS will:

Notify R-ESF #7 supporting agencies in accordance with Level 1 criteria as listed above;

Request R-ESF #7 to identify support agencies who may be needed to supply subject-matter expertise;

Establish a multi-directional flow of communications with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies; and

Provide a communication platform to support the coordinated planning response of the participating agencies.

3. If any participating R-ESF #7 organization, agency, or jurisdiction is made aware of a potential or actual emergency, communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

D. Coordination

R-ESF #7 members have access to plans, contacts, and other pertinent information through multiple media including, but not limited to, COG website, COG-provided Information CD, and RICCS.

1. Initial Actions

R-ESF #7 organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions will use available information to determine the status and assess the resource impacts of the public emergency, including resources needed to respond.

R-ESF #7 organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions will identify and recommend actions necessary to obtain needed resources to repair or restore damaged resource systems and disruption in resource circulation.

If the Incident Commander determines that the event is significant, the commander will contact R-ESF #5 through the RICCS with any EEIs concerning the situation and ask that R-ESF #7 or all R-ESFs be notified of the emergency.

Based on the nature and extent of the emergency, COG or any participating R-ESF #7 organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a conference call to be convened through RICCS to discuss the emergency.

The conference call will be used to determine the type and extent of the emergency, ongoing actions, responses and support requirements; identify the next steps; and discuss any other key issues.

The purchasing agent or designee in the jurisdiction where the emergency has occurred will coordinate the jurisdiction's resource requirements with the COG CPOC.

2. Continuing Actions

R-ESF #5 is the focal point for receipt of reports for resource support requirements. There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, and communication through RICCS for each incident.

Additional conference calls may be scheduled or requested by any participant as required.

Subject-matter experts from any participating R-ESF #7 organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis to facilitate the response.

R-ESF #7 will consult state authorities as needed.

R-ESF #7 will assist in the location of resources.

3. Stand Down

All participating agencies will be notified through RICCS when the regional incident or regional emergency is over.

Each individual jurisdiction, agency, or organization will submit reimbursement requests in accordance with FEMA requirements and other guidelines.

4. After-action Critique

Following the regional incident or regional emergency, participating R-ESF #7 agencies will be asked for recommendations/lessons learned on how R-ESF #7 can be improved. This will be developed into an Incident Assessment Summary Report (IASR). Each member will submit a report to the R-ESF #7 lead, who will compile the IASR. The IASR will be presented and coordinated as appropriate.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #7 Key Participating Agencies

Key participating agencies are the Level 1 agencies as defined in *Section IV C. Notification*, and identified on pages 1 and 2.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. The primary purpose of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning, is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.
2. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #7—Resource Support participating agencies will be able to exchange information including, but not limited to:

Status of transportation systems and facilities;

Listing of resources required (priorities);

Location where resources are needed, including time of availability and duration of need;

Status of communications system;

Location of hazardous areas; information on the hazards at the location;
Status of key contractor support;
Name and phone numbers of all purchasing officials from each jurisdiction;
Status of resource support required throughout the National Capital Region;
Overall resource priorities for response;
Resource availability;
Logistical problems;
Status of key personnel;
Major issues/activities of R-ESFs; and
Forecasted requirements.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The designation of subject-matter experts and emergency contacts should occur in each jurisdiction prior to the initiation of the cycle. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained in regional resource management, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designated to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats. R-ESF #7 and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle for R-ESF #7.

A. Planning

The CPOC and COG are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #7, including review and recommending revisions to R-ESF #7. All participating resource support agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #7.

Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the resource sector and identification of emergency response and coordination needs. Plans will be evaluated on a semi-annual basis to determine if any changes are needed. The evaluation will be performed by a subcommittee. The subcommittee will present a summary of recommended changes to the entire CPOC.

B. Training

COG will take the lead on scheduling annual training; however, the CPOC will appoint a subcommittee to be responsible for the development and planning of the training needs. Training will be held on a semi-annual basis to correspond with changes to the plan, and take place at a designated location.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of resource management simulations/exercises are to be conducted in coordination with other R-ESFs. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or another organization.

D. Evaluation

To ensure continuous improvement in the resource management function and in the RECP, the coordination of plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

Evaluations will occur in the form of after-action critiques. After-action critiques will be compiled after all training, exercises, and plan utilizations. Each after-action critique will be compiled in an IASR. The IASR will be compiled by R-ESF #7 and the report findings will be presented and coordinated as appropriate.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #8 Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services

Regional Coordinating Organization

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Coordinating Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Rockville
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Takoma Park

District of Columbia Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services Organizations

District of Columbia Department of Health
DC Fire and EMS
DC Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
DC Office on Aging
DC Emergency Management Agency
DC Department of Mental Health
DC Health and Human Services
Metropolitan Police Department
D.C. Public Schools

Maryland Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services Organizations

Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services Systems
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Maryland Emergency Management Agency

Maryland State Police
Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Maryland Local Health Departments
 Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
 Prince George's County Health Department
 Frederick County Health Department
County Public Schools

Virginia Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services Organizations

Community Services Boards in all jurisdictions
Virginia Department of Mental Health,
 Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services
Virginia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Virginia Department of Emergency Management
Virginia Department of Health
Northern Virginia Emergency Medical Services Council
Virginia State Police
Virginia Park Police
Virginia Local Health Departments
 Arlington County Health Department
 Fairfax County Health Department
 City of Alexandria Health Department
 Prince William County Health District
 Loudoun County Health Department
County Public Schools

Private-sector Coordinating Organizations

National Capital Region—Emergency Response (NCR–ER)
Greater Washington Board of Trade

Private-sector Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services Organizations

DC Hospital Association:
 Children's National Medical Center
 Columbia Hospital for Women
 George Washington University Hospital
 Georgetown University Hospital
 Greater Southeast Community Hospital
 Hadley Memorial Hospital
 Howard University Hospital
 Malcolm Grow Medical Center
 National Naval Medical Center
 National Rehabilitation Hospital
 Providence Hospital
 The Psychiatric Institute of Washington
 Riverside Hospital
 Saint Elizabeth's Hospital—Department of Mental Health

Sibley Memorial Hospital
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Washington Hospital Center
Maryland Hospital Association
Montgomery County Hospital Groups:
Washington Adventist Hospital
Holy Cross Hospital
Montgomery General Hospital
Suburban Hospital
Shady Grove Adventist Hospital
Prince George's County Hospital Groups:
Fort Washington Hospital Center
Prince George's Hospital Center
Greater Laurel Regional Hospital
Doctors Hospital
Southern Maryland Hospital
Virginia Hospital Association
American Psychological Association
American Psychiatric Association
American Public Health Association
American Medical Association
National Association of Social Workers
Mental Health Crisis Network (Metro Chapter NASW)
American Red Cross (National Capital Chapter)
Metropolitan Washington Public Health Assessment Center
State Pharmaceutical Associations
Specialty Nursing Associations
Academic Institutions and Boards of Education
Northern Virginia Emergency Response Coalition:
Regional Hospital Members:
Virginia Hospital Center—Arlington
Inova Alexandria Hospital
Inova Fair Oaks Hospital
Inova Mount Vernon Hospital
Inova Fairfax Hospital/Inova Fairfax Hospital for Children
Inova Emergency Care Center—Fairfax
Inova Emergency Care Center—Reston
Inova Healthplex—Springfield
HCA Reston Hospital
HCA Northern Virginia Community Hospital
Loudoun Hospital
Potomac Hospital
Prince William Hospital
DeWitt Army Hospital

Funeral Directors Associations
Clinical Pastoral Resources
Specialty Medical Societies
State Medical Societies
Local Medical Societies
Private Physicians
Managed Care Organizations

Federal Government Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services Organizations

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness
 Office of Public Health Preparedness
 National Institutes of Health
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
 Food and Drug Administration
 Office of Emergency Preparedness
Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Office of National Preparedness
Office of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Executive Branch Medical Units
U.S. Capitol, Office of the Attending Physician
All federal police forces

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services facilitates communication, cooperation, and coordination among local and state jurisdictions concerning regional health, mental health, and medical services issues and activities before, during, or after a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF #8 is intended to focus on information regarding disruptions of health, mental health, and medical services with local and state impacts requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination. R-ESF #8 also coordinates necessary information to determine health, mental health, and medical needs across the region as the result of a regional incident or regional emergency. Coordination with R-ESF #1—Transportation and R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure, are critical to ensure effective delivery of services.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #8 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) Health Officials Committee will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that R-ESF #8 procedures are appropriately followed and are in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the RECP.
- C.** Essential Elements of Information (EIs) will be conveyed through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) as required by the incident.
- D.** R-ESF #8 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as necessary.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

1. If an anomaly is noticed by the jurisdictions through their bio-surveillance systems, preventive actions can be undertaken, reducing the impact on the region.

2. The regional health, mental health, and medical community will experience disruptions in the delivery of routine services. Such an incident could be the result of natural disasters, technological events, or human causes (all hazards). Local health, mental health, and medical activities could be hampered by damaged facilities, equipment, infrastructure, disrupted communications, etc. Additionally, the regional incident or regional emergency could create a significant surge in demand for regional health, mental health, and medical resources.
3. A regional incident or regional emergency could produce a large concentration of specialized injuries, illness, mass casualties, fatalities, and other problems that could overwhelm the healthcare community within the region.
4. Critical and long-term patients in existing hospital or health care facilities may need immediate relocation from these facilities if they are damaged or inoperable.
5. If the regional incident or regional emergency lasts for several days or weeks, there could be a severe impact on health, mental health, and medical services capabilities. Contributing factors that must be considered include complications and issues regarding relocation, shelters, vector control, potable water, and wastewater and solid waste management.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Planning partners will include public and private organizations.
2. The RECP will promote inter- and intra-jurisdictional cooperation and coordination while preserving the unique characteristics and operating procedures of each member jurisdiction.
3. The resources routinely available within the affected emergency area will be inadequate to clear casualties from the scene or treat them in nearby health care facilities. Two high priority areas, which will impact the delivery of healthcare services and necessary medications, are transportation and communication.
4. Medical re-supply will be needed throughout the emergency area, based on the requirements of the affected jurisdictions.
5. A terrorist release of WMD may lead to toxic water/air/land environments that threaten surviving populations and response personnel, including exposure to hazardous chemicals, biological agents, radiological substances, and contaminated water supplies and food products.
6. Central reporting of testing results, and management and dissemination of this information, is key to mitigating the response.

7. Assistance in maintaining the continuity of health, mental health, and medical services will be required, especially for citizens with long-term and ongoing health care needs. Health, mental health, and medical services will be financially impacted.
8. The stress, loss, and pain caused as a result of a regional incident or regional emergency may result in the region's mental health system becoming overwhelmed, producing urgent need for mental health crisis counseling for emergency victims, response personnel, their families, and the general public.
9. Any WMD incident will lead to a potentially large magnitude of health issues as well as require multi-jurisdictional and inter-agency coordination and entail addressing long-term psychological needs.
10. Delivery of multi-lingual messages, and the availability of personnel with multi-lingual skills, is critical due to diversity of the population throughout the region.
11. During an incident a large number of providers may themselves be affected and therefore unable to provide care to others.
12. A biological event may occur unannounced, only becoming apparent over time.
13. Horizontal and vertical communications will be necessary to ensure an effective response before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Both major and minor regional incidents or regional emergencies involving health and mental health will be cause for convening R-ESF #8.
2. Local jurisdictions that participate in R-ESF #8 will coordinate and execute their respective health, mental health, and medical authorities and program responsibilities before, during, and after the regional incident or regional emergency.
3. The R-ESF #8 function will collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional health, mental health, and medical related issues, including disease surveillance, facilitated through RICCS as appropriate.

4. Requests for information regarding emergency regional health, mental health, and medical issues will be referred to the R-ESF #8 liaison for R-ESF #5 through the RICCS. The liaison will coordinate with the health, mental health, and medical services regional partners, including with R-ESF #6—Mass Care.
5. A regional approach to preparing for and managing a “shelter in place” decision is developed and pre-event distribution of information is implemented.

B. Organization

R-ESF #8 will operate under the leadership of the COG Health Officials Committee:

COG Health Officials Committee

District of Columbia Department of Health
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Virginia Department of Health
Arlington County Health Department
City of Alexandria Health Department
Fairfax County Health Department
Frederick County Health Department
Loudoun County Health Department
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
Prince George’s County Health Department
Prince William County Health District

(Note: One or more federal agencies are regularly invited to attend.)

The mission of public health is to prevent disease and promote community-wide health. Local, state and federal public health officials are mandated to protect their respective jurisdictions *as a whole* from disease or injury. By contrast, private healthcare providers have a primary responsibility for the welfare of each *individual* patient. Although the public and private health sectors share several overlapping objectives, it is essential to recognize the distinctions in roles and responsibilities. Ideally, the various sectors of the healthcare community will work in concert with one another.

C. Notification

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a regional incident or regional emergency, RICCS will provide a communication platform to support the coordinated response of the participating agencies. RICCS provides for the multi-directional flow of communications. Communications will be made in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

1. RICCS notification is for informational purposes only. RICCS is designed to facilitate the ability of all sections of the healthcare community to communicate with one another and with the public in an emergent situation.
2. RICCS is not intended to usurp everyday channels of communication but rather to facilitate the coordination of communication when the system must be expanded to deal with an unusual situation.
3. It is anticipated that different types of incidents will result in notification messages being transmitted among members of R-ESF #8 through the RICCS. Notification of R-ESF #8 concerning regional incidents or emergencies involving chemical, nuclear, radiological, explosive, and natural hazards such as floods and tornadoes will likely be originated by other R-ESFs (such as R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10). Bio-event notification of R-ESF #8 will likely take place among R-ESF #8 participants.
4. In a bio-event, the initial case(s) is reported by the hospital/private practitioner to the local health department, which in turn notifies the COG Health Officials Committee. This body is responsible for ensuring that appropriate notifications regarding the event are made through the RICCS for regional incidents and regional emergencies.
5. Subject matter and type of incident will drive the participation in the RICCS conference call. Additional members will be included from the participating organizations as determined by the COG Health Officials Committee.

D. Coordination

In addition to bio-events, there are other situations that will require convening R-ESF #8. These situations include contaminated water supply, hazardous materials spill, an explosion, etc.

1. Initial Actions

Four-Level Risk Assessment Module:

The health communication and coordination process for regional incidents and regional emergencies involving a bio-event will follow a four-level risk assessment module, as follows:


Risk Level 4	No active threat
Risk Level 3	Potential bio-event
Risk Level 2	Possible bio-event
Risk Level 1	Confirmed bio-event

This risk assessment module has been adapted from the one used in the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Comparable four-level risk assessment modules are being incorporated into various health response plans throughout the NCR, including the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments West Nile Virus Response Plan.

Risk Level 4

- Local and state health departments maintain on-going passive surveillance in accordance with existing local, state and federal requirements.
- State epidemiologists in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia regularly share disease-related data.
- Hospitals and private practitioners maintain communication with their local health departments through established lines of communication and reporting systems, including identifying and reporting all reportable diseases as mandated, as well as any anomalies.
- If an anomaly is detected, the NCR moves to Risk Level 3.


Figure 8-1: Level 4 Risk Assessment



Risk Level 3

- An anomaly is detected and reported to a local or state health department.
- A local or state health official requests notification of the Health Officials Committee through the RICCS and the committee coordinates a regional assessment.
- Local and state health departments commence active surveillance and enhanced communications with local sentinel hospitals, HMOs, medical examiners, fire and EMS, and law enforcement officers.
- Emergency management agencies are notified.
- Epidemiological investigations and law enforcement investigations commence.
- Hospitals and private practitioners maintain communication with their local health departments through established lines of communication and reporting systems.
- Local and state officials will make a determination as to whether a bio-event has occurred once the investigation is conclusive. If a bio-event has occurred, the National Capital Region moves to Risk Level 2.

Figure 8-2: Level 3 Risk Assessment




2. Continuing Actions

Risk Level 2

- A bio-event has been identified that may pose a regional threat.
- The local and state health officials utilize the RICCS to share information among public and private health sectors to determine the regional public health significance and threat of the bio-event.
- A regional epidemiological investigation is expanded and active surveillance throughout the National Capital Region continues.
- Local health departments follow current requirements and report to appropriate local, state and federal agencies.

- Private providers receive notification from health departments, medical societies, the CDC Health Alert Network, HMOs and other existing information-management systems.
- Hospital emergency departments receive alert notifications from health departments, hospital associations, and H-MARS.
- Mental health service providers are notified.
- Public health officials will brief key elected officials and decision-makers, who will then determine what information will be shared with the public, when to brief them, and the potential need for a declaration of a State of Emergency. (The public can be given appropriate information and instructions via the Emergency Alert System (EAS).)
- If a bio-event of regional significance is confirmed, the National Capital Region moves to Risk Level 1.

Figure 8-3: Level 2 Risk Assessment



Risk Level 1

- A bio-event of regional significance has been confirmed.
- EEIs are gathered from the relevant communication clusters through the RICCS, including those health EEIs listed in Figure 8-4 below.
- If the appropriate authorities declare a presidential State of Emergency, the FRP is activated and the FBI and FEMA will be included in the communication and coordination process.

Figure 8-4: Level 1 Risk Assessment




Figure 8-4: Level 1 Risk Assessment, continued

**Health EEIs (continued):
*List of Chemical, Radiological,
Nuclear, Explosives, and Natural
Hazards EEIs***

Casualty counts
Need to request State and Federal medical assets—
DMATs, DMORTS, NMRT, etc.
Status of EMS personnel and services—support
needed
Supporting/staffing casualty collection points
Assessment of in-patient capacity
Bed-tracking systems—types of beds available
Availability of medical resources—personnel,
equipment, supplies
Patient tracking and locator systems
Family reunification/relocation
Fatality tracking, identification and management
Patient evacuation from scene
Relocation and/or discharge of patients to alternate
sites (NDMS)
Identification of agent by HazMat
Hospital decontamination and personal protective
equipment capability
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile—logistics
Security at fixed facilities
Need for “field hospitals”
Subject matter expertise in any of the above hazards
Ability of medical community to maintain “status quo”

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional incident or regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, nor requires inter-jurisdictional communication and coordination, a notification will be made through RICCS and a stand down debriefing conference call will take place.

As there may be many long-term sequelae that require regional attention there may need to be regional communication on an ongoing basis for some incidents.

4. After-action Critique

Within four weeks of stand down of the regional health incident or emergency, information for an after action critique will be gathered by the participating organizations and the Health Officials Committee will convene a meeting of interested persons to share lessons learned.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #8 Participating and Supporting Agencies

The primary purpose of the R-ESF #8 is to facilitate communication and coordination among jurisdictions before, during, and after regional incidents and regional emergencies. Health, mental health, and medical services partners coordinating in a regional response will use RICCS to facilitate communication and coordination of information and response to a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and through RICCS.
2. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, with R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services, state, local, and regional agencies will be able to exchange information (to the best of their ability) about many topics, including, but not limited to:

Jurisdictions involved;
Status of health, mental health, and medical, resources, personnel, equipment, supplies and facilities impacted by the incident/threat of incident;
Actual/potential (social, economic, political) impacts on the function and/or jurisdiction;
Other R-ESFs potentially impacted;
Overall resource shortfalls, response needs and priorities;
Relevant historical and demographic information;
Short term, medium and long-range response and recovery plans;
Recommendations for emergency ingress/egress for responders;
Assessment of health/medical needs, including in-patient capacity;
Health surveillance, including infectious disease surveillance;
Patient identification, tracking and evacuation requirements;
In-hospital care;
Food/drug/medical device safety;
Worker health/safety;
Radiological/chemical/biological hazards consultation and technical assistance, decontamination of victims and health and medical personnel;
Mental health care for victims, asymptomatic possibly exposed individuals, response personnel, health and medical personnel, general public, persons already in treatment, and persons concerned about possible exposure;
Public health informational/risk communication on public health issues, to include protective actions recommendations (PARs);
Vector control;
Potable water/wastewater and solid waste disposal testing;
Veterinary services and animal control;
Victim identification;
Credentialing requirements;
Liability issues and concerns;
Patient tracking/locator capabilities;
ESF #6—Mass Care issues concerning schools, children, family assistance centers, family reunification centers, and foster care; availability of Crime Victim Compensation Funds;
ESF #4—Firefighting issues concerning injuries and medical emergencies (including status of emergency medical services personnel, activities and needs);
ESF #10—Hazardous Materials concerning injuries and medical emergencies, decontamination options and information for hospitals on agent(s) identified;
ESF # 1—transportation issues dealing with access to care and transport of supplies and personnel;

Agricultural services and related issues;
Veterinary services and related issues;
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile—issues concerning reception, placement, distribution, security and dispensing;
Distribution of prophylactic medications and immunizations; and
Security services at health, mental health, and medical facilities.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

A. Planning

1. Planning includes a comprehensive review of existing capabilities and an analysis of strengths and gaps;
2. Roles and responsibilities during an incident are defined and communications interfaces developed so that all sectors of the healthcare community can receive the identical information without compromising patient confidentiality;
3. This enables effective decision-making and communication thereof to both healthcare providers and the public;
4. Agent fact sheets with appropriate instructions are developed in advance and made available for dissemination to providers and the community in the event of an incident;
5. A regional approach to locating, storing, managing and disbursing supplies from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile is developed;
6. R-ESF #8 and COG are responsible for assisting with the R-ESF #8 preparedness cycle; and
7. The COG Health Officials Committee will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that R-ESF #8 procedures are appropriately followed and are in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the RECP.

B. Training

1. Ongoing training presented by different organizations is codified and published so that all members of the healthcare community can attend the appropriate classes; and

2. Classes will include those provided by the different institutions and academic entities in the National Capital Region as well as State and Federal and distance learning opportunities.

B. Exercises

1. Exercises, both local and regional, are conducted on a regular basis and the participation of the different jurisdictions is solicited to create a coordinated regional response structure;
2. These will be tabletop, functional and/or field exercises that will exercise all elements of the healthcare community in conjunction with their counterparts in other emergency response agencies; and
3. Multi-disciplinary, multi-agency cooperation is a key component of an effective response mechanism.

C. Evaluation

After-action reports (AARs) will be developed for both real (e.g. October Anthrax) and notional (e.g., DC EMA Flu Exercise, Montgomery County NPS Retreat) events.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured and entered into a database where they will be available on request by the member jurisdictions.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #9 Technical Rescue

R-ESF #9 is incorporated into:

R-ESF #4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations (See page 4-1).

Note that R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are structurally the same and are contained in R-ESF #4.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #10 Hazardous Materials

R-ESF #10 is incorporated into:

- ? R-ESF #4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations (See page 4-1).

Note that R-ESFs #4, #9, and #10 are structurally the same and are contained in R-ESF #4.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #11 Food

Regional Coordinating Organization

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Coordinating Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State Coordinating Agencies

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
District of Columbia Department of Human Services
Maryland Department of Agriculture
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Federal Coordinating Agencies

Federal Emergency Management Agency
US Department of Agriculture

Regional Coordinating Private and Volunteer Organizations

District of Columbia Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
Maryland Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
Virginia Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
American Red Cross Washington Metropolitan Consortium

American Red Cross Frederick County Chapter
Greater Washington Board of Trade

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #11—Food facilitates the communication and coordination among regional organizations, agencies, private sector food sources and distributors, and jurisdictions regarding the procurement, storage, transportation, and distribution of food provisions and food stamps, and feeding assistance before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency. R-ESF #11 performs food communication and coordination activities in conjunction with and in continuance of the mass-feeding activities performed under R-ESF #6—Mass Care.

B. Scope

R-ESF #11 focuses on activities in response to the disruption of food availability that will require communication and coordination among regional partners. This inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing will address issues such as the determination of food assistance needs (including special-needs groups), the availability of food resources, the acquisition of appropriate food supplies, the transportation of those food supplies, the areas to which the supplies will be distributed, and the authorization of food stamps.

R-ESF #11 outlines an emergency food management communication and coordination function that can be implemented for regional events of any magnitude. R-ESF #11 responds to the short- and long-term food assistance needs associated with regional events that go beyond the communication and coordination function of R-ESF #6—Mass Care.

R-ESF #11 will work within existing channels of communication to provide an efficient and effective response to any regional incident or regional emergency. The interoperation structure of many volunteer organizations, on whom R-ESF #11 heavily relies for its communication and coordination activities, entails a system of local responders that provide the information used in the decision-making process. This unique, pre-existing, lateral communication structure, as well as a series of liaisons, will be used on the local level to facilitate regional communication and coordination.

II. Policies

- A. R-ESF #11 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, local government, or jurisdiction.
- B. R-ESF #11 will not usurp or override any memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that exist between an organization and any federal agency, state government, local government, or jurisdiction.
- C. Jurisdictions will respect existing contractual agreements so that there will not be competition for resources that are already under contract to a jurisdiction.
- D. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations and/or agencies to ensure that R-ESF #11 procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- E. R-ESF #11 will be used to collect information, communicate, and coordinate between regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions concerning food emergencies, and to facilitate the coordination of planning, response, and evaluation activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
- F. The Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS), in order to augment existing communication structures, will be used as the communication and coordination system on the regional level among R-ESF #11 members.
- G. Essential elements of information (EIs) will be collected by local organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions and reported through the RICCS.
- H. R-ESF # 11 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5, as necessary.
- I. R-ESF #11 will collect information regarding food needs and availability from regional coordinating organizations, agencies, and organizations through the RICCS.
- J. There will be close communication and coordination between R-ESF #11, R-ESF #6—Mass Care, and R-ESF #15—Donations and Volunteer Management, as dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency.
- K. In the case of a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #11 will communicate with R-ESF #1—Transportation, R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement, and R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach, and any other R-ESF as dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional event may result from a significant natural or man-made disaster, a technological emergency, power disruption, or any other regional event that causes a public health or safety hazard, as outlined in the Baseline Plan of the RECP. A regional event could create short- or long-term impacts that affect the ability of individuals to obtain food throughout the region, placing a significant demand on R-ESF #11 resources. Any regional event will require the communication of food assistance needs and the coordination of food related activities to plan for and provide an efficient and effective regional response.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Regional communication and coordination activities during a regional event will eliminate redundancy and facilitate an efficient and effective response.
2. Agencies and organizations under R-ESF #11 will perform tasks under their own authority, as applicable, and coordinate these tasks under the RECP.
3. R-ESF #11 public and private organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will focus on the communication and coordination of food needs assessments and food distribution throughout the region to ensure efficient and effective response coverage in all impacted disaster areas.
4. The following food related emergency conditions may exist:

- Localized food emergency requiring additional assistance;
- Food emergency in two or more jurisdictions;
- Region-wide food emergency;
- Food emergencies specific to certain economic or demographic groups of any origin;
- Food emergency related to the public or private procurement of food (i.e., market or distribution system shut-down);
- Health emergency preventing normal movement or congregation;
- Short- or long-term food emergency of any scale; and
- Any other condition that would require the emergency procurement, storage, transportation, or distribution of food.

5. R-ESF #11 will coordinate and communicate closely with members of R-ESF #6 to fulfill the food assistance needs of regional jurisdictions in emergency situations, including pre-planning and continual assistance, that may result from any regional event, beyond that which is covered under R-ESF #6.
6. Pre-designated, or normal, points of food management, used for the procurement, transportation, inspection, storage, and distribution of food, may be non-functioning due to direct impact from the incident or regional emergency.
7. Modification of traditional methods of managing the procurement, transportation, storage, and distribution of food may be necessary to fulfill the needs of the impacted area and residents.
8. The size and scope of a regional event will dictate the duration of R-ESF #11 communication and coordination activities, the relevant EEIs, and the amount of communication and coordination among regional partners necessary to achieve an efficient and effective response to the emergency food assistance needs of the region.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. R-ESF #11 members will engage in planning, training, and evaluation activities (e.g., discussions, focus groups) to develop relationships and analyze potential food needs and availability prior to the occurrence and/or threat of a regional emergency.
2. With the occurrence of a regional incident or regional emergency, the organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions that comprise R-ESF #11, while executing their respective responsibilities and authorities within their local or state operation plan, will communicate and coordinate under the RECP.
3. Information will be collected at the local level through existing channels of communication as determined by standard operating procedures and will be relayed to R-ESF #11 through the RICCS.
4. R-ESF #11 will collect local information regarding food needs and availability and will provide this information to regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions through the RICCS.

5. Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #11 will provide information for overall situation assessments in order to facilitate communication and coordination among R-ESFs.
6. As required, R-ESF #11 may provide a liaison to R-ESF #5.

B. Organization

Local organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions involved in food related response, as activated by their respective emergency operations plan, will form R-ESF #11. R-ESF #11 organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will use the appropriate communication and coordination activities as dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency.

C. Notification

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a regional incident or regional emergency requiring R-ESF #11 support, the RICCS will notify R-ESF #11 regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions and will establish appropriate communication. If R-ESF #11 members are made aware of an actual or possible event through the already existing communication channels, they will notify the RICCS. Organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions that need to supply a liaison will be notified through the RICCS. Communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #11 Participating Organizations, Agencies, and Jurisdictions

The primary purpose of the R-ESF #11 is to facilitate communication and coordination among jurisdictions before, during, and after regional incidents and emergencies. Local responders are to report food-related information to their respective authorities by means of standard operating procedures and through existing channels of communication. Participating R-ESF #11 organizations and/or agencies are responsible for providing food-related information through the RICCS. This information will then be relayed to other R-ESF #11 organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions. EEs have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESF #11 agencies.

B. Essential Elements of Information

The primary purpose of the RICCS is to facilitate the exchange of information among the coordinating organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency. EEs have been determined as the minimum essential elements of information to satisfy coordination needs within and among the R-ESFs. Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #11 coordinating organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will exchange information including, but not limited to:

- Status of transportation system and facilities;
- Status of food supply and distribution schedule;
- Location of useable mass care facilities, including shelters and feeding stations;
- Availability of medical and first aid support;
- Status of bulk distribution networks;
- Evacuation locations and routes;
- Location of hazardous areas;
- Status of volunteer organizations and health professionals;
- Status of DWI system;
- Estimated time for return to normal operations and for people to return home/work;
- Status of potable water supply;
- Status of communications network;
- Status of operations for local supermarkets and other food stores;
- Listing of possible contaminated food products in the area;
- Storage locations for bulk food products;
- Location of the incident or regional emergency;
- Jurisdictions involved;
- Overall priorities;
- Estimated term of impact;
- Needs assessments;
- Status of resources, personnel, and facilities;
- Status of efforts under the local, state, or federal emergency operations plans;
- Status of upcoming events;
- Socio-economic impacts;
- Logistical problems;
- Funding; and
- Prioritization of service/deliveries.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for R-ESF #11 and the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with the sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will engage in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against the scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

The local organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions involved in food-related response are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #11, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #11. All participating food supporting agencies and organizations will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #11. R-ESF #11 and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to RECP and R-ESF #11 responsibilities will be developed and carried out.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of food shortage simulations/exercises will be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series is composed of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the coordination of food supplies and/or resources under R-ESF #11 and the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #12 Energy

Regional Coordinating Organization

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State Government Energy Agencies

District of Columbia Energy Office
District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Maryland Energy Administration
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Federal Government Agencies

Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy, Philadelphia Support Office

Energy Regulatory Commissions

District of Columbia Public Service Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Maryland Public Service Commission
Virginia State Corporation Commission

Private Sector and Other Energy Organizations

Allegheny Energy
BG&E
Colonial
Columbia Gas
Covanta
Dominion Virginia Power
Maryland Petroleum Council
Michigan Cogen
Mid-Atlantic Petroleum Distributors Association
Mirant
Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative
PEPCO
PJM Interconnection
Washington Gas
Washington, Maryland, Delaware Service Station & Automotive Repair Association

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #12—Energy facilitates communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions to ensure an effective and timely response to public emergencies that affect the regional energy infrastructure (including the supply and delivery of electricity, natural gas, and petroleum fuels) before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF #12 is intended to focus on disruptions of regional energy systems requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing. Provision of energy services is essential to many systems covered by other R-ESFs, including transportation, communications, disaster relief, health care, and public works. Disruptions in energy services can result from direct impacts upon the regions energy infrastructure (e.g., due to natural disasters or acts of terrorism), from extreme demands placed upon regional energy systems by emergencies in other functional areas, or a combination of the two.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #12 will not usurp or override and will be consistent with the policies of local governments or jurisdictions, state governments, and federal agencies.
- B.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the R-ESF #12 activities are consistent with the purpose and guidelines of R-ESF #12 and the policies and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C.** Essential Elements of Information (EIs) will be reported through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) as required by the regional incident or regional emergency.
- D.** As required by the regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #12 will designate a liaison to R-ESF #5.
- E.** R-ESF #12 will serve as the energy emergency management component of the Comprehensive Regional Energy Plan being developed by the Energy Policy Advisory Committee (EPAC).

- F. R-ESF #12 priorities are intended to facilitate and coordinate information that will help protect and/or quickly restore energy resources and infrastructures in order to maintain continuity of essential public and private services and help protect lives and property throughout the region.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency could adversely impact the energy resources and infrastructure throughout the region. This could include—but is not limited to—the electricity generation, transmission, and distribution systems; the natural gas storage, transmission, and distribution systems; and the petroleum (e.g., gasoline, diesel, and heating oil) storage and distribution systems. A number of critical activities could be adversely affected by damage to or excessive demand placed upon key components of the regional energy infrastructure. Potentially affected activities include communications and transportation, both of which are essential to emergency response and evacuation. At the same time, a regional incident or regional emergency could create significant surge demands for energy resources to provide for relief and recovery, as well as for the clearing and restoration of the energy system itself.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Energy infrastructure is a critical component for the effective implementation of most R-ESF annexes for regional emergency planning.
2. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, the regional civil energy infrastructure may experience disruptions.
3. Energy disruptions can occur for several reasons. These include direct impacts upon the energy infrastructure (e.g., damage to electricity or natural gas transmission or distribution networks resulting from natural disasters or terrorist attacks), surges in requirements placed upon the energy system by emergencies in other functional areas, and widespread energy shortages.
4. Energy or non-energy infrastructure damage and communications disruptions may inhibit efficient coordination of energy support during the immediate response and post-disaster period.
5. Energy disruptions may similarly affect the coordination and execution of relief activities throughout the region.

6. Energy flow will improve as systems are cleared and repaired and as generators and back-up sources of energy become available.
7. Gradual clearing of energy systems and improved communications will permit an increased flow of emergency relief, although localized distribution patterns might remain unusable for a significant period.
8. The energy infrastructure must be sensitive and responsive to energy contingency plans and national security-related energy requirements.
9. COG will be the point-of-contact for local jurisdictions for the purposes of coordinating information about emergency energy activities where a regional coordination is warranted.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Upon the occurrence and/or threat of a regional incident or regional emergency with regional energy implications, R-ESF #12 will be used.
2. The supporting regional agencies and organizations that constitute R-ESF #12 will coordinate and execute their respective energy authorities and program responsibilities during the regional incident or regional emergency.
3. R-ESF #12 will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional energy-related issues (i.e., equipment and technical support) with R-ESF #5 and RICCS.
4. Requests for information through the RICCS regarding emergency regional energy issues will be referred to the R-ESF #12 liaison to R-ESF #5.

B. Organization

R-ESF #12 is composed of members of the Energy Policy Advisory Committee (EPAC) representing the COG member jurisdictions. EPAC membership includes all major jurisdictions, utilities, and representatives from the federal agencies (including DOE and GSA). In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, the jurisdiction where the response is located will notify R-ESF #5 and EPAC of the circumstances, which will then trigger the utilization of R-ESF #12. Upon the utilization of R-ESF #12, a member of the affected jurisdiction will be designated as a lead. The lead will facilitate all conference calls, and report any necessary information to R-ESF #5. An R-ESF #12 liaison will be provided to R-ESF #5 as necessary.

Notification

1. Upon the request of any participating R-ESF #12 organization, agency, or jurisdiction, the RICCS will:

Notify R-ESF #12 appropriate regional supporting agencies;

Ask R-ESF #12 to identify organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions that may need to supply subject-matter expertise to the RICCS; and

Establish communication with appropriate organizations and state and federal agencies.

2. If R-ESF #12 is made aware of an imminent or an actual regional emergency through other sources, it will notify RICCS. Communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

C. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

Upon detection of an energy-related incident, COG or any participating R-ESF #12 organization, agency, or jurisdiction will first make an internal assessment of the situation.

R-ESF #12 organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions should use available information to determine the status and assess the energy impacts of the public emergency, including public agency and government resources needed to respond.

R-ESF #12 organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions should identify and recommend government actions necessary to obtain needed resources to repair or restore damaged energy systems and disruptions in energy supplies.

If that organization, COG, or any other R-ESF #12 organization, agency, or jurisdiction determines that the event is of regional significance, they should contact the RICCS with any EEIs concerning the situation and ask that R-ESF #12 or all R-ESFs be notified of the regional incident or regional emergency.

Based on the nature and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, COG or any participating R-ESF #12 organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a conference call to be convened

through the RICCS to discuss the regional incident or regional emergency. The R-ESF #12 member from the affected jurisdiction will act as lead and will facilitate the conference call.

The conference call would be used to determine the type and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, ongoing actions, responses and public messages; identify the next steps; and discuss any other key regional issues.

R-ESF #12 organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions should receive and respond to requests for information from RICCS and to notify RICCS of priorities to repair damage and disruptions in energy supply through consultation with other organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions.

2. Continuing Actions

R-ESF #5 will serve as the focal point for receipt of reports of damage to energy supply and distribution systems and requirements for system restoration. There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, communication, and response for each incident with information facilitated through the RICCS.

Additional conference calls may be scheduled by conference call participants or may be requested by COG or any participating R-ESF #12 energy organization, agency, or jurisdiction as required by the ongoing regional incident or regional emergency.

Subject matter experts from any participating R-ESF #12 organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis of the regional impact of the regional incident or regional emergency to the R-ESFs through the RICCS to facilitate the regional response.

R-ESF #12 will consult state authorities on priorities for energy restoration process, assistance, and supply.

R-ESF #12 will help locate fuel for transportation, natural gas services, generators, technical support, communications, and emergency operations.

If needed, R-ESF #12 will recommend actions to jurisdictions regarding the conservation of petroleum fuel, electricity, and natural gas.

R-ESF #12 will coordinate the collection and reporting of energy supply information to the public through the RICCS and R-ESF #14.

3. Stand Down

Once the regional incident or regional emergency is over, a notification will be sent out via RICCS to alert the entire R-ESF #12 group of the stand-down of R-ESF #12.

4. After-action Critique

Once the regional incident or regional emergency has been terminated, R-ESF #12 will prepare an Incident Assessment Summary Report on the lessons learned. The Incident Assessment Summary Report will be compiled by the R-ESF #12 lead, designated for the specific regional emergency, and will consist of reports from each jurisdiction on their activities performed during the regional incident or regional emergency, and submitted to the R-ESF #12 lead for compilation. The report findings will be presented at the next regularly scheduled EPAC meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #12 Participating and Supporting Agencies

Energy-related organizations participating in a regional response will contribute EEIs to the RICCS as required by the RECP policies.

Key organizations and their coordination roles include the following:

1. **District of Columbia Energy Office**—The DC Energy Office is the primary agency in the District of Columbia responsible for coordinating with all other regional and District governmental department response elements and utilities to restore the District's energy systems.
2. **Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**—Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is an independent regulatory agency within the Department of Energy that regulates, licenses, and oversees energy and related environmental matters.
3. **Maryland Energy Administration**—Maryland Energy Administration is the coordinating agency that advises the Governor on maximizing energy efficiency while promoting economic development, reducing reliance on foreign energy supplies, and improving the environment.
4. **Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments**—COG is the primary agency in the Metropolitan Washington area responsible for coordinating with all other regional and District governmental

department response elements and utilities to restore the region's energy systems.

5. **Mid-Atlantic Petroleum Distributors Association**—This association is an organization of independent marketers of petroleum products, petroleum suppliers, and industry participants who coordinate legislative and regulatory support, as well as educate members, and ensure fair business practices.
6. **Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative**—This organization is a member-owned, locally based and operated electric distribution system providing reliable energy and services to the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area.
7. **PJM Interconnection**—This organization is responsible for the operation and control of the bulk electric power system throughout major portions of five Mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia.
8. **Virginia Department of Emergency Management**— This state agency works closely with local government emergency managers, other state agencies, voluntary organizations and federal agencies to ensure a comprehensive, efficient, and effective response to emergencies and disasters throughout Virginia, including coordinating energy emergencies.

B. Essential Elements of Information:

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs through RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #12—Energy, the organizations are responsible for providing to R-ESF #5 any knowledge available about the following EEs during a regional incident or regional emergency involving energy disruptions or services:
 - Status of transportation system and facilities;
 - Status of mutual aid agreements;
 - Status of communications system;
 - Potential impacts to the community;

Status of key contractors;
Detailed damage report to any energy infrastructure;
Estimated time for bringing energy infrastructure back online;
Access/transportation routes to and from hazards within emergency areas;
Location of the regional incident or regional emergency;
Jurisdictions involved;
Status of energy systems;
Status of resources, personnel, equipment and facilities impacted by the regional incident or regional emergency/threat of regional emergency;
Other R-ESFs potentially impacted;
Response needs and priorities;
Need for remote sensing and reconnaissance activities;
Short-, medium-, and long-term energy response, recovery, and continuity plans;
Injuries and medical emergencies;
Geographical Information System (GIS) mapping if available; and
Logistical problems.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is an iterative process designed to ensure a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the participating organizations is evaluated in order to refine the plans, and the cycle repeats. R-ESF #12 and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle for R-ESF #12.

A. Planning

EPAC and COG are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #12, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #12. All participating energy agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #12.

Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the energy sector and identification of unfunded regional incident or regional energy emergency response and coordination needs. Plans will be evaluated on an annual basis to determine if any changes are needed. The evaluation will be performed by the entire EPAC group, concluding with discussion of changes at a regularly scheduled EPAC meeting.

B. Training

COG will take the lead on scheduling annual training; however, on a rotating basis, each EPAC member will be responsible for the development and planning of the annual training needs. Training will be held on a yearly basis to correspond with changes to the plan, and take place at a COG designated location.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of energy simulations/exercises are conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

Exercises will alternate between tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises on an annual basis as determined by COG. Exercises will occur on a yearly basis; however, if major changes are made to the plan, then additional exercises may be planned.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the energy function and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises. Lessons learned from these experiences are captured in a corrective action system and the issues are tracked in order to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

E. Corrective Action

Evaluations will occur in the form of after-action critiques. After-action critiques will be compiled after all training, exercises, and plan utilizations. Each after-action critique will be an Incident Assessment Summary Report on the lessons learned. The Incident Assessment Summary Report will be compiled by the R-ESF #12 lead, designated for the specific training, exercise, or plan utilization, and will consist of reports from each jurisdiction on their activities performed. The reports will be submitted to the lead for compilation. The report findings will be presented at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #13 Law Enforcement

Regional Coordinating Organization

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Regional Law Enforcement Agencies

Metropolitan Transit Police

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Police

Local and Law Enforcement Agencies

Alexandria

Arlington County

Bowie

College Park

District of Columbia

Fairfax

Fairfax County

Falls Church

Frederick County

Gaithersburg

Greenbelt

Loudoun County

Metro Transit Police

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Police

Montgomery County

Prince George's County

Prince William County

Rockville

Takoma Park

State Law Enforcement Agencies

Maryland National Capital Park Police/Montgomery County Division

Maryland National Capital Park Police/Prince George's County Division

Maryland State Police

Virginia State Police

Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms/Washington Field Office

Bureau of Engraving and Printing Police

Central Intelligence Agency—Security Protective Service

Defense Protective Service

Drug Enforcement Administration/Washington Field Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation/Washington Field Office
Federal Protective Service
National Institutes of Health Police
Capitol Police
U.S. Marshals Service
Mint Police
U.S. Park Police
Secret Service

Military Law Enforcement Authorities

Military District of Washington/Provost Marshal
Naval District of Washington

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #13—Law Enforcement facilitates communication and information coordination among regional jurisdictions concerning law enforcement issues and activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, as defined in the RECP.

B. Scope

R-ESF #13 focuses on regional coordination of law enforcement information associated with an incident or emergency requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #13 does not usurp or override the policies or mutual aid operational agreements of any local jurisdiction or government, state government, or federal agency.
- B.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among participating organizations to ensure that the R-ESF #13 communication and coordination process is consistent with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C.** The Incident Command System (ICS) will be the organizational structure and terminology used during a response for the coordination of police services.
- D.** Essential elements of information (EIs) will be reported through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) consistent with RECP policy.
- E.** R-ESF #13 will provide an information liaison to R-ESF #5 for conference calls as necessary.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

R-ESF #13 provides an overall communications and coordination mechanism that builds on the existing regional infrastructure for law enforcement communication and information coordination, as defined by jurisdictional

protocols and the Police Mutual Aid Plan. Three levels of communication of incident information are identified:

1. **Level 1** covers local incidents that are within the capabilities of the primary responding jurisdiction, and that have no likely impact on other jurisdictions. For these incidents, R-ESF #13 provides for information-only notification to other agencies via the RICCS at the discretion of the Incident Commander.
2. **Level 2** encompasses incidents that affect other jurisdictions beyond the bounds of the primary responding agency or that involve existing cross-boundary mutual aid activities or that may have impact on other R-ESF activities, such as Transportation or Mass Care. For Level 2 incidents, R-ESF #13 provides for notification of the chiefs of participating agencies via the RICCS and for interagency coordination at the chief level. It may also be used for operational communication for technical consultation at the discretion of the responding jurisdiction.
3. **Level 3** incidents are those that require interagency operations beyond the scope of existing mutual aid agreements or which involve significant operations on the part of other R-ESFs. For these incidents, full implementation of the RICCS at the chief administrative officer or elected official level is indicated.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Infrastructure damage and communications disruptions may inhibit efficient coordination of law enforcement support during the immediate response and post-event period(s).
2. Police services disruptions can occur as a result of direct impacts upon the law enforcement locations or from surges in requirements placed upon the law enforcement organizations by emergencies in other functional areas.
3. The continuity of police services must be sensitive and responsive to the national security-related law enforcement requirements.
4. There may be multiple command posts to handle the different aspects of the police services response to an event, such as an investigative command post and a response command post. There will be a need to coordinate information among these various command posts.
5. For a regional incident or regional emergency resulting from criminal acts, command and control of the criminal investigation and dissemination of non-sensitive intelligence, as necessary, will need to have communication and coordination focus.

6. Existing regional mutual aid agreements will be invoked.
7. Due to the inherent nature of the law enforcement, information flow must be sensitive to operational security.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Participating agencies in R-ESF #13 will use RICCS to:

Share EEI;

Tap into the larger operational picture to see how other R-ESF activities may impact law enforcement activities; and

Coordinate communications.

2. The R-ESF #13 function will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional law enforcement related issues through RICCS.

B. Organization

The chief or senior operational official of the lead local, state or federal law enforcement agency will determine the need for information sharing among the jurisdictions. When it is determined that regional emergency or pre-planned event assistance or information sharing is needed, RICCS can be used for the coordination of information.

C. Notification


Any participating R-ESF #13 organization, agency, jurisdiction, or any jurisdiction's Emergency Communications Center/Emergency Operations Center (ECC/EOC) may use RICCS to notify the appropriate R-ESF #13 supporting agencies, jurisdictional police chiefs, or jurisdictional CAOs of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency requiring law enforcement support. Such notifications will be consistent with the EEI guidelines established by R-ESF #5—Information and Planning.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions


Any participating R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement organization, agency, or jurisdiction may send an initial informational notification to the participating law enforcement agencies via the Level 1 Notification process (See Figure 13-1, Level 1 Notification), informing them of a local incident of possible regional interest.

Figure 13-1: Level 1 Notification



Level 2 encompasses incidents that may affect other jurisdictions or that involve cross-boundary mutual aid activities or that may have impact on other R-ESF activities, such as Transportation or Mass Care (see Figure 13-2: Level 2 Notification). For Level 2 incidents, R-ESF #13 provides for notification of the chiefs of participating agencies via the RICCS and for interagency coordination at the chief level. It may also be used for operational communication for technical consultation at the discretion of the responding jurisdiction.

Figure 13-2: Level 2 Notification




Level 3 incidents are those that require interagency operations beyond the scope of existing mutual aid agreements or that involve significant operations on the part of other R-ESFs (see Figure 13-3: Level 3 Notification). For these incidents, full implementation of the RICCS at the chief administrative officer or elected official level is indicated.

The jurisdiction in charge under the Incident Command will provide periodic updates to RICCS.

The affected jurisdiction will act as lead agency and facilitate the conference call.

Figure 13-3: Level 3 Notification



2. Continuing Actions

For major regional incidents or emergencies, RICCS will be the primary communications network for ongoing inter-jurisdictional coordination at the agency chief, CAO, and elected official level.

3. Stand Down

At the discretion of the lead jurisdiction, inter-jurisdictional communications through RICCS may be terminated via a RICCS notification and final conference call.

4. After-action Critique

Within two weeks of stand-down of the regional public emergency, participating R-ESF #13 agencies will be asked for recommendations on how R-ESF #13 can be improved. Specific incidents may require roundtable discussion if the incident is high profile and of a critical nature.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #13 Participating and Supporting Agencies

Organizations participating in a regional response will provide EEIs to RICCS as required by RECP policy.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement, the agencies are responsible for providing the following essential elements of information for regional incidents or emergencies requiring police services:

- Status of transportation system;
- Status of jails and courthouses;
- Location of temporary holding facilities for criminals;
- Location of hazardous environments;

Status of security of hazardous locations;
Status of mutual aid agreements;
Location of the command post;
Listing of law enforcement agencies on scene (federal, state, local);
Access points to emergency areas;
Location of the regional emergency;
Crowd control problems;
Jurisdictions involved; which jurisdiction has the law enforcement lead;
Status of resources, personnel, equipment and facilities impacted by the regional emergency/threat of regional emergency;
Other R-ESFs potentially impacted;
Overall resource shortfalls, response needs, and priorities;
Status of remote sensing and reconnaissance activities;
Logistical problems;
External communications capabilities for citizen access to services;
and
Internal communications capabilities within the agency/region.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

The Police Chiefs Committee of COG is responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #13, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #13.

B. Training

Training related to the RECP and R-ESF #13 responsibilities will be coordinated through the Police and Fire Training Subcommittees and COG.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of law enforcement simulations/exercises are conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and

coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or another organization.

D. Evaluation

To ensure continuous improvement in the law enforcement function and the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #14 Media Relations and Communications Outreach

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Coordinating Agencies

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State/District Government Outreach Organizations

District of Columbia Media/Community Relations Offices
Maryland State Media/Community Relations Offices
Virginia State Media/Community Relations Offices

Federal Government Outreach Organizations

Federal Agency PIOs

Public and Private-sector Outreach Organizations

Greater Washington Board of Trade
Employers
School Districts
Consortium of Universities
News and Public Affairs Outlets
Functional Entity PIOs (i.e., Transportation, Utilities, Health, and Safety)

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The goal of Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #14—Media Relations and Communication Outreach is to provide accurate, authoritative, and timely regional information to news media representatives before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, thereby supporting the National Capital Region (NCR) partners as they work to protect the health and safety of citizens in the NCR.

Media Relations and Communications Outreach primarily focuses on coordination with local jurisdictions regarding communication of regional information to the public through the media, employers, schools, universities, and community organizations. This regional information will focus on issues related to regional essential services during and after potential or actual regional public emergencies. The information usually will be about issues away from what is happening at the site of a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Scope

This R-ESF discusses the policies, responsibilities, and concept of operations for the R-ESF #14 elements before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency. R-ESF #14 would be utilized in the event of a local public emergency that has regional or multi-jurisdictional implications.

R-ESF #14 is a support function for a range of authorized parties including the chief administrative officers (CAOs) from the jurisdiction directly affected by the incident, other jurisdictional CAOs, officials/managers of other R-ESFs, or regional experts in functional area R-ESFs.

The mission of R-ESF #14 is to contribute to the well-being of the regional community before, during, and after a public emergency by disseminating accurate, consistent, timely, and easy-to-understand information as well as coordinating communication among affected entities. Specific objectives are to:

Coordinate regional information and message development with government officials and all relevant organizations through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS).

Assess and convey the nature of a regional incident or regional emergency to the public in a form that is factually accurate as soon as possible.

Provide critical regional information to the media and general public concerning the region's response to the emergency.

Provide critical information concerning public emergency support assistance, including shelter information, mobility and transportation issues, recovery assistance, and local, state, and federal assistance availability.

Provide accurate authoritative regional information to minimize rumors and false information.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #14 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the R-ESF #14 planning and procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C.** COG will facilitate coordination among member organizations before, during, and after a potential or actual regional emergency to foster effective communications and message development.
- D.** EEIs will be reported through the RICCS as required by RECP policy.
- E.** R-ESF #14 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5, as needed.
- F.** EEIs will be gathered from RICCS and reported to the local jurisdictions and other affected entities as required by RECP policy.
- G.** R-ESF #14 policy directs the RICCS PIO to proactively interact with the news media to provide critical regional information.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

1. The period immediately following a public emergency is critical in setting up the appropriate mechanism necessary to respond to the emergency public information and news requirements generated.
2. After a regional incident or regional emergency, local, state, and federal assistance may be available and a need will exist to inform the public on the types of assistance being offered.
3. Different levels of regional incidents and regional emergencies may require different types of coordination and communication. Three regional emergency condition levels are outlined below:

Regional Incident or Regional Emergency Condition (Worst-case Scenario)

- In a worst-case regional incident or regional emergency, significant disruptions will be experienced in many essential services on a regional basis, including transportation, communications, power and water systems and public health and safety support systems. Normal means of communications in the affected area may be destroyed or severely disrupted; therefore, only limited and incomplete information may be expected from the area until communications can be restored. Regional communications may also be severely disrupted such that the normal conferencing system is not operational.
- In the event of such a regional incident or regional emergency, the functioning of R-ESF #14 may need to be convened through the use of alternate means of communication (i.e., radio phones, secure phones; or other system defined through R-ESF #2). The RICCS PIO, working in coordination with the appropriate R-ESF #2 contact, will ensure the issuance of said radios, phones, or other communications equipment.
- In the event of such a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF # 14 managers/officials might also need the assistance of the managers/officials of R-ESF #12, Energy Annex or emergency power support from R-ESF #3.

Disruptive Regional Incident or Regional Emergency Condition

- A disruptive regional incident or regional emergency condition is a multi-jurisdictional event that is not necessarily life threatening to the general public.
- Communications are functional.
- Mobility, public safety, and health may be affected.
- Early release of employees may occur.

Regional Incident (Threat Condition)

- A regional incident (threat condition) is a regional incident that threatens the National Capital Region.
- Local and regional officials may not be in charge of deciding when and what information is released.
- Timing and release of information may vary according to the specific nature of the threat.
- Premature release of information may be limited to mitigate threat.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. R-ESF #14 will be coordinated closely with any affected jurisdictions and facilitated as required by COG.
2. R-ESF #14 will be coordinated with all affected elements of the region including CAOs to ensure that information disseminated is accurate, timely, and consistent in keeping with the theme “common message, many voices.”
3. There will be a frontline Incident PIO response by the jurisdiction at the scene. R-ESF #14 information will focus on regional impacts generally away from the event; in depth analysis and expert opinions; and media monitoring ability.
4. For regional incidents or regional emergencies, one of two scenarios may govern the functioning of R-ESF #14:

When there is a regional incident or regional emergency at a site within one (or several) jurisdictions, an Incident PIO from that jurisdiction will be the Lead PIO for the incident, and will be responsible for gathering and disseminating information to the media and all other relevant parties. Under this scenario, the RICCS PIO will work to support the Incident PIO as required by providing regional information generally not directly related to what is happening at the site to the media and other relevant parties.

When the regional incident or regional emergency affects the entire region, the RICCS PIO will work with the CAOs, elected officials from the jurisdictions and other subject-matter experts to disseminate information to the media and other relevant parties. Under this scenario, the RICCS PIO will be the lead PIO for the event/incident.

5. Additional coordination and communication with state and federal entities will be required if state or federal response elements are utilized before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
6. Up-to-date and pre-programmed resource databases maintained by COG will be available to provide established contacts, relationships, and rosters of regional government officials, media, and appropriate community groups and organizations
7. The RICCS PIO will communicate regional impacts (e.g., transportation, mobility, etc.) arising from the regional emergency to affected entities.
8. In the event of a regional threat, some information may be tightly controlled if it is in the interest of law enforcement authorities in order to contain or mitigate the threat. All parties should be aware of the need to protect such information when necessary to the success of the operation.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. R-ESF #14 will provide support to authorized parties including the CAO(s) from the jurisdiction directly affected by the incident, other jurisdictional CAOs, officials/managers of other R-ESFs, or regional experts in functional area R-ESFs.

2. The supporting agencies that comprise R-ESF #14 will coordinate and execute their respective media/community relations authorities and program responsibilities during the regional emergency.
3. A primary function of R-ESF #14 is coordination of information among local jurisdictions.
4. R-ESF #14 will establish a capability to receive, collect, coordinate, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional emergency issues through the RICCS in a timely manner.
5. Requests for information regarding emergency regional response issues will be referred through the RICCS to the PIO of the responding jurisdiction.

B. Organization

1. In situations where an incident or regional emergency occurs within one (or several) jurisdictions, the Lead PIO for the incident/emergency will be the affected jurisdiction's PIO. In this situation, the RICCS PIO will support the incident PIO.
2. In situations where an incident is not limited to one (or several) jurisdictions, the RICCS PIO will be the lead PIO for the event/incident and will coordinate with the CAOs, elected officials and other subject matter experts to disseminate information.
3. The RICCS PIO will be initially staffed by the COG Office of Public Affairs, but for major and long-duration regional incidents/emergencies the RICCS PIO function will be carried out by a crisis communication PIO team under contract to and coordinated by COG. This PIO team must be familiar with the region and have all relative contact information and equipment necessary to respond to the event.

The RICCS PIO will be responsible for regional news media management, including dispensing accurate information and background material and arranging for expert interviews and monitoring media reporting of the incident.

The RICCS PIO also will be responsible for dispensing accurate, timely regional information to employers, schools, and universities and community organizations.

4. The RICCS PIO shall be included in any notification and conference calls. The RICCS PIO shall be responsible for working with regional officials to develop a common message and as requested, delivering that

message in a timely manner to the media. Message development will most likely take place during a conference call organized through the RICCS that includes decision makers as well as appropriate PIOs.

C. Notification

Upon notification by COG or any participating R-ESF #14 organization, agency, or jurisdiction of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency requiring communications support, RICCS, as requested, will notify the CAOs and R-ESF #14 regional supporting agencies of the incident. If PIOs of any organization are made aware of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency through any source, they will notify R-ESF #14 members through RICCS.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, the RICCS PIO will be responsible for coordinating with the region's CAOs and PIOs to deliver accurate news information to the media and to develop an appropriate message, analysis, and background material in a timely manner to accompany the news. This will include notification of the media regarding the event, and notification that the region is working together. The RICCS PIO will supplement and complement the incident jurisdiction(s) PIO(s) by providing regional information and regional analysis.

Before, during, or after a regional incident or regional emergency, as requested, the RICCS PIO will be responsible for participating in any conference calls with the region's CAOs, PIOs, other R-ESF clusters, or subject-matter experts.

The CAOs from each jurisdiction will provide information about the region's emergency response efforts and work with elected officials to develop a unified message.

Based on the nature and the extent of the situation, COG or any participating R-ESF #14 organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a message development conference call to be convened through RICCS to discuss the incident.

The RICCS PIO will notify applicable parties of a message development conference call, facilitate the preparation of a

regional message in the course of the call, and provide the regional message to all appropriate parties.

The RICCS PIO is responsible for providing talking points on regional information/messages for the jurisdictions' Chief Executive Officers and CAOs.

The RICCS PIO is responsible for providing overviews, regional information coordination, information on regional issues (i.e., transportation, health, etc.), coordination of PIO mutual aid, media tracking, background analysis, and analysis of regional effects. Information dissemination regarding non-regional issues is the responsibility of local jurisdictions.

The RICCS PIO is responsible for conducting additional in-depth analysis to complement the message from the local jurisdictions. The RICCS PIO is also responsible for finding experts and information as well as providing interview access to appropriate regional officials and experts.

The RICCS PIO, as requested, shall also provide a media monitoring capability for the region (e.g., contracting for transcripts of radio and TV, collecting copies of print media).

During an emergency, the RICCS PIO will be responsible for coordinating with the region's CAOs to advise and deliver accurate information to schools, employers, universities, and other community organizations. This may include writing and distributing press releases.

The RICCS PIO will be responsible for establishing and directing a regional information operation for employers, community organizations, schools, and universities.

2. Continuing Actions

Additional message development conference calls may be scheduled by the conference call participants or may be requested by COG or any participating R-ESF #14 organization, agency, or jurisdiction as dictated by the ongoing incident.

The RICCS PIO will be responsible for providing news briefings on regional issues as needed.

The RICCS PIO will be responsible for providing information on an on-going basis to employers, schools, universities, and community organizations as well as for receiving input and providing outreach to impacted communities.

The RICCS PIO is responsible for maintaining contact and information exchange with region-wide umbrella organizations as well as with chambers of commerce and other applicable organizations.

3. Stand Down

The CAOs and other decision makers will determine when there is no further need for the continued function of R-ESF #14 and the RICCS PIO.

4. After-action Critique

Within two weeks of stand-down of the regional incident or regional emergency, information for an after-action critique will be gathered by the RICCS Lead PIO and the critique will be discussed at the next regularly scheduled COG Communication Work Group meeting and at the next regularly scheduled COG PIOs Committee meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #14 Participating and Supporting Agencies

Agencies participating in a regional response will contribute regional EEs to the RICCS as required by the incident.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and through the RICCS.
2. From the perspective of R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Communication Outreach, the agencies are responsible for providing the following regional essential elements of information concerning regional

public emergencies involving regional media relations and communications outreach functions:

- Media on scene;
- Status of press releases;
- Information on evacuation, sheltering and food supply;
- What jurisdictions are involved;
- Location of the JIC; who is the lead jurisdiction;
- What information is being passed to the public; how is it being passed;
- Detailed information on the incident;
- Status of hazards involved;
- Status of communications network;
- Communication and coordination efforts being used by the involved jurisdictions;
- Status of media monitoring efforts;
- Status of key personnel;
- Major issues/activities of R-ESFs;
- Resource shortfalls;
- Overall priorities for response;
- Status of upcoming events;
- Social, economic, and political impacts;
- Status of R-ESF activation;
- Historical and demographic information;
- Status (statistics) on recovery programs (human services, infrastructure, Small Business Administration);
- Status and analysis of initial assessments (needs assessments and damage assessments, including preliminary damage assessments);
- Status of efforts under federal emergency operations plans;
- School closures
- Citizen assistance requests; and
- Logistical problems.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

The COG Communications Work Group supported by the COG PIO Committee is responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #14, including review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #14. All participating media relations and community outreach agencies will contribute to the planning of R-ESF #14.

Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the media relations and community outreach sector and identification of unfunded regional communication emergency response and coordination needs.

Planning will also include design of training programs and exercises by the COG Communications Work Group and COG PIO Committee.

Planning will also include development of a scope of work and contractor selection through COG for the on-call crisis communication PIO team that would serve as the RICCS PIO in major and long duration emergencies.

B. Training

Training for this R-ESF shall be conducted in concert with training for jurisdictional emergency operations personnel as well as with training that includes members of other R-ESFs or clusters that address communication and coordination.

Training for jurisdictional PIOs, COG public affairs staff, and the Crisis Communication PIO Team is essential and will be provided on a semi-annual basis.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of communications simulations/exercises are conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises facilitated by COG and supported by other organizations. These exercises will provide opportunities for all PIOs who may be requested to help fill the RICCS PIO role.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the media relations and communications outreach function and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Regional Emergency Support Function #15 Donations and Volunteer Management

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Coordinating Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State Coordinating Agencies

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
District of Columbia Commission of National and Community Service
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Federal Coordinating Agencies

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III–Voluntary Agency Liaison
The American Legion

Regional Coordinating Private and Volunteer Organizations

District of Columbia Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
Maryland Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
Virginia Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
American Red Cross Washington Metropolitan Consortium
American Red Cross Frederick County Chapter
Greater Washington Board of Trade

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Regional Emergency Support Function (R-ESF) #15—Donations and Volunteer Management, facilitates the communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions and agencies regarding the need for, and availability of, donations and volunteer services before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.

B. Scope

R-ESF # 15 focuses on activities in response to the disruption of resource availability that would require communication and coordination among regional partners providing donations and/or volunteer support.

1. Communication and coordination concerning donations and volunteer availability and management may be conducted as separate or joint functions, as dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency.
2. R-ESF #15 will work within existing channels of communication to provide an efficient and effective response before, during, and after any regional incident or regional emergency. The system of local volunteer organizations that comprise R-ESF #15 will use existing dissemination methods to inform those involved in the communication and coordination activities. In conjunction with regional agencies and jurisdictions, the lateral communication structure and a series of liaisons will facilitate regional communication and coordination under R-ESF #15.

II. Policies

- A.** R-ESF #15 will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, local government, or jurisdiction.
- B.** R-ESF #15 will not usurp or override any memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that exist between an organization and any federal agency, state government, local government, or jurisdiction.
- C.** Jurisdictions will respect existing contractual agreements so that there will not be competition for resources that are already under contract to a jurisdiction.
- D.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations and/or agencies to ensure that R-ESF #15 procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

- E.** R-ESF #15 will be used to collect information, communicate, and coordinate between regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions concerning donations and volunteer management, and to facilitate the coordination of planning, response, and evaluation activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
- F.** The Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) will be used as the communication and coordination system on the regional level among R-ESF #15 members.
- G.** R-ESF #15 organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will communicate and coordinate information and activities that are within their area of expertise (i.e., unaffiliated volunteers) and within their operational capacity (i.e., warehousing donations).
- H.** Essential Elements of Information (EIs) will be collected by local organizations, agencies, or jurisdictions and reported through the RICCS.
- I.** As needed, R-ESF #15 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5.
- J.** R-ESF #15 will collect information regarding donation needs and volunteer availability from regional coordinating organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions through the RICCS.
- K.** There will be close communication and coordination between R-ESF #6—Mass Care, R-ESF #11—Food, and R-ESF #15, as dictated by the regional event.
- L.** Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #15 will communicate with R-ESF #1—Transportation, R-ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering, R-ESF #5—Information Planning, R-ESF #6—Mass Care, R-ESF #7—Resource Support, R-ESF #11—Food, R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement, and R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach, as dictated by the regional event.
- M.** Communication with R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach will help coordinate public donations in an effort to reduce redundancy and excess from unsolicited donations and provide information to the public on the need for and “collection” stations of affiliated and unaffiliated volunteers. R-ESF #14 will also assist in channeling unsolicited volunteers to best meet, or balance, the needs of the emergency.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional emergency may result from a significant natural or man-made disaster, a technological emergency, power disruptions, or any other regional emergency that causes extensive damage. A regional emergency could create short, or long-term impacts on resource availability throughout the region, placing a significant demand on R-ESF #15 donations and volunteer resources. Regional emergencies may cause the need for long-term donations assistance across the region, while others may require a quick response. Any regional emergency will require communication of donation needs, volunteer service availability, and the coordination of related R-ESF #15 activities to plan for or provide an efficient and effective regional response.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Regional communication and coordination activities before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency will eliminate redundancy and facilitate an efficient and effective response.
2. Agencies and organizations under R-ESF #15 will perform tasks under their own authority, as applicable, and coordinate these tasks under the RECP.
3. R-ESF #15 public and private organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will focus on the communication and coordination of donations and volunteer management throughout the region to ensure efficient and effective response before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
4. The following emergency conditions may exist:

- Localized emergency requiring resource supplementation through R-ESF #15;
- Emergency in two or more jurisdictions;
- Region-wide emergency of any scale—short-term or long-term;
- Emergencies specific to certain economic or demographic groups of any scale and of any origin;
- An emergency related to the public or private availability of food, household supplies, clothing, etc.;
- Any other condition that would require the emergency transportation or distribution of donations (i.e., food, household supplies, pet supplies, clothing) and/or volunteer services.

5. The size and scope of a regional incident or regional emergency will dictate the duration of R-ESF #15 activities, the relevant EEIs, and the amount of communication and coordination among regional partners necessary to achieve an efficient and effective response to any regional event.
6. Under R-ESF #15, communication and coordination activities for the management of donations and volunteers may be conducted as separate or joint functions, as dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. R-ESF #15 members will engage in planning, training, and evaluation activities (e.g. discussions, focus groups) to develop relationships and analyze potential donations and volunteer management issues and methods before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency.
2. Before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency, the organizations, agencies and jurisdictions that comprise R-ESF #15 will, while executing their respective responsibilities and authorities within their individual operation plans, communicate and coordinate under the RECP.
3. Information will be collected at the local level through existing channels of communication as determined by standard operating procedures and will be relayed to R-ESF #15 through the RICCS.
4. In order to augment existing communication, R-ESF #15 will collect local information regarding donation needs and volunteer availability, and will provide this information to regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions through the RICCS.
5. Before, during, and after a regional incident or emergency, R-ESF #15 will provide information for overall situation assessments in order to facilitate communication and coordination among R-ESFs. R-ESF #15 will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as needed.
6. As dictated by the regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #15 will coordinate donations and volunteer management functions with other R-ESFs. Coordination may include, but is not limited to:

R-ESF #1—Transportation

- o Coordination of the transportation of donations
- o Coordination of the transportation of volunteers

R-ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering

- o Coordination of providing potable water to volunteers

R-ESF #5—Information Planning

- o Coordination and communication with RICCS

R-ESF #6—Mass Care

- o Coordination of donations for displaced persons within the impacted area
- o Coordination of volunteers, as needed

R-ESF #7—Resource Support

- o Coordination of incoming resources via donations

R-ESF #11—Food

- o Coordination of donated food stuffs for impacted areas
- o Coordination of feeding volunteers

R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement

- o Coordinate security at donations and volunteer management sites

R-ESF #14—Media Relations and Community Outreach

- o Coordination of message to public regarding donations
- o Coordination of message to public regarding volunteers

B. Organization

Communication and coordination activities for a regional event will begin with notification of an actual or possible implementation of the RECP through the RICCS. Local organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions involved in donations and/or volunteer-related response activities that have been activated under their respective operational plans will form R-ESF #15. R-ESF #15 organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will utilize the appropriate communication and coordination activities as dictated by the regional event. The lead R-ESF #15 member from an affected jurisdiction is responsible for such actions as facilitating any conference calls.

C. Notification

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency requiring R-ESF #15 support, the RICCS will notify R-ESF #15 regional organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions

and will establish appropriate communication. If R-ESF #15 members are made aware of a potential or actual regional incident or regional emergency through other sources, they will notify the RICCS. The RICCS will be used to notify the organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions that need to supply a liaison. Communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

V. Responsibilities

A. R-ESF #15 Participating and Supporting Agencies and Organizations

The primary purpose of the R-ESF #15 is to facilitate communication and coordination among jurisdictions and private organizations before, during, and after actual or potential regional emergencies. Local responders are to report emergency events within their jurisdictions to their respective authorities through existing standard operating procedures. Participating R-ESF #15 organizations and/or agencies are responsible for gathering information about where donations and volunteer resources might be needed to supplement a regional emergency response. This information exchange is to be transmitted through the RICCS. EEIs have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESF #15 agencies.

B. Essential Elements of Information

The primary purpose of the RICCS is to facilitate the exchange of information among coordinating agencies during a regional event. EEIs have been determined as the minimum essential elements of information to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs. In the event of a regional incident or regional emergency, R-ESF #15 organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions will be able to exchange EEIs through the RICCS. EEIs include, but are not limited to:

- Status of transportation system and facilities;
- Status of food supply and distribution schedule;
- Location of useable mass care facilities, including shelters and feeding stations;
- Sources of donations;
- Donations needed;
- Availability of medical and first aid support;
- Status of bulk distribution networks;
- Evacuation locations and routes;
- Location of hazardous areas;
- Status of volunteer organizations and health professionals;
- Status of Family Well-Being Inquiry System;

Estimated time for return to normal operations and for people to return home/work;
Status of potable water supply;
Status of communications network;
Location of the incident or regional emergency;
Demographics of the area (language and/or cultural barriers);
Jurisdictions involved;
Socio-economic impacts;
Overall priorities (immediate need);
Status of resources, personnel, and facilities;
Status of efforts under the local, state, or federal emergency operations plans;
Credentials and certifications of affiliated and non-affiliated volunteers;
Volunteer organizations' areas of expertise;
Liability status of active and potential volunteers;
Receiving/collection points;
Security controls;
Logistical problems;
Structural areas impacted or out of commission; and
Prioritization of service/deliveries.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of ensuring a high level of readiness for R-ESF #15 and the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with the sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will engage in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against the scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats. R-ESF #15 and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle.

A. Planning

The Donations and Volunteer regional clusters, under R-ESF #15, are responsible for coordinating planning under R-ESF #15, including the review and recommending revisions of R-ESF #15. All participating Donations and volunteer management supporting agencies and organizations will contribute, in some capacity, to the planning of R-ESF #15.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to RECP and R-ESF #15 responsibilities will be developed and carried out.

C. Exercises

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of regional simulations and/or exercises will be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. This exercise series includes of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to ensure continuous improvement in the coordination of donation supplies and resources, and volunteer availability under R-ESF #15 and the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real-world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Animal Protection Support Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Rockville
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Takoma Park

State Government Organizations

Maryland Emergency Management Agency
District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
Virginia Department of Emergency Management
District of Columbia Department of Health
Maryland Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD)
District of Columbia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters
Virginia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters

Federal Government Organizations

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Health and Human Services

Private-sector and Non-governmental Organizations

Humane Society of the United States (HSUS)
American Red Cross (ARC)
Fund for Animals
Maryland Animal Disaster Planning Advisory Committee (MD ADPAC)

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Animal Protection Support Annex facilitates communication and coordination among regional entities to ensure an effective and timely response in emergency situations where animals and the animal industry may be affected. Planning for animals is a necessary part of the emergency response for the following reasons:

1. People refuse to evacuate without their pets and/or try to return early to unsafe areas, thereby putting themselves and public safety responders in danger;
2. Public health and safety risks are caused by animals at large;
3. Public health and safety risks are increased by animal carcasses;
4. Local economies that include animal-related businesses may be affected;
5. Animal issues are a potential public relations catastrophe; and
6. Need for control of self-responders (i.e., unauthorized volunteers) and misuse of donations.

B. Scope

The Animal Protection Annex is intended to focus on information regarding animal- and animal-industry-related emergencies that have local and state impacts, and may require inter-jurisdictional coordination. The Animal Protection Support Annex also coordinates necessary information to determine animal services needs across the region as the result of a regional emergency.

1. This Annex is designed to facilitate communication and coordination activities among appropriate agencies in order to protect animals during an emergency situation and to protect the public from disease, injury, or other health public safety risks associated with an animal- or animal-industry-related emergency or disaster.
2. The scope of this Annex is broad because it is intended to include the activities and capabilities of organizations, governments, as well as private and non-governmental entities that might have a role in addressing an animal emergency within the National Capital Region (NCR). This approach to animal protection is intended to foster the development of a common vision for the protection and welfare of animals among COG jurisdictions.

3. For the purposes of this plan, animal protection includes the following:

Promoting information sharing in order to assist animal owners in protecting themselves and their animals in case of an emergency or disaster.

Promoting information sharing in order to assist the animal industry in protecting itself in case of an emergency or disaster.

Evaluating public health and safety risks potentially associated with animal emergencies and considering ways to avoid or minimize their effects.

Conducting conference calls in order to assess the status of each jurisdiction with regard to a particular emergency, and discussing how best to mount a regional response to the crisis.

4. The Animal Protection Support Annex is intended to focus on communication and coordination among appropriate agencies with regard to the following situations: a regional emergency or disaster situation arising from natural or human-induced catastrophes that places animals at the same potential risk as human beings, as well as other emergencies unique to an animal-service response, such as a fire at a local animal shelter.

II. Policies

- A. The Animal Protection Support Annex will not usurp or override the authorities, policies or inter-jurisdictional agreements of any federal agency, state government, local government, or other jurisdiction.
- B. COG will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that animal protection procedures are maintained and consistent with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C. Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) will be coordinated through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) in instances of regional emergencies.
- D. The Animal Protection Support Annex cluster group will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as needed.
- E. The Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Memorandum of Understanding for Animal Services provides for mutual assistance among the signatories with regard to managing any emergency or disaster and facilitates the following:
 1. The maintenance of good order;

2. Provision of animal care and control; and
3. The maintenance of public safety within the region during a state of emergency or other crisis situation that requires animal services assistance beyond the capacity of a signatory jurisdiction or agency.

III. Situation

A. Emergency Condition

Both large and small-scale emergencies (i.e., a fire at the local animal shelter, large-scale animal hoarder, or a natural disaster) may adversely affect an animal and/or the public on a regional basis.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. The Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Memorandum of Understanding for Animal Services is the primary instrument of coordination and communication of animal-related activities among COG jurisdictions.
2. For the purposes of this Annex, a “domestic pet” is defined as a cat or dog; “livestock” are defined as cattle, sheep, hogs, goats, horses, or poultry; “exotics” are defined as animals from another area of the world; and “wildlife” are defined as animals living in a natural undomesticated state.
3. Coordinating entities under the Animal Protection Support Annex will perform tasks under their own authority, as applicable, in addition to coordinating their animal-protection activities with the overall RECP.
4. Local coordinating jurisdictions are encouraged to be a signatory to the Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Memorandum of Understanding for Animal Services.
5. Individual coordinating jurisdictions are encouraged to develop local emergency animal-protection plans that include an inventory of resources located within each jurisdiction. This inventory should contain:

A roster of boarding facilities that can be used as temporary shelters;

A roster of locations housing animals;

A list of veterinarians in the NCR; and

Facilities or other resources with special or unique capabilities that are able to assist animals and animal owners during an emergency.

6. Each jurisdiction is encouraged to identify locations within their area where animal carcasses can be buried or burned and to establish MOUs in advance with the Department of Energy (DOE) to facilitate this process if the need occurs. In the event that carcasses need to be moved elsewhere, biosecurity measures should be developed for this operation and MOUs with other areas should be established.
7. Each jurisdiction is encouraged to develop and share information regarding supplies and equipment they would need in order to respond to an animal disaster; and to either purchase that equipment, develop MOUs for the sharing of equipment, or put contracts in effect to purchase at the time of the need. This list should be reviewed at least every six months and revised as necessary. A system for rotation of dated supplies (i.e., drugs) should be developed.
8. The welfare of animals, as well as any possible associated public-health implications, is sometimes forgotten during emergency situations. In addition, specific provisions for the welfare of animals, such as pets and livestock, are not always made in advance. As a result, animals are often abandoned and left to fend for themselves in times of emergency. Consequently, a serious problem may result and the animals may suffer deprivation and/or untreated injuries and also may create a public health and safety risk for human beings is created.
9. Working animals should be accorded the same protection as other animals.
10. Pet owners evacuating from a vulnerable community who are not seeking temporary shelter in a mass-care center should make every effort to relocate with their pets.
11. While there are extended care and temporary boarding facilities for domestic pets throughout the region, owners should have a plan for protecting their pets that includes provisions for evacuating with pets or using pet-friendly sheltering.
12. Livestock should be confined in a secure structure on high ground with access to food and water, if possible. Animal owners who evacuate should take with them appropriate identification, immunization, and health records for all animals left behind.
13. Proper preparation and effective coordination of animal issues enhances the ability of emergency personnel to protect both human and animal health and safety.
14. A roster of veterinary hospitals, kennels, and other boarding facilities that will participate in the temporary sheltering of domestic pets may be developed, maintained, and shared with appropriate regional agencies and organizations.
15. A roster of locations housing animals may be developed as part of the Animal Protection Annex. This list may be maintained and shared with appropriate regional agencies and organizations.

16. Local jurisdictions shall designate an Animal Services Representative to be part of the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This person shall have animal protection services expertise, the authority to act in case of emergency situations, as well as the ability to identify and coordinate available regional animal services-related resources.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Major and minor emergencies, as well as potential or actual regional emergencies that cause animal specific crisis situations will be cause for utilization of the Animal Protection Support Annex.
2. The Animal Protection Support Annex will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional emergencies, including those of the traditional realm and those unique to an animal-service response, through the RICCS.
3. The supporting regional agencies in this Annex will coordinate and execute their respective animal service and protection responsibilities during the emergency.
4. The Animal Protection Cluster Group liaison to R-ESF #5 will monitor the situation and address all information requests regarding emergency animal protection.
5. To facilitate coordination among R-ESFs and Support Annexes, the RICCS will monitor their respective emergency-specific activities and will report all accumulated information back to the R-ESFs and Annexes involved.

B. Organization

The Animal Services Disaster subcommittee, one of six formed by the Animal Services Committee, is composed of regional animal services representatives and is chaired by the Deputy Director of the Animal Services Division for Montgomery County.

The Animal Protection Cluster Group is composed of representatives from all local coordinating organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions, as listed on page one and two of the Annex. (Additional coordinating organizations and agencies may be added to the list as the Annex is further developed). The group will provide 24-hour contact information and participate in RICCS notification and coordination in the event of an animal related emergency. Subgroups of the Animal Protection Cluster will be formed and composed as follows:

1. Designated representatives of the participating local government jurisdictions' animal services agency, as well as HSUS Disaster Services and Fund for Animals representatives; and

2. Directors of each jurisdiction's animal welfare shelter(s), as well as HSUS Disaster Services and Fund for Animals representatives (to initiate a conference call, this subgroup must coordinate through their local government animal services agency or the government designated representative, i.e., contracted agency.)

The Animal Services Committee is a regional task force with representatives from the 17 COG jurisdictions and from private sector and non-governmental organizations to share and coordinate information regarding animal services current events, problems, and training opportunities throughout the region. Chaired by the Associate Director of the Prince George's County Department of Environmental Resources, Animal Management Division, the Committee has six standing subcommittees, including finance, humane education, training, wildlife, disaster services, and dangerous dogs.

Coordination of regional animal protection and service issues will be initiated by the Animal Services Disaster Subcommittee. This group will act as the Annex representative in policy discussions, negotiations with other R-ESF and Annex clusters, and in other matters.

In order to address emergency situations whenever they occur, an Animal Protection Cluster Group will be formed by the Animal Services Committee.

C. Notification

Upon request of any participating Animal Protection Support Annex organization, agency, or jurisdiction, the RICCS will:

1. Notify the Animal Protection Support Annex's appropriate regional coordinating agencies;
2. Identify support agencies who may need to supply subject-matter expertise to the RICCS;
3. Establish communication with appropriate state agencies; and
4. Establish communication with appropriate federal agencies.

If any participating Animal Protection organization, agency, or jurisdiction is made aware of a potential or actual regional emergency, communications will be made in accordance with RICCS protocols and in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

D. Coordination

In the event of an emergency situation that may have regional animal-protection implications, the Animal Protection Cluster, or subgroup thereof, will use the following protocol for conference calls:

1. Initial Actions

Upon detection of an animal-related incident, COG, the affected jurisdiction, or any of the local jurisdictions, as defined on page one of the Annex, will make an internal assessment of the situation. The affected jurisdiction will serve as the lead for the Animal Protection Cluster. If COG or the affected local government jurisdiction(s) determines that the event is of regional significance, it may contact the RICCS concerning the regional emergency and ask that the CAOs (in the event of a full-scale regional emergency, and not an animal-specific emergency) and the Animal Services Cluster, or subgroup thereof, be notified of the regional emergency.

Based on the nature and extent of the regional emergency, COG, the affected jurisdiction, or any of the local jurisdictions may initiate a conference call to be convened through the RICCS to discuss the animal-specific or regional emergency.

The conference call would be used to determine the type and extent of the animal-specific or regional emergency, ongoing actions, coordination among jurisdictions' animal services agencies, responses and public messages, identify the next steps, and discuss any other key regional issues.

2. Continuing Actions

Additional conference calls may be scheduled or may be initiated by COG, the affected jurisdiction, or by any of the local jurisdictions as required by the ongoing regional or animal-specific emergency.

There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, communication, and response for each incident with information facilitated through the RICCS.

Subject matter experts from any participating animal services organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis of the regional impact of the regional emergency to the CAOs, if necessary, and the Animal Protection Cluster through the RICCS to facilitate the regional response.

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, a notification will be made through the RICCS and a stand down debriefing conference call will take place.

4. After-action Critique

Once the regional emergency has been terminated, the Animal Protection Cluster will prepare an Incident Assessment Summary Report on the lessons learned and will present this at a regularly scheduled meeting.

5. Coordinating Capabilities

There will be coordination with Regional Emergency Support Functions:

R-ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering

- Coordination regarding disposal of animal carcasses

R-ESF #4, #9, and #10—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations

- Coordination and communication with US&R personnel for animals left behind and/or individuals remaining behind in an incident situation

R-ESF #5—Information Planning

- Coordination and communication with RICCS

R-ESF #6—Mass Care

- Identification of potential pet shelters near approved emergency American Red Cross shelters

R-ESF #7—Resource Support

- Coordination of additional resources needed from outside affected jurisdictions

R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services

- Identification of diseases which have public health significance, including epidemiological and environmental health activities
- Coordination regarding mental health implications during incident situation
- Provision of resources for people with animals and animal-protection responders

R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement

- Coordination with public safety authorities in cases of animal-specific emergencies and/or evacuation situations

R-ESF #14—Public Information

- Provision of information on location of animal shelters and other animal-related matters before, during, and after the disaster.
- Coordination of public education efforts such as brochure distribution.

R-ESF #15—Donations and Volunteer Management

- Refer volunteer personnel to the appropriate jurisdictions' agencies

- Coordinate efforts to provide food, water, shelter and other physical needs to animals

V. Responsibilities

A. Animal Protection Support Annex Coordinating Organizations

Agencies participating in a regional response will contribute EEIs to RICCS based on the regional emergency.

The Animal Services Committee is composed of local coordinating jurisdictions outside of those defined as member governments in the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, as this committee, and thereby the Animal Protection Annex, extends its coordination to Anne Arundel County.

B. Essential Elements of Information

Coordinating agencies are responsible for providing information concerning animal protection activities to RICCS and to their group (TBD), in emergencies with regional or animal-specific implications as stated in the planning assumption for the Animal Protection Support Annex.

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional public emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs across the R-ESFs and through the RICCS.
2. During the Animal Protection Support Annex, conference call, the agencies listed are responsible for providing the following essential elements of information concerning regional emergencies involving animals during the conference call:

Status of transportation system;

Status of key contractor support;

Status of any animal issues (disease potential, harm to human population, etc.);

Location of the animal emergency, including considerations of the demographic profile of the affected locale(s);

Jurisdictions involved;

Status and analysis of initial assessments, including considerations of any injuries or medical emergencies;

Resource availability, terms, and conditions, logistical considerations;

Response priorities;

Potential implications;

Need for other functional support;

Previous lessons learned and their current applicability; and

Special circumstances (e.g., zoos, research laboratories, or seniors who are pet owners).

C. Special unique capabilities, needs, requirements, or specific organizations are addressed below:

1. Biological, Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical, or Explosive (B-NICE) weapons;
1. Animal diseases;
2. Special rescue situations;
3. Zoos;
4. Private, non-governmental, organizations, resources, and agreements include the following:

Humane Society of the United States: HSUS' Disaster Services Program provides a comprehensive approach to disaster education and training, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. When a disaster strikes, the HSUS Disaster Response Teams (DART) move quickly to assess the damage and evaluate the impact on animals, and then to provide the most appropriate support to the local community. Working with local emergency responders, local human associations and shelters, and local disaster volunteers, the disaster response program is supported by a network of trained and equipped staff volunteers available for response.

American Red Cross: The American Red Cross works in conjunction with HSUS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to transform the caring and concern of the American people into immediate action.

Fund for Animals: The Fund for Animals maintains animal care facilities for the rescued and orphaned. It works for the protection of wildlife and domestic animals through advocacy campaigns, education, legislation, litigation, and hands-on care.

Maryland Animal Disaster Planning Committees (ADPAC): These committees are organized nationwide by The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) in collaboration with local animal disaster authorities and humane organizations. In Maryland, the MD ADPAC is co-chaired by Dr. Jack Casper, DVM, responsible for government disaster planning for animals and Anne Culver, Director of Disaster Services for HSUS. ADPAC membership is open to everyone and its purpose is to bring together all organizations interested in protecting animals against disaster threats and to coordinate in responding to animals in emergency situations.

5. Specialists (For example, animal-specific resources, animal therapy).

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. Once personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats. The Animal services committee and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle.

A. Planning

1. The Animal Services Committee is responsible, as the broad animal protection regional body, for continuously coordinating planning under the Animal Protection Support Annex, including review and revisions of the Annex. All participating animal services coordinating agencies will contribute to the planning of the Annex.
2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the animal services and protection emergency response and coordination needs.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and the Animal Protection Support Annex responsibilities will be developed and carried out. Training will include workshops and educational campaigns to assist local communities, animal services personnel, and coordinating agencies.

C. Exercise

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of animal-protection communication and coordination simulations/ and exercises are to be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series includes tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to facilitate continuous improvement of the Animal Protection Support Annex's communication and coordination of animal protection-related activities, as designated in the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support readiness and proficiency are to be evaluated through real-world experiences and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

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Business Continuity Support Annex (To Be Developed at a Later Date)



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Credentialing Support Annex

Credentialing is a critical component in any jurisdiction's response to emergencies. It is imperative that authorized individuals be able to gain quick access to a site without having to undergo laborious and time-consuming background checks. No less important is the need to deny site access to individuals with questionable or non-mission critical motives, whose presence would be a hindrance at best.

In the Washington metropolitan area, where it is not unlikely that a regional incident or regional emergency could occur that requires assistance from neighboring jurisdictions, a reliable and regionally understood credentialing system is vital. In the optimal circumstance, a system would allow unimpeded site access to authorized responders from all metropolitan regional partners and federal partners.

The credentialing systems used by COG jurisdictions vary in their design, stage of development, and sophistication. Some jurisdictions have no formal credentialing system in place, relying instead on face or name recognition. Others are developing or reworking their credentialing system. The District of Columbia has recently launched a new credentialing initiative that incorporates state-of-the-art technology to facilitate site access for authorized responders. This Annex summarizes the major elements of the District's credentialing initiative.

I. Purpose

The purpose of the District of Columbia Credentialing Initiative is two-fold:

To develop tamper-proof IDs for all District employees that will be recognized by federal and regional public safety partners and that will permit critical employees access to the District's Emergency Operations Center and other operation and response areas in the case of an emergency.

To develop mobile credentialing facilities that can be rapidly deployed in the event of an emergency.

These projects are described in more detail below.

II. Employee IDs

The District has recently redesigned the standard ID badge issued to each employee. Although the primary purpose of the badge is to identify an individual as a District employee, the badge also contains information that further designates whether an individual is critical to any District emergency response.

The front side of a standard ID badge contains the following common elements:

Expiration Date – date access privileges expire

Picture – picture of the card holder

Name – full name of the card holder

Employee Type – District employees are designated as one of five categories:

- *Public Safety* – employees directly involved in ensuring public safety (excluding administrative and support staff)
- *Health Services* – employees directly involved in all health services (excluding administrative and support staff)
- *Employee* – general full-time classification (including administrative and support staff)
- *Temporary/Volunteer* – employees on loan from federal agencies, volunteers, or part-time employees
- *Contractor* – full-time and part-time contract employees

Color Code – These codes correspond to the employee types above, and are used to quickly distinguish employee type from a distance

- *Black* - Public Safety
- *Yellow* - Health Services
- *Blue* - Employee
- *Green* - Temporary/Volunteer
- *Red* - Contractor

Agency – agency of employment

Security Hologram – hologram to prevent tampering or fraudulent reproduction

District Flag

Watermark – matte finish overlay of the District government flag that covers the entire card to prevent fraud; visible when card is held at an angle

The elements contained on the back side of a standard ID card, listed below in order of their appearance on the card, depend on whether an employee is critical to any District emergency response. (Such elements are denoted with an asterisk.)

Emergency Designation* – contains the words “EMERGENCY CRITICAL” in big block letters, and identifies employees, of any type, as critical to any District emergency response

Name* - employee’s full name should be identical to the name printed on the front of the card

Agency Symbol* - symbol of the agency with which an employee is affiliated

Verification Number* - hotline to DCEMA for verification of the individual’s access privileges

Bar Code* - unique number associated with the card holder that contains employee data

Unauthorized Use Statement – statement that unauthorized or fraudulent use of the card is punishable under US and District code

Property Disclaimer – address to which lost cards should be returned

Tier Designation* - identifies the employee's level of criticality:

- *Executive* – highest criticality
- *Tier 1* – highest criticality
- *Tier 2* – mid-level criticality
- *Tier 3* – lowest criticality

ESF Designation – denotes one or more emergency support functions to which the employee is assigned; if the employee is critical to all ESFs, the designation will read “All ESFs”

The purpose of an “EMERGENCY CRITICAL” designation is to facilitate the transit of the card holder to the perimeter of the site. Such a designation would inform police and other security personnel assigned to restrict access to the city that the card holder should be allowed to pass. Once at the site, the card holder would still have to be screened and issued a credential before site access would be permitted.

III. Mobile Credentialing Facilities

As part of its credentialing initiative, the District is arranging for the provision of two mobile credentialing facilities that could be deployed without delay in the event of an emergency. Each facility would be a tent shelter complete with a generator, electric power, and interior environmental control.

Each facility would contain a mini-Local Area Network, consisting of a server with a ruggedized case, ten work stations, one laptop, one camera, and one or more card printers. Networked bar code readers at all perimeter access points would track the entrance and exit of response personnel.

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Disease Surveillance Support Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Metropolitan Washington Public Health Assessment Center

Local Coordinating Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Rockville
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Takoma Park

DRAFT

District of Columbia Health Organizations

District of Columbia Department of Health
DC Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
DC Department of Health and Human Services
DC Public Schools
DC Employee Health Services
DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services

Maryland State and Local Health Organizations

Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services Systems
Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Montgomery County Hospital Groups
Prince George's County Hospital Groups
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
Prince George's County Health Department

Frederick County Health Department
County Public Schools
County and State Employee Health Services
County Emergency Medical Services

Virginia State and Local Health Organizations

Virginia Department of Health
Virginia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Arlington County Health Department
City of Alexandria Health Department
Fairfax County Health Department
Loudoun County Health Department
Prince William County Health District
County Public Schools
County and State Employee Health Services
County Emergency Medical Services

Federal Government Organizations

Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Department of Defense
Global Emerging Disease Surveillance System (GEIS)
Veterans Health Administration

Private-sector Health Organizations

DC Hospitals
Maryland Hospitals
Virginia Hospitals
Health Maintenance Organizations
Sentinel Private Physician Practices
Sentinel Pharmacies
Sentinel Veterinary Clinics

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Disease Surveillance Annex facilitates the ability for each jurisdiction to communicate with the other jurisdictions across state lines concerning the presence of abnormal disease indicators. This will enable early identification of disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or resulting from bioterrorism. Rapid identification, treatment, and isolation are required to contain an otherwise exponentially growing infectious disease outbreak. To control such epidemics, public health practitioners have placed a premium on surveillance systems that can generate timely data.

B. Scope

1. The Disease Surveillance Annex focuses on the need for establishing a centralized, inter-jurisdictionally-coordinated, regional electronic disease surveillance system that involves the ongoing, systematic and timely collection, analysis, and interpretation of infectious disease-related data.
2. Although a variety of disease surveillance systems exist for some specific diseases in the metropolitan Washington region, there is currently no electronic system for regional coordination of disease identification and response or for coordinating information dissemination or recommendations.
3. An evaluation of the requirements for an optimal regional electronic disease surveillance system are provided in sections VI, D and VII of this Annex, including an analysis of the legal issues that enable or restrict data sharing across state lines with regard to patient confidentiality; information technology, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS), currently under development, to improve communication and coordination throughout the region; and, the potential for syndromic surveillance.

II. Policies

- A.** The Disease Surveillance Annex will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure the Disease Surveillance Annex procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated

missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

- C. Essential elements of information (EEIs) will be shared through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) as required by the incident.
- D. The COG Health Officials Committee will provide a liaison to R-ESF #5 as necessary.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

1. When a public health surveillance program identifies an aberrancy (an excursion statistically above the expected value), and when an investigation by local health departments in concert with their respective state health departments confirms a community health problem, active surveillance is initiated.
2. Early recognition of the presence of emerging disease by the jurisdictions through their bio-surveillance systems allows preventive actions to be undertaken, thereby reducing the impact on the region.
3. Electronic transfer of appropriate information from clinical information systems in the health care industry to public health departments will facilitate the timeliness and quality of information provided.
4. Surveillance can help:
 - a. Identify the site and nature of an attack, and the perpetrator(s);
 - b. Separate hoaxes and natural occurrences from actual attacks;
 - c. Alleviate suffering and reduce health consequences by enabling a rapid intervention; and
 - d. Minimize the spread of an infectious agent to populations not initially exposed.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. Disease surveillance systems collect and monitor data for infectious disease trends and/or outbreaks so that public health personnel can protect the nation's health.
2. A surveillance system supports disease prevention and control in a bioterrorism attack when it produces information that identifies cases

- quickly after an attack; locates contacts of cases who are still asymptomatic; identifies high-risk populations; and, pinpoints the source, nature, and location of the attack.
3. Currently, a variety of different systems exist both across the region and the nation.
 4. Due to the proximity of the jurisdictions and the well-developed transportation routes between them, it is not uncommon for individuals to live in one jurisdiction, work in another one, and receive healthcare in yet another.
 5. Current local systems do not allow for automatic centralization of “real-time” data.
 6. The legal authority and responsibility for disease surveillance reside with the three state health departments, with the District of Columbia Department of Health functioning as both a state and local health department. The primary responsibility for carrying out disease surveillance is assigned to the local health departments in each jurisdiction.
 7. Each state has a list of reportable diseases and conditions.
 8. In each of the COG jurisdictions, providers are required to file reports within a specific time period when a reportable disease is confirmed or, in the case of specific high-priority diseases, suspected.
 9. Providers may be physicians in the hospitals and/or in private practice, health centers, health maintenance organizations, hospital emergency departments or infection control personnel, laboratory personnel, school nurses, et al.
 10. The local health department then initiates an investigation and epidemiologic follow-up, and will report its findings to the State health department.
 11. The State health department can at any time consult with the CDC and, once the case is confirmed, will report its findings to them.
 12. Syndromic surveillance—statistical analyses of counts of individuals in emergency rooms or other health care settings with pre-identified sets of symptoms, rather than confirmed diagnoses—can be utilized for early detection of large attacks and quick intervention. Many public and private organizations in the metropolitan Washington region are developing syndromic surveillance systems.

13. Communication needs to improve between public health departments and private providers regarding clinical feedback on reports submitted and on reporting requirements in general.
14. COG has completed a study to evaluate the requirements for the development of an optimal Metropolitan Washington Regional Disease Surveillance System.
15. A highly functioning reportable disease surveillance system will quickly detect most large-scale outbreaks and effectively support emergency response to both covert and overt attacks.
16. Public health surveillance activities are embedded in a legal framework that empowers government action to protect the public's health, while balancing authority against competing social interests, such as privacy protection.
17. State rather than federal privacy laws and regulations are most likely to present barriers to sharing of information for surveillance purposes.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Upon the threat and/or occurrence of a regional emergency incident that includes health-related issues, the disease surveillance mechanisms will be activated and/or "stepped up" and applicable regional personnel may be called.
2. All local health jurisdictions will coordinate and execute their respective authorities and program responsibilities during a regional emergency.
3. The Disease Surveillance function will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional disease issues in conjunction with R-ESF #8, R-ESF #5 and the RICCS.
4. Requests for information through RICCS regarding emergency regional disease issues will be referred to the Health Officials Committee, which is the liaison to RICCS for the coordination of health and disease-related problems throughout the region.

B. Organization

Disease Surveillance in the National Capital Region operates under the auspices of the COG Health Officials Committee. A Regional Surveillance Coordination Center can play an important role in the coordination of surveillance data. It will need to work under the delegated authority of the three state health departments and in conjunction with the COG Health Officials Committee.

COG Health Officials Committee:

District of Columbia Department of Health
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Virginia Department of Health
Arlington County Health Department
City of Alexandria Health Department
Fairfax County Health Department
Frederick County Health Department
Loudoun County Health Department
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
Prince George's County Health Department
Prince William County Health District

C. Notification

1. Currently, there are no electronic linkage systems between local hospitals and physicians practicing in the community, even when outpatient practices and hospitals are affiliated with a single investor.
2. Private providers often overlook the role of public health when encountering unusual cases of infectious disease, often relying on informal consultations among other providers, and may not report cases or suspect cases to their local health departments. These problems have been attributed to a lack of feedback from health departments to providers on cases as well as a lack of understanding among physicians of the requirement to report certain diseases and their public health responsibilities in general.

3. RICCS can be used to provide a more streamlined communication system between federal, state, and local health departments and between private providers. This will help to overcome the gaps in coordination between public health authorities and, in the event of an outbreak, the delays in clinical action.

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a potential or actual regional emergency, RICCS will provide a communication platform to support the coordinated response of the participating agencies. RICCS provides for the multi-directional flow of communications. Communications will be made in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

RICCS notification is for informational purposes only. RICCS is designed to facilitate the ability of all pieces of the medical community to communicate with one another and with the public in an emergent situation.

RICCS is not intended to usurp everyday channels of communication but rather to facilitate the coordination of communication when the system must be expanded to deal with an unusual situation.

RICCS can be used to provide a more streamlined communication system between federal, state, and local health departments and between private providers. This will overcome the lack of coordination between public health authorities and, in the event of an outbreak, the delays in clinical action.

Ideally, RICCS may be able to facilitate the incorporation of physician outpatient private practices into the public health surveillance network.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

Continuous active monitoring of the population of the metropolitan Washington area for unusual patterns of events is in effect.

Current reporting methods are:

- **District of Columbia**—The D.C. Department of Health functions as both a local and state health department.

- **Virginia**—Local health departments send completed forms to state health departments. In Northern Virginia, local health departments send all forms to the regional epidemiologist for Northern Virginia who reviews and then forwards them to the State.
- **Maryland**—County health departments report the details of cases electronically to the state health department in Baltimore using the Maryland Electronic Reporting and Surveillance System (MERSS).
- States use reportable disease data to determine whether there are disease outbreaks affecting multiple jurisdictions within their states or with the potential to cross state lines. *At this time, detection of clusters of outbreaks is based on informal means.*

Syndromic surveillance currently in operation in the National Capital Region gathers data for the following categories:




Fig 1. Modified Syndromic Surveillance
Priority Categorization (Courtesy of Arlington County)

When a patient is seen and diagnosed by a physician or hospital in a jurisdiction other than the one in which they live, the provider is supposed to report to the health department in the jurisdiction in which the provider is located. That department, in turn, is supposed to contact the health department in the jurisdiction in which the patient resides, which then takes over any necessary follow-up or intervention.

These formal reporting mechanisms are not the only ways that information about reportable disease is exchanged within and across jurisdictions. Many informal communication mechanisms exist between local health departments across the region, such as making phone calls to share information about potential regional outbreaks.




Fig 2. Current flow of surveillance information in the Washington metropolitan area (Courtesy of RAND Report)

Surveillance and related activities are essential at each of the four risk levels in the current plan.

- At Risk Level 4, no active threat, surveillance and planning are the primary activities.
- At Risk Level 3, suspicious event encountered, surveillance should be stepped up from passive to active.
- At Risk Level 2, unexplained event (possibly bio-event), epidemiologic investigation begins. Appropriate and up to date surveillance data is essential to doing such investigations efficiently.
- At Risk Level 1, a confirmed bio-event, epidemiological investigation continues, and surveillance data guides medical interventions and event management, the primary activities at that stage.

Communication with the public is critical, and regional surveillance provides the accurate information that is needed to make such communication credible.

RICCS will be used to facilitate information sharing about unusual cases among an existing network of health officials, epidemiologists and infectious disease specialists.

2. Continuing Actions

COG's current response plan for a bioterrorist event calls for a regionally coordinated effort, with continuous surveillance to detect abnormalities in disease patterns and epidemiologic investigation with allied health partners, to ascertain the nature and extent of the event.

Once epidemiologists have established working case definitions, information will be provided to physicians to enhance their ability to detect suspicious cases of illness.

Once the emergency response is launched, a shift will occur and the information collection will focus on monitoring the parameters of the epidemic and measuring the impact of disease control and prevention efforts.

Surveillance systems will be needed during the response phase to allow health authorities to monitor the impact of the attack and evaluate the effectiveness of public health responses.

RICCS can facilitate the two-way communication with physicians to further improve health outcomes.

Public health preparedness and response refers to the specific accountabilities of health departments before and after an emergency event. (See chart below.)

When a bioevent occurs, the health departments shift from preparedness to response mode.

Public health officials will coordinate the medical response needed to contain the spread of the pathogen.




Fig. 3 How surveillance contributes to enhanced response (Courtesy of RAND Report)

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, and does not require inter-jurisdictional communication and coordination, notification will be made through RICCS and a stand-down debriefing conference call will take place.

As there may be many long-term secondary effects that require regional attention, regional communication may be needed on an ongoing basis for some incidents. Passive surveillance will continue.

4. After-action Critique

Within four weeks of stand-down of the regional health emergency, information for an after-action critique will be gathered by the participating organizations, and the Health Officials' Committee will convene a meeting of interested persons to share lessons learned.

V. Responsibilities**A. Participating and Supporting Agencies**

All healthcare entities in the region, both public and private will contribute information to RICCS as required by the incident and RECP policy.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with RICCS.
2. In addition to regional EEIs covered in R-ESF #5, additional EEIs apply for this Annex and may include, but not be limited to:

- Status of communications system;
- Message being sent to the public;
- Identify need for any key piece of equipment or personnel;
- Status of mutual aid support;
- Ability of local hospitals to handle case load;
- Pharmacy sales of prescription and non-prescription medications;
- Clinical information from private physicians offices, hospital emergency departments, public clinics, etc.;
- Laboratory and poison center data;

Notifiable disease reports;
Insurance claims data;
Absenteeism in schools and workplaces;
Case definitions;
Communicability of organism;
Clinical practice modalities;
Location of contacts of cases who are still asymptomatic;
Identification of high-risk populations; and
Source, nature, and location of the attack.

This is information that both public health and healthcare providers need to effectively provide for the treatment, isolation, quarantine, and immunization of individuals in the population. Law enforcement agencies may also find public health surveillance data useful in their separate efforts to apprehend the perpetrator(s) of the attack.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

A. Planning

Planning includes a comprehensive review of existing capabilities and an analysis of strengths and gaps;

Roles and responsibilities during an incident are defined and communications interfaces developed so that all sectors of the healthcare community can receive the identical information without compromising patient confidentiality;

This enables effective decision-making and communication thereof to both healthcare providers and the public; and

Agent fact sheets with appropriate instructions are developed in advance (and in collaboration with the recommendations of the Protective Actions Annex) and made available for dissemination to providers and the community in the event of an incident.

The Health Officials Committee and COG are responsible for maintaining the Disease Surveillance preparedness cycle.

B. Training

Train physicians and school health nurses to identify patterns, numbers, and locations of suspicious symptoms; astute clinicians treating individual cases may then be able to detect a possible outbreak;

Train all parties to understand and use their jurisdictions' correct channels of communication to report unusual or sentinel symptoms to the public health departments;

Train all parties to understand and follow the procedures for surveillance and reporting in the four risk levels described in R-ESF #8—Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services;

Provide user training for any electronic or online surveillance system (public and private) developed for syndromic and notifiable disease reporting;

Ongoing training presented by different organizations is codified and published so that all members of the healthcare community can attend the appropriate classes; and

These training classes will include those provided by the different institutions and academic entities in the National Capital Region as well as State and Federal and distance-learning opportunities.

C. Exercises

Exercises, both local and regional, are conducted on a regular basis and the participation of COG and the different jurisdictions is solicited to create a coordinated regional response structure;

These will be tabletop, functional, and/or field exercises that will exercise all elements of the healthcare community in conjunction with their counterparts in other emergency response agencies to identify and report suspicious symptoms, based on the four risk levels described in R-ESF #8; and

Multi-disciplinary, multi-agency cooperation is a key component of an effective response mechanism.

D. Evaluation

After-action reports will be developed for both real and notional events.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured and entered into a database where they are available on request by the member jurisdictions.

VII. Analysis of Legal Issues and Recommended Action

An analysis of the legal issues that enable or restrict data sharing across state lines with regard to patient confidentiality highlight the following:

- A. Privacy protection is a matter of both state and federal law;
- B. At the federal level, regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) serve to protect the confidentiality of health information throughout the United States:

Federal law in the form of the privacy regulations under HIPAA is unlikely to impose a major incremental burden on state public health activities;

This is because the HIPAA privacy regime specifically exempts public health surveillance from federal confidentiality standards.

- C. *State, rather than federal, privacy laws and regulations are most likely to present barriers to sharing of information for surveillance purposes.*
- D. Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have enacted different laws and regulations for protecting health information privacy;
- E. State law provisions are designed to protect identifiable health information and to preserve individual anonymity;
- F. The disclosure of health information that is *non*-identifiable does not present a threat to privacy, and thereby circumvents the focus of legal privacy restrictions:

To the extent that some aspects of a public health surveillance system can be structured to make use of non-identifiable data, this might offer a threshold strategy for minimizing the regulatory barriers imposed by privacy laws.

- G. State public health statutes in each of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia impose additional confidentiality requirements on state officials:

However, the statutes, which differ from state to state, draw heavily on the judgment of public health administration officials at the highest levels to balance privacy against the need for disclosure.

- H. Current state statutes create barriers to disclosure of confidential information across state lines. Two possible steps to reduce the legal barriers associated with sharing public health data across state lines could include the following:

To consult among the highest-level state public health authorities in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, to seek consensus regarding state-level confidentiality restrictions; and

To publish a state regulatory guidance describing in greater detail how public health officials actually implement the balancing that is mandated by statute.

Economic Recovery Support Annex (Work is Ongoing on this Support Annex)



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Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments/National Capital Region
Transportation Planning Board

Federal Government Transportation Organizations

U.S. Department of Transportation

Transportation Operating Agencies

District of Columbia

District Department of Transportation

State of Maryland

Maryland Department of Transportation

State Highway Administration

Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA)—see entry under “Airports”
below

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA)—see entry under “Maryland
Transit Services” below

Maryland Port Administration

Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA)

Motor Vehicle Administration

Maryland Local Jurisdictions

Maryland Transit Services

Maryland Transit Administration—administered by MDOT

Maryland Area Rail Commuter—administered by MDOT/MTA

Maryland Local Bus Transit Providers

Frederick County—TransIT Services of Frederick County

City of Laurel—Connect-a-Ride

Montgomery County—Ride On

Prince George’s County—The BUS

Commonwealth of Virginia

Virginia Department of Transportation

Virginia Local Jurisdictions

Virginia Transit Services

Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation

Virginia Railway Express

Northern Virginia Transportation Commission

Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission and
OMNIRIDE

Virginia Local Transit Providers

Arlington County—ART – Arlington Transit

City of Alexandria—DASH

City of Fairfax—CUE Bus System

Fairfax County

Fairfax Connector

RIBS (Reston Internal Bus Service)

Loudoun County—Loudoun County Commuter Bus

Regional Transit Operator

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

National Park Service

U.S. Park Police

National Capital Directors Office

Airports

Baltimore Washington International (BWI) Airport—administered by MDOT/MAA
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

Private Sector and Other Transportation Organizations

Amtrak

Commuter Connections

Commuter Transit Bus Companies

CSX Transportation Inc.

Norfolk Southern

Private and Commercial Bus Services

Trucking & Hauling Associations

Other Organizations

Federal

Office of Personnel Management

Department of Health and Human Services

Military District of Washington

Department of Defense

Federal Emergency Management Agency

General Services Administration

State

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency

Maryland Emergency Management Agency

Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Public Safety

R-ESF #4—Fire, Technical Rescue, and Hazardous Materials Operations and
R-ESF #13—Law Enforcement public safety organizations will coordinate
and interact with R-ESF #1 on an as needed basis.

Private

Greater Washington Board of Trade (GWBOT)

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Regional Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination (REETC) Annex of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan Framework (RECP) (the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex) is intended to address the transportation aspects of moving people around or out of the regional area and moving required resources into the area in anticipation of, and following a regional incident or emergency that requires evacuation. The transportation system cannot operate at peak efficiency when it is subject to extreme surges of demand. Therefore, this annex also addresses coordination of demand management, identifying situations and strategies where the majority of people do not evacuate the area, but shelter in place, to ensure that transportation system capacity is available for those who truly need it.

The Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Region is very well served by competent, sophisticated and innovative transportation agencies and other Federal, State, local, regional and private entities that share in evacuation responsibilities. Many emergency plans and procedures are already in place. R-ESF #1 and this annex are intended to provide additional tools to be used by these agencies for planning and response, when warranted by extraordinary incidents. This annex cannot not be a "playbook" because it is a public document, and because additional specific data are needed to outline the exact steps that agencies will take in particular circumstances.

More importantly, our adversaries are creative and flexible and we need to be the same. Herein is the major contribution of the annex--additional capability to plan and respond to any type of incident, anywhere in the region and involving any conditions. To achieve the highest degree of readiness, this annex must be implemented in the context of the RECP, especially the coordination and communication provided through the RICCS, it must be used by all agencies in their planning and it must be extensively practiced and drilled to evolve specific responses and plans to specific incidents at specific locations. Just as our adversaries know no rules, so too must we be innovative and flexible in response. This annex helps both with planning and response and with both the need to be innovative and the need to establish as specific as possible response protocols.

B. Scope

The Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex addresses primarily those regional incidents or emergencies that will require the information exchange and the decision-making resources designated in the RECP Framework to coordinate evacuation, shelter, and response efforts across functional and jurisdictional lines. The parameters and strategies described in the annex can be useful in a

wide variety of incidents where there might be surge demands on the transportation system, the need for coordination among transportation agencies regarding road closures, network status, and similar issues, the need for coordination among decision-makers regarding employee- or school-release advisories or other demand strategies related to the nature of the emergency and the status of the transportation system, or a desire by the public to be advised on their best course of action regarding transportation or sheltering-in-place.

A major incident can lead to panic and spontaneous evacuation of an area far greater than necessary, resulting in gridlock on the transportation network that compounds the dangers and difficulties in responding to the initial incident. Regional coordination with the incident managers, and in particular clear, accurate and timely communication among decision-makers and with the public, may help reduce the panic levels and keep the evacuation to a more manageable level that will save lives. Therefore, with incidents that may lead to panic and spontaneous evacuation, it is critical for the incident manager to:

- 1) Identify the parameters of the situation and the radius of the incident;
- 2) Communicate (through R-ESF #5, R-ESF #14 and the RICCS) exactly who is advised to leave what specific area, and strongly advise that in most cases all others should stay/ shelter in place, both for their own safety and to allow those who must get out to get out;
- 3) Coordinate (via R-ESF #5 and RICCS) with transit agencies on available resources and the best safe locations to send directly-affected pedestrians for further transport out of the area; and
- 4) Communicate (via R-ESF #14) to those who are involved in an incident and need to clear an area how best to do so and where to go, utilizing strategies in part enumerated in the “Overview of Regional Strategies to Facilitate Regional Evacuation” section (Section I.D) of this Annex.

Many government offices and private sector businesses have developed routine evacuation plans for individual buildings. A number of other evacuation or emergency transportation plans have been developed by individual regional jurisdictions, that adequately address the evacuation of an area in which the extent and severity of the threat or the size/population of the area exceeds the limits of routine evacuation (i.e., evacuation of a single dwelling or limited area). The Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex addresses events that may occur in a localized sector that are beyond the evacuation or coordination resources of a single local jurisdiction, or events that require a multi-jurisdictional evacuation and coordination effort of multiple communities in the greater Washington region.

Procedures in this Annex may be used to coordinate evacuation required by a broad spectrum of hazards including, but not limited to, fire, flood, severe weather, hazardous materials accidents/incidents, and acts of terrorism or

deployment of weapons of mass destruction. This Annex primarily addresses coordination among transportation providers, and is not intended to serve directly as a recommendation for actions that the public should take in evacuation situations. Recommendations for direct action will come from local jurisdictions or from state and federal authorities, in accordance with the particulars of the incident or emergency at hand.

This Annex is not intended to duplicate or supercede the current emergency or evacuation plans of local jurisdictions, and is a supplement to the RECP. Reference is made to the RECP procedures and R-ESFs throughout this document. As demonstrated in the section on Situations, below, the variety and type of incidents that can occur is virtually infinite. Therefore, in planning for such events, it is critical to establish a flexible framework for decision-making and coordination that can be adapted in an emergency. This is achieved in large part through the already-established RECP, building on local jurisdiction plans. The key contributions that are expected from the current effort include:

- 1) List of regional demand and supply strategies for management and coordination in emergencies;
- 2) Structured questionnaire template for managers to help assess the situation, and to provide a framework for transportation systems coordination;
- 3) Template for analysis of scenarios, applicable for future scenario development, exercises, and situations;
- 4) Example scenarios that illustrate cases that may require extraordinary regional cooperation and responses, and illustrate the application of the regional strategies;
- 5) Regional maps building on efforts of local jurisdictions and roadway knowledge, illustrating potential engineering issues such as critical intersections, choke points, lane drops and transit stations; and
- 6) An inventory of transit availability, including private providers and school buses.

The Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex is comprehensive and may be utilized in regional emergencies in its present form; however, additions and refinements to this Annex will be anticipated. Continuing review and coordination with local, regional, state and federal stakeholders will be required. Potential additions and refinements include:

- 1) More detail, refinement and testing of scenarios and strategies;
- 2) Review, testing and coordination with specific jurisdictional and agency plans;
- 3) Public involvement and education on responses to emergency situations;
- 4) Engineering/ technical analyses on capacities and related issues; and
- 5) Coordination with non-transportation aspects of evacuation.

C. Definitions

Regional Incident: Regional incidents are events that have the potential to disrupt essential services, mobility, public safety or health on a regional basis.

Regional emergency: Regional emergencies are events that have disrupted essential services, mobility, public safety or health on a regional basis.

Evacuation: Moving persons a safe distance from an incident, or ordering persons with the capability to move on their own, from a high risk area to a lower risk area. In most cases, an evacuation occurring exclusively within particular city, county, or other jurisdictional limits will not be considered a regional incident or emergency. Likewise, an incident requiring evacuation that can be managed through standard operating procedures and bilateral agreements between adjacent jurisdictions would not constitute a regional incident or emergency.

Regional Incident or Emergency Requiring Evacuation: An incident or emergency requiring evacuation within a single jurisdiction, or even between two adjoining jurisdictions, will only be considered a regional incident or emergency requiring evacuation if and when the primary jurisdiction invokes the RICCS, requests decision-making support in the form of a conference call according to R-ECF protocols, and requires significant resource support from outside the jurisdiction limits. Incidents or emergencies requiring evacuation support across multiple jurisdictional lines will be considered regional incidents or emergencies.

Assembly Point: A location in a safe area, such as a Metro station or other location, where people will be directed to gather after an incident in order to be transported to shelter or designated meeting places. It may also refer to gathering places for emergency car pool pick-up points (“super-slug” points of contact.)

Shelter: A school, church, recreational facility or other non-resident public or private building used to temporarily lodge, feed and provide medical care and welfare services for persons who have been evacuated from their homes or other locations.

Shelter Manager: The person designated by the agency normally occupying the building (for jurisdictionally-controlled government buildings), or the person designated by the Red Cross (for non-jurisdictionally-controlled government buildings) to manage the shelter.

Note that the annex is intended primarily to apply to evacuation, and to unusual cases of surge demand. For example, a typical snow emergency may

create a surge of demand for transportation, and requires the standard coordination efforts among highway officials and transit providers. This demand surge is typically for commuters or other workers returning home, and will rarely result in the need for exceptional evacuation and/or shelter requirements. Shelter requirements for travelers who may be stranded by a winter storm are likewise accommodated through existing arrangements. On the other hand, a forecast for a major hurricane that could potentially damage large sectors of the region with high winds and flooding clearly constitutes a regional incident requiring evacuation, with attendant requirements for shelter and response efforts.

D. Organizations

See R-ECP for full descriptions and interrelationships. Evacuation coordination is a cross-functional and cross-jurisdictional effort, and involves most if not all regional emergency support functions. The incident commander on the scene of the event may be from the local fire department, but evacuation will engage a variety of functional areas, including transportation, communications infrastructure, information and planning, media relations and community outreach, law enforcement, mass care, and possibly others. The current document focuses on the transportation component, but recognizes that transportation is but one element of a comprehensive Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex and identifies critical interfaces with agencies and jurisdictions.

It is critical to coordinate this annex with the local, state and federal agencies and jurisdictions represented in the full RECP such as local governments and emergency response agencies, as well as with private and non-profit sector agencies such as the Red Cross. One set of key jurisdictional interfaces that has a major bearing on how well the region can react to and coordinate efforts for an emergency is the interaction with Federal officials and understanding of procedures for agencies such as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), General Services Administration (GSA), the National Park Service and United States Park Police, Secret Service, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).

II. Policies

- A.** The Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex will not usurp or override the policies of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** COG/TPB is responsible for coordinating the planning for transportation aspects of emergency preparedness and maintaining the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex in concert with the stated missions and

objectives of the RECP. Member jurisdictions are responsible for operations and the execution of the annex.

- C. COG/TPB and member jurisdictions will work to ensure that individual agency Standard Operating Procedures and the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex procedures coincide and are consistent.
- D. COG/TPB will review the Office of Homeland Security Threat Advisory System, and adopt a common terminology to describe various regional threat conditions and possible transportation scenarios.
- E. Agencies participating in the evacuation and implementation anticipate coordinating to the greatest extent possible with those federal agencies that may have transportation contingency plans and national security plans, such as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the General Services Administration (GSA), the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Military District of Washington, (MDW), the Secret Service, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and other agencies. Efforts will be made to engage appropriate agencies and personnel from the executive, legislative and judicial branches, as well as independent agencies. In addition, there must be coordination with local and state emergency management agencies, who have responsibilities in emergencies.
- F. During a regional emergency, local jurisdictions and transit agencies will use their internal processes to disseminate information provided by the state departments of transportation and WMATA to coordinate and formulate their respective response to transportation emergencies. (For example, MDOT, VDOT, WMATA, the Federal Highway Administration DC Division of USDOT, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration DC Division of USDOT, and COG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with DDOT for the development and coordination of a transportation emergency preparedness plan and communication system which obligates the signatories to perform certain duties relating to handling transportation emergencies. These duties include integrating emergency operating centers, developing a data-sharing network, and updating mass evacuation plans.)
- G. In each situation, one or more Level A Transportation agencies (see R-ESF #1) will be designated to consolidate transportation information provided by the involved agencies and to provide this information to the Incident Commander and to the media and real-time public information resources. For example, WMATA has a web site that provides important transportation status information to the traveling public on a real time basis. Level B agencies (designated in R-ESF #1) will also be consulted as necessary, and apprised on public information advisories. Information from other R-ESF

responsibility areas, such as emergency management, mass care, etc. will follow their respective protocols.

- H. Essential elements of information will be reported by a designated agency to the R-ESF #5—Information and Planning through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the regional emergency.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

In some emergency situations, such as a tornado or an air-borne chemical, nuclear or bio agent, an attempt to evacuate may expose more people to greater danger. If congestion is likely, people stuck in gridlock or waiting for transportation will have increased exposure. This type of situation may include a relatively short advanced warning and a time-limited duration of the danger. In these cases “sheltering in place” may be the best protective action. However, in some cases, evacuation may be required.

This section first presents overriding assumptions for evacuation planning and incidents. Second, it provides a brief overview of the regional transportation network and maps of major roadways that may serve as primary evacuation routes. Third, it identifies a range of demand and supply strategies that can be employed to help deal with transportation surge demands from major incidents. Fourth, it introduces the emergency evacuation assessment framework and the assessment worksheet that can be used to describe and define an incident or emergency. It then proceeds through a series of questions and discussion that define a regional evacuation incident and transportation strategies that may apply to various situations. Finally, the Scenario Development section identifies five specific example scenarios to demonstrate the application of the emergency assessment worksheet and transportation strategies that may be employed by state and local emergency management and transportation agencies during the emergency.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. A wide range of incidents may occur which either require large-scale regional evacuation, or have the potential to initiate a large-scale spontaneous evacuation. Such incidents rely upon the regional transportation system and may overwhelm the resources or capabilities of a single jurisdiction and/or require coordination across multiple jurisdictions.

2. Demand management will be critical in such incidents to avoid overwhelming the system. Advance public education, tests, and drills, plus public information during the incident, are critical to achieve success.
3. During such incidents the region may experience localized or widespread disruptions to the regional transportation system or infrastructure. These may include damage to infrastructure or deliberate closures by law enforcement, military, or other government agencies to protect strategic assets. Access to areas of the region will improve as routes are cleared and repaired and as detours or workarounds are provided.
4. Surges in requirements will be placed upon the transportation system by emergencies in other functional areas, in addition to the surge in demand as a result of the evacuation and response activity.
5. Infrastructure damage and communications or power disruptions will likely inhibit efficient coordination of transportation support during the immediate response and post-disaster period.
6. Transportation disruptions will likely impact the movement of relief supplies throughout the region. Gradual clearing of access routes and improved communications will permit an increased flow of emergency relief, although localized distribution patterns might remain unusable for a significant period.

C. The Regional Network

The regional transportation network comprises highways, from limited access highways and interstates, (some with High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes), to arterials, collectors, and neighborhood roads; fixed route rail lines and stations serving freight, commuter rail and Amtrak; the Metrorail line and stations; and pedestrian and bicycle facilities, from dedicated trails and bike lanes to sidewalks. Roads and rail lines are all capacity-constrained, and subject to overcrowding. In addition, in an emergency situation, capacity may be further reduced through roadway closures and/or station closures.

The transportation system cannot operate at peak efficiency when it is subject to extreme surges of demand. A building or room can be evacuated more quickly when it is managed so that stairways are not overcrowded. The same is true of the transportation system components (i.e., Metrorail, freeways and arterials). Therefore, demand management will be a key strategy for managing an emergency situation. This includes identifying situations and strategies where the majority of people do not evacuate the area, but shelter in place.

Public transportation providers range from commuter rail and Metrorail to Metrobus, regional bus, local bus, and paratransit systems. Here capacity is also constrained, but can provide needed resources. For example, WMATA has 1,451 buses and 784 rail cars. (This and all of the totals below should be considered approximate.) Ride-On, the Fairfax Connector, The Bus, PRTC, Alexandria Transit, CUE and ART supply an additional 714 buses. VRE has 68 commuter rail passenger cars and 19 locomotives, while MARC has 153 passenger cars and 34 locomotives.

In addition to the public transit providers, there are additional significant sources of transportation capacity, from school buses, to private charter and tour services, to taxis. Area schools have 5,634 buses, with the largest fleets in Fairfax County (1,428), Prince George's County (1,255) and Montgomery County (1,165). There are also more than 760 commuter and other buses in or near the region, according to initial surveys.


The logistics of deployment of drivers and vehicles, for example in midday, night, or times when drivers and vehicles are not typically available, may be complex and time-consuming.

Probably the largest source of carrying capacity is privately owned automobiles and other passenger vehicles. This capacity may be able to be tapped in some types of emergency situations, without overwhelming the system, if people are advised to form super-car pools- to fill each available automobile with as many people as it can carry, regardless of destination, in order to clear buildings and clear the area as quickly as possible.

Exhibits 1.1 through 1.9 are maps that identify regional transportation facilities that could be important to any significant regional emergency. Exhibit 1.1 displays all of these facilities for the entire Washington area. Exhibits 1.2 through 1.9 provide maps for the District of Columbia and individual Maryland and Virginia counties with associated cities. Each map identifies freeways, arterials and Metrorail stations as well as critical intersections along these routes that require special attention. The number of existing lanes on each facility are displayed to facilitate addressing capacity and lane transition issues in the future. Exhibit 2 illustrates the Metrorail system.

In summary, the major constraints to effectively moving people out of an affected area are typically roadway (or sidewalk/ walkway) capacity, vehicle availability and capacity, and available time. In the event of a regional emergency requiring evacuation, all aspects of the regional network will be highly stressed, in particular if one or more transportation facilities is disabled or closed in the incident. Section D, following the maps, addresses a variety of supply and demand strategies that can be employed during an emergency to increase the number of people that can be transported to safer areas.

Exhibit 1.1 Metropolitan Washington Regional Transportation Facilities *










Exhibit 1.3 Regional Transportation Facilities Frederick County





**Exhibit 1.4
Regional Transportation Facilities
Montgomery County**














D. Overview of Regional Strategies to Facilitate Regional Evacuation

Most current jurisdictional emergency response plans are geared to local rather than regional-scale incidents. The following items represent a suggested tool-box of strategies to address demand management and coordination and highway and transit supply management and coordination. Strategies range from simple extensions and expansions of current policy to more extreme measures that will require extensive advance regional planning and cooperation to develop and deploy. There is overlap between the demand and highway and transit supply strategies, as they are all aspects of an integral intermodal system. The categorization here is intended for guidance only. The strategies listed should be considered a menu of possibilities, and additional strategies may also be developed through further development efforts. The listing of a strategy does not imply endorsement of or requirement for a strategy. Particular strategies may or may not be advisable in specific situations.

1. Demand Management Strategies

a. Communications for Demand Management: There may be times when people are safer in their buildings than on the streets, at least until streets are navigable. RICCS and prompt public communications can help manage or avert panic by clearly defining the at-risk area, defining shelter in place recommendations, and providing roadway advisories to let people know in advance what they will be getting into on highways and transit. This should include communication of all demand and supply strategies that have been agreed upon through the conference calls, such as staggered employee release, emergency HOV, restricted highway access outside the critical perimeter, location of transit assembly areas, and other measures.

b. Staggered/ timed release: In order to ensure that transportation network capacity is not overwhelmed in gridlock, which may endanger great numbers of people, it may be advisable for government and private sector employers to stagger the release of employees, beginning with those in the most at-risk areas. This may be accomplished through announcements, e-mails or other mechanisms, and will be far more effective if education and drills have taken place prior to the incident.

c. HOV management: In most cases, existing HOV restrictions should remain in place. There may also be cases where HOV restrictions on existing HOV roadways are imposed during non-peak hours in the event of an emergency to facilitate the flow of people. For example, revised VDOT procedures emphasize movement of people over vehicles.

d. Emergency HOV Restrictions/ “Super-slugging”: A major emergency might require mandatory HOV restrictions on roadways that are not normally designated HOV; or at times when HOV restrictions are not normally in place. Restrictions can be put in place in the long-term aftermath of a regional incident or emergency, as done for Manhattan in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001. Mandatory HOV restrictions would apply to severely impacted areas. For example, restrictions could extend to allowing one car per family (as in a night-time evacuation situation), or mandating that only vehicles with four or more persons per vehicle are allowed access to major evacuation routes.

Public information and advisory outreach prior to an event could set up “emergency car pool” contingency plans in offices throughout the area, such that employees would know in advance who in their building typically headed home in approximately their direction, if there is time for such organization. If there is no time available, people may simply be advised to fill every private vehicle as it leaves each building or parking facility, regardless of ultimate destination, in order to clear the area as quickly as possible. Assembly areas may also be set up for those unable to secure a ride from a particular building for whatever reason. This could be termed “super-slugging”, and would obviously require planning and policy decision-making and coordination well in advance of an event.

e. Pedestrian and Bicycle Strategies: Many incidents will require persons in the affected area to walk (or bicycle) to an assembly area, for longer-range transport to a safer area. (See Transit Strategies: Metrorail Primary and Metrobus and Local Buses in Special Evacuation Service). This can be facilitated by clear media and other public communications, clear direction from emergency responders and law enforcement on the scene, and dedication of entire roads, if necessary, to pedestrian and bicycle traffic. Bicycles may also be of service in outlying assembly areas to reduce demand for other forms of transport (such as shuttle buses).

2. Roadway Network/ General Transportation System Strategies

a. Traffic signals and traffic control: The District of Columbia and other jurisdictions have plans in place to change signal timing to facilitate outward movements on key routes, and also to deploy law enforcement personnel at key intersections to prevent blocking of intersections and potential gridlock. Establishment and maintenance of a regionally agreed interjurisdictional “emergency” signal timing plan to facilitate evacuation is envisioned. Such a plan may maximize traffic flow on major evacuation routes.

b. Closed circuit television, improved communications, and roadway signs: These techniques are increasingly being deployed in many jurisdictions, such as by DDOT and Arlington County, both to monitor events and to inform the public as to roadway status and detours or alternatives. Regional coordination in the event of a major emergency is required to ensure that consistent instruction and direction is provided.

c. Dynamic Rerouting: It may be advisable to develop tools to determine strategies in an emergency situation, that can be used for “dynamic rerouting”. These could be used to dealing with the loss of facilities. Such plans must identify what is not available, and optimize what is left.

d. Roadway clearance: Ensure that plans are in place to shut down/ remove construction equipment as necessary on major roadways. Tow trucks should be deployed to clear parked vehicles, have trucks on standby in critical areas to clear stalled/ other incident vehicles.

e. Emergency Set-Aside Routes for Buses and Emergency Vehicles: There may be merit in evaluating and designating certain routes parallel to the major evacuation routes that would be limited to transit vehicles for outgoing movements, with appropriate signalization. Still other routes may be reserved for incoming and/or emergency vehicles. This will require coordination with R-ESF #13, Law Enforcement (possibly auxiliaries), and R-ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. Communications among transit providers and highway control personnel are critical (R-ESF #5). Communicating transit reroutings to the public is also critical, through every means possible- media, websites, phone recordings and information, etc. via R-ESF #14, Media Relations and Community Outreach.


f. Access Restrictions: Restricting access to major facilities outside the perimeter of the incident in order to ensure available capacity for access/ evacuation from the area at risk is both an access management and a demand strategy. This could entail ramp closures to major routes in the areas on the perimeter of the incident, for example, such as deploying maintenance vehicles or other barriers to impede access to the roads from outside the danger zone. Exhibit 3 provides a schematic overview of the access restriction strategy. In common with many other strategies identified in this report, preparing the policy protocols and decision-framework for such seemingly radical but potentially life-saving actions will require regional cooperation and decision-making well in advance of an emergency that might require such actions.

Another facet of access control is perimeter control. This is needed to secure facilities and create perimeter control to stop people from coming into the evacuation area. This is primarily the responsibility of Law

Enforcement, with critical support required from the Credentialing Annex. These must both be coordinated with government and business Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs), which may require that certain personnel have special access to restricted areas.

Exhibit 3.

Incident Where Ramp Closures Outside Danger Zone Facilitates Evacuation



g. Reversing Lanes/ Roadway Directions: Reversing major interstates or other roadways to have all lanes running in one direction is something that requires analysis and time. Reversing lanes/directions within city and on freeway to help traffic move out can be accomplished with planning and coordination. There would need to be alternate routes for those emergency workers needing to drive into the area. Limited access highways would need on and off-ramps closed in the counter-flow direction in the affected area.

An example of how and where such a technique might be deployed would be at a location where outbound lanes currently drop from four lanes to two lanes. Assuming the outbound traffic from the emergency is filling the four lanes, the counterflow lanes could be made available using a highway crossover, with law enforcement personnel to direct traffic to the crossover and trucks and/or other barriers to prevent entry to the inbound lanes. This will require identification of crossover and median breaks on major roadways and testing of strategies for tight control of access points. It has been stated that DC roads are not engineered to reverse directions,

and would require more study and planning to develop analogous strategies.

h. Active Management- Critical Intersections: For the purposes of this annex, regional critical intersections are defined as intersections that are located on evacuation routes, in particular those that represent an at-grade crossing of two evacuation routes, or high volume at-grade intersections for accessing evacuation routes. Such intersections may require higher level/ more active management, from traffic control monitoring and signal timing, up to and including active law enforcement to ensure that traffic continues to move through the intersections. Draft designations of regional critical intersections are identified on the enclosed maps, Exhibits 1.1 through 1.9.

3. Transit System Strategies

a. Metrorail Primary: The rail system, comprising Metrorail, VRE, and MARC will be utilized to the maximum extent possible to move people from the “core area” to outlying stations. WMATA will provide Metrorail, (or substitute bus service, if feasible), to key Metrorail stations, especially terminal stations.

b. Assembly Points: Rail stations, especially terminal Metrorail stations, will be used as assembly points for passengers. (Note: shelters are under the purview of R-ESF #6, Mass Care). It is likely that most scenarios would include a higher volume of, and less “transit-familiar”, passengers than usual. Additional staging areas should be designated within walking distance of major Metrorail stations.

c. Metrobus and Local Buses Maintain Regular Routes: Metrobus and local jurisdictional bus systems will transport passengers from Metrorail, VRE, and MARC stations along their regular routes to the maximum extent possible.

d. Metrobus and Local Buses on Priority Routes: Metrobus and local jurisdictional bus systems will transport passengers from key available Metrorail, VRE, and MARC stations, relying primarily on normal service configurations, with reductions of service in some branches and special route variations. Such a strategy may be necessary if buses must also provide special evacuation services and/or substitute for Metrorail or commuter rail services.

e. Metrobus and Local Buses in Special Evacuation Service: If time is available, buses may be deployed to designated points near the incident to transport people to a safer area. It is anticipated that most people would

walk to these staging areas. The bus pick-up areas must be in a safe location (for the drivers and passengers) and easily distinguishable. Buses may also serve as shuttles from key Metro stations to safe areas.

f. Charter/ School Buses, Taxis, Other Providers Deployed: Taxi companies, school buses, charter bus companies, and other transportation providers may be integrated into the service annex, as determined appropriate, to supplement the rail and bus systems. This may require conditional contracts, MOUs, or emergency powers legislation to permit cooperation/ lifting of operating restrictions, or other issues.

g. Bus Shuttles between Key Metrorail Stations: In the event of a major outage, as in one line or a major portion of a line being out of service, it is intended that Metrorail service would transport passengers that would normally use the out-of-service line to the closest Metrorail station on an unaffected line. For example, if service to one terminal station were affected, passengers could be transported to the nearest adjacent, working station, which might be a terminal station on another line. A shuttle would be set up between the two stations, using available resources such as Metrobus, local buses, school buses, charter buses, or other transportation providers, depending on availability. In this manner, local services such as Ride-on, DASH, etc., would maintain their current routes. R-ESF #5 procedures will be used to inform emergency personnel as to status and operations; R-ESF #10 will inform the public.

h. Regional Buses Divert to Metrorail Stations: If downtown roadways are blocked with traffic, regional buses such as OmniRide and MTA suburban services may be better off serving outlying Metrorail stations, rather than losing time trying to navigate downtown. This must be communicated to patrons in time for them to alter their plans and get to the designated station. There may be a need to inform some riders of unfamiliar transportation alternatives in some locations.

i. Traffic Control at Key Stations, and Auto Traffic to Alternate Pick-Up Sites: In a major incident, key Metrorail stations may be used as staging areas for buses to take people to safer sites, or on to homes or other locations. Such an incident is also likely to initiate a much higher than normal demand for auto access. In such an event, it may be necessary to prohibit auto traffic (as in the kiss-and-ride lots) in order to handle the additional bus traffic, and to avoid overwhelming the system. This is likely to require official or auxiliary law enforcement personnel. Key stations should have a designated auto-overflow facility, where patrons and auto pick-up persons can meet. This should either be within easy walking distance, such as a nearby mall, or clearly-marked shuttle buses should be available to transport patrons. This may require advance

agreements with malls and other sites, to ensure cooperation in the event of an emergency.

j. Complete Closure of Metrorail. This may be considered more a scenario than a strategy. If the entire Metrorail network is affected, either through contamination, massive, multiple power failures, or other incident, the full range of supply and demand strategies must be considered. Emergency bus response procedures will come into play to essentially operate buses parallel to the rail line, but could not approach the capacity of Metrorail. Other strategies such as emergency HOV, bringing in charter buses, school buses, and possibly employing taxis (with prearrangement) may be necessary in immediate aftermath to deal with displaced crowds. Certain roads may need to be designated as bus routes to ensure traffic flow. See Example Scenario 5 for a description of such an event.

4. Warning Systems and Communications

Communications are substantially addressed in R-ESFs #2, #5, and #14. Some additional critical communication issues regarding evacuation in a regional incident or emergency include the following:

a. Internal Communications Strategies (R-ESF #2 and #5)

Federal Engagement-Demand: Communication and coordination with federal agencies is imperative for improving emergency annex and implementation efforts in the region. Federal executive branch employee release directives often have a ripple effect far beyond federal employees, extending to policies for release of other branches of government and private sector employees. Federal participation (in particular the OPM/GSA/FEMA release coordination group) in the RICCS and RES-F #5 conference calls for coordination would provide crucial support for regional demand management coordination. (See also Staggered/Timed Release under Demand Strategies.)

Federal Engagement-Supply: In many areas, roadway closures mandated by various branches of the federal government create significant blockages, such as in Arlington County where the federal government leases a number of buildings, or in the District of Columbia, where access to and from major government buildings may be preempted by federal government entities. Similarly, National Park Service and U.S. Park Police actions on major roadways such as the Baltimore-Washington Parkway or the George Washington Memorial Bridge can greatly impact emergency response efforts. Federal participation (in particular the

GSA, National Park Service, U.S. Park Police, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Military District of Washington, and possibly other DoD agencies, depending on location) in the RICCS and RES-F #5 conference calls for coordination would provide crucial support for regional supply management and coordination.

Transit Communications: Communication among transit providers/agencies is an important factor for establishing a Regional Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex (See R-ESF #1). The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is the first contact, they then contact other transit providers/agencies. Many agencies contact their drivers via phone calls or contact the contractors to mobilize drivers in the event of an emergency.

Standard Protocols: Communications for an evacuation should follow the RICCS protocols for emergency incidents, using RICCS and initiating conference calls with the incident manager. Additional parties beyond local jurisdictions may need to be involved, e.g., state governors or other authorities that can declare the state of emergency and authorize evacuation.

b. Public Communications Strategies (R-ESF #14)

Consistent and Accurate Information: The information dissemination strategy in the RECP includes Police, Fire, Emergency Management, Military, and others. It is critical to ensure the publication/ availability of accurate emergency plans.

Tourist, Visitor Information: Communication must address the needs of tourists, especially since they may be unfamiliar with evacuation routes and transit options.

Roadway Status: Clear, timely information must be provided on the status of roadways given damage, closures, congestion, and other issues. If strategies such as road reversals, access restrictions, roads dedicated to transit or emergency vehicles, or HOV restrictions have been implemented, these must also be clearly communicated, along with recommendations for alternative routes, staying in place, etc.

Transit Status: Metrorail status, transit bus reroutings, locations for emergency pick-ups, and other actions must be clearly communicated using available media, as discussed above.

Staging, meeting sites, recommendations. If school children have been evacuated, parents must know where to find them, and/or who to call to find out. Families and other groups will need to know likely sources for information, if they have not previously arranged for a meeting site. And, as noted above, Metrorail kiss-and-ride lots may be closed to autos, and the alternate pick-up sites must be made known.

5. Key Common Issues

Authority: Multiple jurisdictions and authorities will be involved in all major evacuation situations, and will coordinate through the R-ESFs and the RICCS. A lead agency may be designated for an evacuation incident that clearly establishes a chain of command, but that may vary depending on the jurisdiction where the incident occurs.

Initiating the More Extreme/ Higher Level Response Actions: Agencies contemplating the use of the “more extreme” transportation supply or demand management strategies will coordinate regionally through the RICCS.


Sheltering in Place: Notwithstanding that this annex primarily addresses movement of people and vehicles, as noted throughout the document, it must be considered that sheltering in place of the population or segments thereof may be the most feasible strategy, and thus must be clearly communicated to the public if applicable.

Planning considerations may include the necessity to convince the general population of the need to shelter in place where they are, rather than trying to join their family. This may require reassuring parents that their children are safer in school than in transit, making sure special needs populations are cared for, and providing scenario specific instructions and up to date information on the location and probable duration of the hazard, identifying shelter locations for people who are already in transit, and, perhaps, even shutting down transportation.

E. Introduction to the Emergency Evacuation Framework

A variety of issues must be addressed in coordinating and conducting evacuation operations, as shown in Exhibit 4. These include the impact analysis of the emergency, identification of the population at risk, and development of protective action, which may include the decision to evacuate.

Exhibit 4. General Evacuation Assessment Framework



The Emergency Assessment Worksheet, which is also used for Example Scenario Development, is discussed in detail below. The assessment worksheet focuses on the elements most pertinent to the transportation system. Future versions of this annex may develop demographic assessments, consequence analysis and similar details for particular Example Scenarios using the COG model and similar resources. Exhibit 5 demonstrates the link between the assessment framework and the items in the worksheet. Exhibit 6 introduces the worksheet.

Exhibit 5. General Evacuation Assessment Framework/ Worksheet Interface

Framework Category	Worksheet Detail Category
Impact Analysis of Emergency Input	Nature of Accident/Incident
	Warning Time
	Geographic Spread of Incident
	Type of Facility
Impact Analysis Output	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Population at Risk Input	Meteorological conditions
	Demographics: Time of Day/ Day of Week
	Physical Characteristics: Location CBD/Suburb
Population at Risk Output	Emergency Planning Zone Definition: Evacuation Radius
	Expected Duration of Event
Protective Action Input	Transportation Network Status
	Transit System Status
	Communications System Status
	Federal Action/ Reaction: OPM/GSA/FEMA; National Guard; Park Service; Secret Service; Other
	State and Local Emergency Management Agency Actions
Protective Action Output	Plans for Specific Response Actions (RECP)
	Public Warning Plan (R-ESF #14)
	Potential Highway Network Strategies
	Potential Transit Strategies
	Potential Demand Strategies

Exhibit 6. Emergency Assessment Worksheet

Page 1 of 2: Description	Comment																																																																																	
Brief Description																																																																																		
Geographic Spread of Incident																																																																																		
Evacuation Radius																																																																																		
# to Evacuate																																																																																		
Expected Duration of Event																																																																																		
Warning Time																																																																																		
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Page 2 of 2	Comment
Strategies to Employ	
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	
-Dynamic rerouting	
-Roadway clearance	
-Bus set- aside routes	
-Access restrictions	
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	
-Active management- critical intersections	
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	
-Emergency HOV; “Super-slug”	
-Communications to manage panic	
-Timed/ staged release	
-Pedestrian & bicycle strategies	
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	
-Metrobus on priority routes	
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	
-Local buses maintain regular service	
-Local buses on priority routes	
-Local buses in special service	
-Charter/school buses deployed	
-Taxis, others deployed	
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	
-Traffic control at key stations	
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal coordination: Demand & Supply	
-Transit- WMATA	
-RICCS, conference	
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	
-Roadway status	
-Transit status	
-Staging, recommendations	
Additional Comments/ Notes:	

F. Incident Definition Questionnaire and Discussion of Relevant Transportation Strategies

Large-scale regional evacuation is the primary focus of this annex. However, there may also be instances where regional cooperation is required in order to facilitate evacuation of a local incident by strongly discouraging or prohibiting evacuation of outlying but non-threatened localities. Local events should follow local protocol and established procedures. The following series of questions may help define a regional as opposed to a local event, and identify situations where the specific strategies described above may be helpful.

Questionnaire: Page 1 of 6

1. Type of event (e.g., natural- hurricane; terrorism- conventional weapon)
2. Duration of event: immediate impact (e.g., single explosion? Fire? Chemical leak that will spread?) Expected duration of impacts from event – hours, days, weeks or more
 - a. E.g., will controlling the fire end the incident, or are there ongoing repercussions such as major street closures and/or significant transit system outages and/or major utility outages that will likely carry on for hours, days, weeks or more?
 - b. Depending on the significance of the facility, closures or outages of several hours may be deemed a regional event (e.g., shutdown of the Capital Beltway or an entire Metrorail line), while for other facilities a closure of several days may be considered a local event (e.g., a minor collector road closed due to snow, or power outages in a neighborhood-inconvenient but not regional.)
3. Geographic spread:
 - a. Immediate (e.g., immediate vicinity of explosion or fire; immediate plume from chemical leak)
 - b. Longer term (e.g., if incident will spread, such as chemical or biological incident, how quickly will it disperse, and to what radius, before it is no longer a danger)
4. First responder requirements: e.g., special protection/ precautions/ equipment (R-ESF #4, Firefighting, R-ESF #9, Urban Search and Rescue, R-ESF #10, Hazardous Materials, and R-ESF #13, Law Enforcement)

Questionnaire Continued: Page 2 of 6

5. Citizen protection requirements and evacuation decision

- a. Have citizens been injured or killed, and/or are more injuries or deaths likely, with or without further action.
- b. Is evacuation called for, to protect from further injury ____ Yes
 - i. Evacuation from what radius of the event
 - ii. Evacuation to what distance
 - iii. Evacuation for what period of time
- c. If evacuation is called for, is the incident small enough to be handled by the local jurisdiction using standard procedures? If yes, this is likely not a regional incident; it may be helpful to inform others in the region about the event, but is not necessary to invoke RECP, conference calls, etc.
- d. If limited evacuation is called for, is shelter in place also called for, for at least some portions of the population? Can this be effectively controlled and coordinated at the local level? If yes, this is likely not a regional incident.
- e. If evacuation of a specific area and shelter in place on the perimeter of the area is called for (specific to the incident itself and the status of the transportation network), will this require regional resources for communication and control? E.g., will regional resources be necessary to limit evacuation activity to the direct risk area, employing regional strategies for demand and supply? If yes, this likely is a regional incident, and the RICCS and RECP should be employed.
- f. If widespread evacuation is not called for, but an unofficial or spontaneous evacuation is taking place (mass exodus, panic) or is likely to take place, regional resources will be needed for communication among jurisdictions and agencies, deployment of control measures, and communication to the public.
- g. If evacuation is called for, does the extent of the evacuation require authorization from higher authorities?
 - i. D.C.- Mayor and Director, Emergency Management Agency
 - ii. VA- depending on scope- incident commander, emergency staff, county authorities, the Governor
 - iii. MD- generally the same as VA
 - iv. Federal - Normally OPM, FEMA and GSA coordinate action for the majority of Federal employees. There are isolated incidents when Agency/ Department Directors make a decision based on the type of emergency. Most quasi-governmental agencies follow OPM guidelines but actual decisions are made by Agency directors. This also holds true for military bases and the Pentagon. More information is needed on the decision-making process for the Judicial and Legislative branches of government.
 - v. Has such authorization been given, and verified as to source?
 - vi. With authorization, who is the lead agency for the evacuation?

Questionnaire continued, page 3 of 6

- h. If quarantine rather than evacuation is called for (under the purview of R-ESF #6, Mass Care, R-ESF #8, Health, Mental Health and Medical Services, and the Disease Surveillance Annex), how does the established perimeter impact transportation facilities or services?
- i. What action(s) are being planned/ have been taken by the federal government- especially the OPM/GSA/FEMA response team?

Summary:

6. Does the event have a regional impact? Yes No
7. Is there a need to inform others in the region about the event?
 Yes No
- i. If yes, RICCS emergency contact protocols come into play.
8. Are there decisions that need to be made by decision-makers beyond the local level, at the regional level? Yes No
- i. If yes, RECP conference calls and RICCS come into play.

In general, only situations where the answer to questions 6 through 8 are “yes” should be considered as regional emergency evacuation situations (taking into consideration the answers to previous questions).

The next set of questions can help further define the nature of the incident, and further determine which among a “toolbox” of regional-scope transportation responses and strategies may be appropriate in addressing the incident.

9. Is there warning time before the event? Yes No

E.g., if this is a terrorist incident, has a credible warning been received, and if so, what is the time frame for evacuation? Likewise, if there is a spill of military materials, there may be adequate time to clear the area before imminent danger. With a chemical spill, the immediate surrounding area may be heavily impacted in a matter of moments, but areas beyond that reach may have minutes or hours to clear the area to be impacted (or take measures to shelter in place), depending on the type of incident, prevailing winds, etc.

With warning time, it may be possible to muster buses and other transportation at a temporarily safe perimeter that people can walk to. In some locations Metrorail may be an option for evacuation. In other cases, people may be able to leave by car, but should be strongly encouraged to work to save lives over vehicles, and be sure that every vehicle is filled to capacity before getting on the streets (emergency HOV strategy).

Questionnaire continued, page 4 of 6

10. Time of day/ day of week

Rush hour _____ Yes _____ No
Off-peak, midday, early evening _____ Yes _____ No
Late night, weekend _____ Yes _____ No

- a. If during a rush hour, more vehicles are on the roads, complicating access; HOV is in effect, people may be easier to mobilize, and maximum transit capacity is available.
- b. During an off-peak period, the majority of the transit resources should be available with operators; it may take more time for people to mobilize.
- c. Late at night or on weekends it will be more difficult to warn and alert people, and more difficult to deploy transit resources (with fewer drivers on hand); however, depending on the incident and time, groups (e.g., family members, partners) may already be together to effect a single departure.

11. Location: Is the incident taking place in the suburbs or the CBD?

Transportation and communications strategies will differ depending on location and incident; e.g., a bus bridge may be feasible for a relatively low-volume disabled suburban rail station but would be far more difficult to implement for a downtown station.

12. Approximately how many people need to move or be moved, how far, and in what period of time?

Depending on volumes of people and distance, walking to a nearby Metro station or to buses at a safe perimeter may be a more viable option than individual automobiles and resulting gridlock.

13. Is the incident threatening residents in their homes, places of business, places of recreation, or all three?

Transportation and communications strategies will differ depending on the affected population's access to automobiles, transit, and mass media and other communications methods.

14. Is the incident threatening any particularly vulnerable populations such as nursing homes or hospitals?

R-ESF #8, Health, Mental Health and Medical Services and R-ESF #14, Community Outreach, working with local communities, should have inventory of facilities with vulnerable populations. These facilities should each have evacuation plans in place, with agreements with other agencies for sharing

Questionnaire continued, page 5 of 6

resources, and acquiring extra ambulances and other vehicles as necessary. This assumption should perhaps be tested during a subsequent study and inventory phase, to ensure that sufficient specialized vehicles and back-up facilities would be available in the event of a large-scale emergency. A related concern is for incarceration facilities, both for transport and subsequent housing in the event of an evacuation.

15. Transportation network status

Are the roadway and signal systems intact? Yes No

If no, may need to implement dynamic rerouting with VMS, other information strategies; manual traffic control at critical intersections; other traffic management strategies as appropriate, with coordinated communications using RICCS (R-ESF #5) and media contacts and public communications (R-ESF #14).

Are communications systems intact? Yes No

If no, may need to implement RICCS backup communications strategies (R-ESF #2 and #5), and public information (R-ESF #14).

Are there significant street closures (federal government, other?)

Yes No

If yes, implement VMS and signage strategies, dynamic rerouting, manual traffic control, other traffic management strategies with RICCS and public communications.

Will the streets be headed for gridlock if a panic evacuation takes place?

If yes, may recommend RICCS and public communications for staggered release, shelter in place, restricted road access in non-impacted areas, emergency HOV restrictions. May need to set aside roads for transit and emergency vehicles. Will also need special recognition devices (to be developed) to permit high-priority persons access to otherwise closed roads or sectors to effectuate continuity of operations plans (this may entail special access into or out of the area). See Credentialing Annex.

16. Transit system status

Has the incident impacted Metro, commuter rail, or bus facilities?

- i. If yes, RICCS should be employed, with Metro as primary contact for transit communications and response.

If Metrorail, has it impacted one or two stations? An entire line?

- ii. If yes, passengers may either be directed/ diverted to nearby unaffected stations or lines (in CBD), or Metro may set up a bus bridge (more feasible/ likely in suburbs). See Shuttle Strategy.

If the entire Metrorail network is affected, either through contamination, or massive, multiple power failures, or other incident, emergency bus response procedures will come into play to essentially operate buses parallel to the rail line, but other strategies such as emergency HOV for key highways, bringing in charter buses, school buses, and possibly employing taxis (with

Questionnaire continued, page 6 of 6

prearrangement) may be necessary in immediate aftermath to deal with displaced crowds. Certain roads may need to be designated as bus routes to ensure traffic flow.

If the incident is not near one or more functional Metrorail stations, have assembly points been established to collect pedestrians being evacuated from the immediate area of the incident, and have buses and other vehicles been deployed to meet them?

Will buses be able to traverse the road network?

- i. If no, certain roads may need to be designated as bus routes.
- ii. If no, regional buses such as Omniride and MTA suburban services may be better off restricting operations to outlying Metrorail stations.

17. Is it primarily related to structures such as buildings, or does it have the potential to impact transportation infrastructure as well?

Even events primarily dealing with structures often shut down roads in the area, some of which may be key arteries, and cause ripple effects throughout the system. Regional communication, coordination, dynamic routing, VMS and other strategies may be called for.

18. Other Demand Status Issues:

Are HOV restrictions in effect? Yes No

If the incident is happening in a time period where HOV restrictions are in effect, have the HOV restrictions been maintained? (In most cases they should be maintained.)

If the incident is happening in an off-peak period, and surge demand is expected, it may be advisable to impose HOV restrictions on normal HOV roads.

In some circumstances, it may be necessary to impose mandatory HOV restrictions on vehicles within a critical area.

Have staggered/ timed release employee plans been engaged?

Is much of the initial traffic pedestrian? Is there a need to set aside entire roadways for pedestrians? Are pedestrians being adequately directed to the assembly points to meet buses and other vehicles, or to Metrorail stations if accessible and operational?


Answers to the above questions can help ascertain the types of transportation and related strategies that may be most appropriate in response to a given set of circumstances, as demonstrated in the Example Scenario Development section which follows.

G. Example Scenario Development

As illustrated in Exhibit 7, even the simplest categorization of evacuation incidents quickly expands into virtually unlimited potential incidents or Example Scenarios. If all the branches were extended, there would be 96 possible Example Scenarios, none of which would likely match the exact event that might occur. Therefore it is critical to develop a framework approach, with representative scenarios outlining potential regional strategies, rather than a strict procedural approach. In most cases the primary jurisdiction where the incident occurs will be relied upon to take the lead in managing the event and calling for assistance as needed. Coordination following the guidance of the RECP will take place through the RICCS.

Although the proliferation of scenarios may make planning seem an impossible task, identifying a few representative Example Scenarios, and testing them against what we know about the transportation network and transit systems, can be very instructive in highlighting potential bottlenecks as well as strategies to impact transportation supply and demand on a regional basis in the event of emergency. Many of these potential strategies require advance policy decisions, memoranda of understanding, and similar coordination efforts. Both the Example Scenarios and the potential strategies highlight areas where additional information and coordination is needed in order to develop the most plausible plans for the annex and framework

Exhibit 7



Various documents have been assembled for review and developed in the course of creating this annex. Key supplementary documents, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction Evacuation Scenarios, minutes of key meetings, and inventories of public and selected commercial private vehicles are bound separately for reference.

1. Risk Assessment Matrix ¹

The risk assessment matrix (see Exhibit 8) is a tool used to conduct subjective risk assessments for use in hazard analysis. The risk posed by a given hazard can be expressed in terms of the combined severity and probability of loss. Risk should be evaluated for the worst *credible* case, not the worst *conceivable* case or conditions. However, failure to assume the worst credible or conceivable case may result in an optimistic analysis.

The general procedure is to first categorize and scale the subjective probability levels for all targets or resources, such as frequent, probable, occasional, remote, improbable and impossible. A target or resource is defined as the “what” that is at risk- personnel, equipment, buildings, transportation infrastructure, etc. Next categorize and scale the subjective severity levels for each target or resource, such as catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible.

Note that risk increases from lower left to upper right. Note also that the assessments are subjective and a guideline, not a determinant for action. Risk assessment can be used as a tool in assessing and prioritizing further analysis of a variety of Example Scenarios.

Exhibit 8. Risk Assessment Matrix

	Probability of Mishap					
Severity of Consequences	F Impossible	E Improbable	D Remote	C Possible	B Probable	A Highly Possible
I Catastrophic						High Risk
II Critical				Moderate Risk		
III Marginal		Low Risk				
IV Negligible						

¹ Adapted from Sverdrup Lesson II, Risk Assessment Matrix, <http://www.sverdrup.com/safety/workmatrix.pdf>, accessed 7/30/02

2. Example Scenarios to Test Application of Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex Strategies and Framework

The R-ESF #1 Technical Committee participated in an all-day workshop Friday, August 2. Using the general Example Scenario worksheet without strategies and information provided on transit and terrorism scenarios, the work group developed nine example scenarios, which were then narrowed to four example scenarios in group discussion. The group then developed the generic strategies that could be applied. The four Example Scenarios selected for further study and discussion are presented as Exhibits 9-1 through 9-4. A fifth example scenario, that of Metrorail completely disabled for an extended period of time, was developed at the request of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority.

Summaries of the example scenarios that were not selected and minutes of the meeting and breakout sessions are available in the separately bound document. The example scenario worksheet is intended to identify the key factors that will define an incident in terms of public reaction and regional response, with varying levels of infrastructure and system damage. Please note that additional Example Scenarios and strategies need to be investigated; and these and other scenarios should form the basis of tabletop and similar planning exercises to further develop responses and strategies.

Exhibit 9-1. Example Scenario 1

Page 1 of 2:	Scenario Title: Large-scale chemical agent release (Attachment 1 WMD Scenario 4)																																																																																
Description																																																																																	
Brief Description	Deliberate explosion of a rail-car of liquefied chlorine, or derailment with similar release of gases; on a rail line near a major Metro station such as L'Enfant Plaza or Union Station																																																																																
Geographic Spread of Incident	Lethal concentrations of gas- 3 miles; dangerous levels 7.5 miles; threshold level ppm 10 miles																																																																																
Evacuation Radius	10 miles																																																																																
# to Evacuate	To be determined- further study																																																																																
Expected Duration of Event	Minimum two days, or until local health authorities determine it is safe																																																																																
Warning Time	Zero to 3 hours																																																																																
Evacuation time avail.	To be determined- further study																																																																																
Federal Actions	(Desirable): Immediate evacuation in immediate vicinity only if shelter in place not feasible, not safe; early release in 10 mile vicinity (if safer than in place), hold others back. Unofficial panic evacuation likely.																																																																																
Local & State EMS Actions	Coordinate through R-ESFs and RICCS																																																																																
Transportation Network Status	Parallel, intersecting roadways closed, compromised																																																																																
Transit System Status	Likely impacts VRE and/or MARC as well as Metro; gas sinks and may require evacuating Metro station, disrupt trains going through station (to be determined)																																																																																
Time of Day/ Day of Week (Home-based/ work based)	Weekday rush hour																																																																																
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Risk Assessment: Probability: Medium based on availability Severity: Low property damage, possible significant fatalities	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="8">Risk Assessment Matrix</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th></th> <th>F</th> <th>E</th> <th>D</th> <th>C</th> <th>B</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>E</th> <th>I</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>V</th> <th>II</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>E</th> <th>III</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <th>IV</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>I</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>T</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>Y</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td colspan="6" style="text-align: center;">PROBABILITY</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Risk Assessment Matrix								S		F	E	D	C	B	A	E	I							V	II				X			E	III							R	IV							I								T								Y										PROBABILITY					
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Priority (HML)	High																																																																																

Page 2 of 2: Strategies to Employ	Title: Large-Scale Chemical Agent Release
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	X
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	X
-Dynamic rerouting	X
-Roadway clearance	X
-Bus set- aside routes	X - Buses deploy to safe perimeter area
-Access restrictions	X – outside 10 mile perimeter
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	X – if necessary, if time, if panic ensues
-Active management- critical intersections	X – if necessary, if time, if panic ensues
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	X – Depending on location
-Emergency HOV; “Super-slug”	X
-Staggered/ timed employee release	X
-Communications to manage panic	X Critical- may be safer in place than on street
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	X but heavily impacted
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	X in outlying areas
-Metrobus on priority routes	X
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	X
-Local buses maintain regular service	X
-Local buses on priority routes	X
-Local buses in special service	X
-Charter/school buses deployed	X If time permits
-Taxis, others deployed	X If time permits
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	X Depending on location
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	X
-Traffic control at key stations	X
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	X
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal actions- demand & supply	X
-Transit- WMATA	X
-RICCS, conference	X
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	X
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	X
-Roadway status	X
-Transit status	X
-Staging, recommendations	X
Additional comments/ notes: Strategies	Highway: Restrict access to evacuation routes beyond 10-mile radius to provide roadway capacity for escape for those within danger zone. Transit: shuttle may be needed

Exhibit 9-2. Example Scenario 2

Page 1 of 2:	Scenario Title: Explosive Materials in Transit																																																																																	
Description																																																																																		
Brief Description	An incident such as the truck carrying military weapons/ other materials which overturned on I-70 instead occurs on a major highway such as I-270																																																																																	
Geographic Spread of Incident	100 yard radius																																																																																	
Evacuation Radius	5 mile radius																																																																																	
# to Evacuate	To be determined- further study																																																																																	
Expected Duration of Event	1 to 2 days																																																																																	
Warning Time	0 to 4 hours																																																																																	
Evacuation time avail.	To be determined- further study																																																																																	
Federal Actions	Coordinate through RICCS																																																																																	
Local & State EMS Actions	Coordinate through R-ESFs and RICCS																																																																																	
Transportation Network Status	1 major artery closed																																																																																	
Transit System Status	Transit system fine in most cases, buses must be diverted around incident; in some situations/ locations segments of Metro could be out of service requiring a bus bridge (some suburban incidents) or shuttles from unaffected rail lines																																																																																	
Time of Day/ Day of Week (Home-based/ work based)	Weekday- early afternoon rush hour																																																																																	
Location (CBD/ Suburb)	Suburb																																																																																	
Risk Assessment	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="8">Risk Assessment Matrix</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th></th> <th>F</th> <th>E</th> <th>D</th> <th>C</th> <th>B</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>E</th> <td>i</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>V</th> <td>ii</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;">X</td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>E</th> <td>iii</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <td>iv</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>I</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>T</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>Y</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td colspan="6" style="text-align: center;">PROBABILITY</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Risk Assessment Matrix								S		F	E	D	C	B	A	E	i							V	ii					X		E	iii							R	iv							I								T								Y										PROBABILITY					
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Priority (HML)	Medium/ high																																																																																	

Page 2 of 2: Strategies to Employ	Title: Explosive Materials in Transit
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	X
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	X
-Dynamic rerouting	X
-Roadway clearance	
-Bus set-aside routes	
-Access restrictions	
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	
-Active management- critical intersections	X
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	X
-Emergency HOV; "Super-slug"	
-Staggered/ timed release	X
-Communications to manage panic	
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	X
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	X
-Metrobus on priority routes	
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	
-Local buses maintain regular service	X
-Local buses on priority routes	
-Local buses in special service	
-Charter/school buses deployed	
-Taxis, others deployed	
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	
-Traffic control at key stations	
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal actions	X
-Transit- WMATA	X
-RICCS, conference	X
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	X
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	
-Roadway status	X
-Transit status	X
-Staging, recommendations	
Additional comments/ notes: Transit, staging, highway status, routes, etc.	Panic not as likely as in some other incidents. Evacuation efforts fairly localized. Regional cooperation needed to inform public, identify alternative routes.

Exhibit 9-3. Example Scenario 3

Page 1 of 2:	Scenario Title: Radiological Device “Dirty Bomb”																																																																																						
Description																																																																																							
Brief Description	Large conventional weapon (similar in size to Oklahoma City device) that contains nuclear waste materials is exploded somewhere in the central business district (CBD)																																																																																						
Geographic Spread of Incident	1 – 2 miles																																																																																						
Evacuation Radius	5 mile radius																																																																																						
# to Evacuate	To be determined- further study																																																																																						
Expected Duration of Event	Several weeks																																																																																						
Warning Time	None																																																																																						
Evacuation time avail.	To be determined- further study																																																																																						
Federal Actions	Coordinate with incident manager through RICCS, advise employees as to best course of action																																																																																						
Local & State EMS Actions	Coordinate through R-ESFs and RICCS																																																																																						
Transportation Network Status	Minor impacts																																																																																						
Transit System Status	Depending on location, Metro could be impacted, more likely to require bus or rail-line diversions																																																																																						
Time of Day/ Day of Week (Home-based/ work based)	Weekday morning																																																																																						
Location (CBD/ Suburb)	CBD																																																																																						
Risk Assessment: Probability (HML)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="8">Risk Assessment Matrix</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th></th> <th>F</th> <th>E</th> <th>D</th> <th>C</th> <th>B</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>E</th> <td>i</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>V</th> <td>ii</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>E</th> <td>iii</td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> <td style="background-color: #cccccc;"></td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <td>iv</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>I</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>T</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>Y</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <td></td> <td colspan="6">PROBABILITY</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>							Risk Assessment Matrix								S		F	E	D	C	B	A	E	i							V	ii							E	iii		X					R	iv							I								T								Y										PROBABILITY					
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Priority (HML)																																																																																							

Page 2 of 2: Strategies to Employ	Title: Radiological Device “Dirty Bomb”
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	X
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	X
-Dynamic rerouting	X
-Roadway clearance	X
-Bus, emergency veh. set- aside routes	X
-Access restrictions	X
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	X
-Active management- critical intersections	X
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	X
-Emergency HOV; “Super-slug”	X
-Staggered/ timed release	X
-Communications to manage panic	X
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	X
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	
-Metrobus on priority routes	X
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	X
-Local buses maintain regular service	
-Local buses on priority routes	X
-Local buses in special service	X
-Charter/school buses deployed	
-Taxis, others deployed	
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	X If Metrorail station(s) impacted
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	X
-Traffic control at key stations	X
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	X
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal actions	X
-Transit- WMATA	X
-RICCS, conference	X
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	X
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	X
-Roadway status	X
-Transit status	X
-Staging, recommendations	X
Additional comments/ notes: Widespread evacuation not recommended but likely to happen. Incoming EMS/ HAZMAT teams, equipment will need defined routing.	Staging areas may include hotels, recreation centers, parks, subway stations, schools or shelters. Regional efforts needed to provide accurate information, instructions, avert panic. May require full range of transit, highway and demand strategies.

Exhibit 9-4 Example Scenario 4

Page 1 of 2:	Scenario Title: Holiday Panic																																																								
Description																																																									
Brief Description	Multiple conventional explosions at Fourth of July, major sporting event, festival, other tourist- visitor gathering																																																								
Geographic Spread of Incident	Varied																																																								
Evacuation Radius	5-10 miles																																																								
# to Evacuate	To be determined- further study																																																								
Expected Duration of Event	1 day more or less																																																								
Warning Time	None																																																								
Evacuation time avail.	To be determined- further study																																																								
Federal Actions	Coordinate with local government through RICCS- employee release a minimal factor, road closures, etc. more critical																																																								
Local & State EMS Actions	Coordinate through R-ESFs and RICCS																																																								
Transportation Network Status	Transportation intact but gridlocked																																																								
Transit System Status	Intact, some Metro stations may be closed																																																								
Time of Day/ Day of Week (Home-based/ work based)	Weekend, evening																																																								
Location (CBD/ Suburb)	CBD and suburb																																																								
Risk Assessment	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="7">Risk Assessment Matrix</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th>F</th> <th>E</th> <th>D</th> <th>C</th> <th>B</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="4">S E V E R I T Y</th> <th>I</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>II</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>III</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <th>IV</th> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"></td> <td colspan="7">PROBABILITY</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Risk Assessment Matrix									F	E	D	C	B	A	S E V E R I T Y	I							II					X		III					X		IV									PROBABILITY						
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Probability rating:																																																									
Severity rating:																																																									
Priority (HML)																																																									

Page 2 of 2: Strategies to Employ	Title: Holiday Panic
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	X
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	X
-Dynamic rerouting	X
-Roadway clearance	X
-Bus set- aside routes	
-Access restrictions	With non-peak volumes, dispersed incidents and unfamiliar drivers, these strategies may cause more harm than good
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	
-Active management- critical intersections	X
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	
-Emergency HOV; "Super-slug"	
-Staggered/ timed release	
-Communications to manage panic	X
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	Limited transit role esp. at night unless Metrorail geared up for event
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	
-Metrobus on priority routes	X
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	
-Local buses maintain regular service	X
-Local buses on priority routes	
-Local buses in special service	
-Charter/school buses deployed	
-Taxis, others deployed	
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	
-Traffic control at key stations	X
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal actions	X
-Transit- WMATA	X
-RICCS, conference	X
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	X
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	X
-Roadway status	X
-Transit status	X
-Staging, recommendations	X
Additional comments/ notes: Transit, staging, highway status, routes, etc.: In this case you would want to evacuate everyone to their homes (or hotels/ temporary lodgings). Federal government becomes a wild card regarding how they manage roadblocks at federal agency buildings.	Managing the panic becomes the biggest priority. Deploying large numbers of buses or gearing up Metro (if private vehicles are blocked off/ unavailable or abandoned in gridlock) becomes difficult at night as most operators are off-duty. Moving large numbers of tourists/ persons not familiar with transit also problematic.

Exhibit 9-5 Example Scenario 5 (In Development)

Page 1 of 2:	Long-Term Metrorail Shutdown																																																																																	
Description																																																																																		
Brief Description	Major biological long-lasting hazard (e.g., Anthrax) released in underground station, transmitted throughout Metro system																																																																																	
Geographic Spread of Incident	Regional																																																																																	
Evacuation Radius	Metrorail system																																																																																	
# to Evacuate	To be determined- further study																																																																																	
Expected Duration of Event	3 to 6 months																																																																																	
Warning Time	15 minutes																																																																																	
Evacuation time avail.	To be determined- further study																																																																																	
Federal Actions	Desirable: Coordinate staggered release, rideshare, etc.																																																																																	
Local & State EMS Actions	Coordinate through R-ESFs and RICCS																																																																																	
Transportation Network Status	Roadway structure unaffected; much heavier traffic volumes with no Metrorail																																																																																	
Transit System Status	Assume all Metro stations closed indefinitely																																																																																	
Time of Day/ Day of Week (Home-based/ work based)	Weekday, evening rush hour																																																																																	
Location (CBD/ Suburb)	CBD and suburb																																																																																	
Risk Assessment	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="8">Risk Assessment Matrix</th> </tr> <tr> <th>S</th> <th></th> <th>F</th> <th>E</th> <th>D</th> <th>C</th> <th>B</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>E</td> <td>I</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>V</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>E</td> <td>II</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>X</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>R</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>I</td> <td>III</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>T</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Y</td> <td>IV</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td colspan="6">PROBABILITY</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Risk Assessment Matrix								S		F	E	D	C	B	A	E	I							V								E	II					X		R								I	III							T								Y	IV									PROBABILITY					
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Priority (HML)																																																																																		

Page 2 of 2: Strategies to Employ	Title: Long-Term Metrorail Shutdown
Highway System Strategies	
-Traffic signals, traffic control	X
-CCTV, VMS, Signage	X
-Dynamic rerouting	
-Roadway clearance	X – peak hours
-Bus set- aside routes	X - Possible long-term strategy?
-Access restrictions	
-Reverse lanes, roadway directions	
-Active management- critical intersections	X
Demand Strategies	
-HOV mgt.	X
-Emergency HOV; “Super-slug”	X (Designate more roadways as HOV?)
-Staggered/ timed release	X
-Communications to manage panic	
Transit System Strategies	
-Metrorail primary	
-Metrobus maintains regular routes	X Expand service- borrow, charter vehicles, school buses?
-Metrobus on priority routes	
-Metrobus in special evacuation service	
-Local buses maintain regular service	X Expand service- borrow, charter vehicles, school buses?
-Local buses on priority routes	
-Local buses in special service	
-Charter buses, school buses	X
-Taxis, others deployed	X Vouchers?
-Bus shuttles between key Metro stations	
-Regional buses divert to Metro stations	
-Traffic control at key stations	X May use stations as pick-up points for buses
-Auto traffic to alternate pick-up sites	X
Internal Communication Strategies	
-Federal actions	X
-Transit- WMATA	X
-RICCS, conference	X – as needed
Public Communication Strategies	
-Consistent, accurate	X
-Tourist/visitor information strategy	X
-Roadway status	X
-Transit status	X
-Staging, recommendations	
Additional comments/ notes: Transit, staging, highway status, routes, etc.	Requires variety of long-range strategies; tremendous impact, extraordinary in nature, strategies such as highway optimization, longer peak periods, major demand management, flex hours, work force deployment to satellite locations, telecommuting, major car pool efforts, heavy load on “Commuter Connections” program, more bus service- rethinking work strategies

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

The concept of coordination for the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex is substantially addressed in R-ESF #1. The impacted agencies, whether transportation, emergency services, or other, should rely on internal processes to respond initially, to convene conference calls with other affected agencies, and to maintain coordination and communication through the RICCS under R-ESF #5..

B. Organization

The transportation aspects of evacuation will be coordinated with Public Works and Engineering (R-ESF #3), Firefighting (R-ESF #4), Information and Planning (R-ESF #5), Mass Care (R-ESF #6), Health, Mental Health and Medical Services (R-ESF #8), Law Enforcement (R-ESF #13), Media Relations and Community Outreach (R-ESF #14), Donations and Volunteer Management (R-ESF #15) and the Protective Actions Annex. Other R-ESFs may be involved, depending on the nature of the incident. These agencies may exchange the following information:

1. Make recommendations on evacuation options, shelter in place options, and safety radius.
2. Identify special transportation requirements and identify pick-up points for people in need of transportation, such as hospital patients, areas with limited auto ownership, etc. In a primarily pedestrian evacuation (to initial assembly points), identify transportation options for persons with limited mobility.
3. Identify evacuation routes and assembly points.
4. Recommend strategies to be employed to facilitate demand and supply management, and maximize safe evacuation and appropriate sheltering in place.
5. Prepare and update the evacuation movement control plan.
6. Verify the continuing safety of evacuation infrastructure.
7. Provide evacuation and re-entry information for dissemination to R-ESF #5 (Planning and Intelligence), and R-ESF #14 (Public Information Officer).

C. Notification

Notification will be carried out as under R-ESFs #1 and #5, through the RICCS.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

When the threat of an incident or disaster is perceived, a number of preparatory tasks must be accomplished. The following represents a basic list of those actions and preparations:

- Contact the designated coordination group personnel.
- Arrange for 24 hour continuity of operation.
- Ascertain projected available time until the onset of hazardous conditions and the time left until the termination of formal evacuation activities.
- Perform a preliminary vulnerability assessment and determine the sectors of the community at risk.
- Determine if evacuation is feasible, given extant time constraints.
- Coordinate evacuation intelligence with the Federal government and other agencies through the RICCS.
- Prepare a recommendation on course of action.

2. Continuing Actions

The successful implementation of the evacuation plan is dependent upon the careful coordination of all the coordination agencies and a number of R-ESFs. Actions required include:

- The participating agencies will review and evaluate all available information relative to the situation and initiate a regional conference call using RICCS, including their recommendation as to the best course of action.
- Upon receipt of approval to evacuate (from appropriate authorities), or upon determination that an unofficial or spontaneous evacuation is likely, imminent and/or underway, all pertinent ESFs are alerted.

Participating agencies are responsible for:

- 1/ Implementation of assigned or recommended evacuation routes.
- 2/ Control of perimeter and outbound routes from the evacuation area.
- 3/ Traffic flow and traffic control.
- 4/ Limitation of access to evacuated areas.
- 5/ Dealing with accidents, breakdowns and other impediments to traffic flow.
- 6/ Alternate routes and traffic capacity expansion.

Participating agencies will provide the designated Public Information Officer (R-ESF #14) with the following information:

- 1/ Advising the public of the specific areas to be evacuated.
- 2/ Advising the public of specific evacuation routes.
- 3/ Advising the public of the pick-up points and times for those in need of transportation.
- 4/ Advising the public of any special HOV restrictions, highway access restrictions, bus reroutings, or similar transportation strategies that may be implemented.

The advent of the *recovery* phase of an incident or disaster imposes an entirely new set of responsibilities upon the Emergency Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex in as much as the focus of the operation becomes re-entry and security. The details of the recovery and re-entry procedures and criteria are to be developed in a future phase of work. Transportation mobilization and coordination may be required.

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, a notification will be made through the RICCS and a stand down debriefing conference call will take place.

4. After Action Critique

Within two weeks of stand down of the regional emergency, information for an After Action Critique will be gathered by the TPB and the critique will be discussed at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

In addition to those agencies listed in R-ESF #1, Section V, the following entities may have responsibilities related to evacuation situations.

A. Participating and Supporting Agencies and Entities

1. Non-Transportation Aspects

R-ESF # 11- Food and R-ESF #6 – Mass Care will have primary responsibility for securing shelters and supplies. Other annexes, such as Business Continuity, National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Annex, and Protective Actions, will also play key roles in coordination and recovery operations.

2. Roles for Private Carriers in Bringing in Food, Emergency Supplies, etc.

CSX Transportation, Inc.—CSX Transportation, Inc. operates 42,700 miles of track and serves every major population and industrial care center east of the Mississippi. CSX is based in Richmond, Virginia. CSX runs freight service from Baltimore through Washington, DC to Northern Virginia and points south and west.

Norfolk Southern—Norfolk Southern is a Virginia based holding company with headquarters in Norfolk. It controls a major freight railroad, Northern Southern Railway Company, which runs a freight service from Baltimore through Washington DC to Northern Virginia and points south and west.

Trucking & Hauling Companies— Trucking and hauling companies may play an important role in an emergency situation and will be treated as the general public and contacted as needed.

B. Essential Elements of Information

One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning, is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with the RICCS.

From the perspective of the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex—Emergency Evacuation, the participating agencies are responsible for providing the following Essential Elements of Information to R-ESF #5 through the RICCS concerning incidents involving regional evacuation, including:

- Status of highway network to support evacuation, including signals, infrastructure, and locations of congestion or gridlock
- Status of the transit system to support evacuation, including vehicle and operator availability, Metro capacity, and the interaction of bus transit with the highway system (alternate routes to avoid congestion, etc.)
- Description of significant disruptions in the transportation system in any jurisdiction that has the potential for regional impacts.
- Status of resources, personnel, equipment and facilities impacted by the incident/threat of incident.

Actual/potential (social, economic, political) impacts on the function and/or jurisdiction.

Other R-ESFs potentially impacted.

Overall resource shortfalls, response needs and priorities.

Relevant historical and demographic information.

Short term, medium and long-range response and recovery plans.

Recommendations for emergency ingress/egress for responders.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the annex and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, annex and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the annex and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

COG/TPB is responsible for coordinating planning under the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex , including review and revisions of the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex . All participating transportation agencies will contribute to the planning of the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex .

Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the regional emergency evacuation sector and identification of unfunded regional transportation emergency response and coordination needs.

B. Training

There will be ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and R-ESF #1 responsibilities as directed by COG/ TPB.

C. Exercise

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of transportation simulations/exercises should be conducted regularly to test the Evacuation Transportation Coordination Annex in the multifunctional environment to which it belongs, combining R-ESFs of the RECP. The exercise series is composed of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to assure continuous improvement in the transportation function and in the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real world experience and exercises. Lessons learned from these experiences are captured in a corrective action system and the issues are tracked in order to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into annex revisions as appropriate.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured and entered into a database where they will be available on request by the member jurisdictions.

VII. Anticipated Future Expansions of this Annex

The Federal, State, local, regional and private entities that share in evacuation responsibilities already have many emergency plans and procedures in place. R-ESF #1 and this annex are intended to provide additional tools to be used by these agencies for planning and response, when warranted by extraordinary incidents. This annex cannot not be a "playbook" because it is a public document, and because additional specific data are needed to outline the exact steps that agencies will take in particular circumstances. The major contribution of the annex is the additional capability to plan and respond to any type of incident, anywhere in the region and involving any conditions. To achieve the highest degree of readiness, this annex must be implemented in the context of the RECP, especially the coordination and communication provided through the RICCS; it must be used by all agencies in their planning and it must be extensively practiced and drilled to evolve specific responses and plans to specific incidents at specific locations. This annex helps both with planning and response and with both the need to be innovative and the need to establish as specific as possible response protocols.

This annex represents a significant regional coordination framework for responding to emergency situations requiring or causing public evacuation. In its development process, an initial dialog was established with key federal personnel. A structure for characterizing incidents was generated. Example scenarios were developed. Regional strategies to address major incidents have been proposed. Many elements of the annex, however, require further study, evaluation, testing, and coordination efforts. The following represents a preliminary list of items for further consideration.

A. Transportation Aspects

1. Develop and test demand management strategies (i.e., > = 4-5 persons per auto, timed releases); develop public education materials.
2. Develop plans for optimizing the transportation system (road and transit). These likely will include regional signal timing strategies and coordination mechanisms; inventories of crossovers, mechanisms and detailed plans for reversing lane directions; and further development and analysis of all the highway and transit strategies noted above.
3. Perform demand and simulation modeling exercises to support # 1 and # 2 above and test capacity and functionality of assembly areas.
4. Investigate school evacuation plans and integrate these into annex.
5. Inventory taxi fleets and identify mechanism/financial mechanism/arrangements/MOUs for rapidly deploying vehicles as needed in an emergency evacuation.
6. Develop plan for integrating ITS way finding technology for buses.
7. Inventory VMS's (variable message signs) and develop plan for their application.
8. Develop training plan for emergency personnel to operate buses.
9. Identify locations for consolidating passengers in vehicles oriented to freeways (ultimate slugging staging areas).

B. Non-Transportation Aspects

1. Fully develop “shelter in place” strategies, and rationale for situations in which it applies and does not apply. Identify protective measures, if necessary, that will increase the safety for those who shelter in place. Develop educational materials to inform the public in advance of the situations where it may be more advisable to shelter in place, and what that may entail. Key responsibilities for these efforts will be in the R-ESFs for Mass Care (#6), Health, Mental Health, and Medical Services (#8), Media Relations and Communication Outreach (#14), as well as in the Protective Actions Annex.
2. Develop and test plan for controlling access to freeway and arterial evacuation routes (separate plans for each)- will require cooperation with Law Enforcement and Public Works.

3. Develop public notification plan R-ESF related to evacuation and sheltering in place.
4. Develop coordination plans for special needs population (disabled, hospital, nursing home, jails, etc.) to address potential shortage of anticipated transportation resources. (Cuts across multiple areas of responsibility). It is possible that multiple institutions (e.g., hospitals or nursing homes), may have evacuation plans that all rely on the same sources, such as Ride-On or a private carrier. Such plans would typically be valid for a small-scale, institutional evacuation, but in a large scale evacuation those resources may be committed elsewhere. It may be worthwhile to survey various institutions and see if their plans can be carried out in the event of a large-scale evacuation.
5. Develop plans for relocation from assembly areas (with R-ESF for Mass Care, Protective Action Annex).
6. Confirmation of Evacuation Process. The confirmation process measures how effectively the evacuation is being accomplished. Confirmation is conducted by the local preparedness agencies, beginning at about the time at which evacuation is estimated to be substantially completed. Confirmation of evacuation is essential for security reasons, to assure that all population has left the area, and to assist those persons having difficulties in evacuating. Methodologies to accomplish this should be developed as follow-on tasks.

C. Coordination

Investigate frameworks for inter jurisdictional institutional coordination related to the annex. Identify existing inter-jurisdictional MOUs, identify gaps, and develop additional MOU's as necessary. Recommend enabling legislative measures that would take effect in an emergency situation.

Maintain contacts with federal agencies and other jurisdictions to ensure cooperation and coordination in the event of an emergency. Joint training, testing, and “table top” planning exercises will help keep lines of communication open, and facilitate the exchange of ideas and recommendations in the event of an emergency.



National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Support Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
National Capital Region National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Task Force

Local Coordinating Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Rockville
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Takoma Park

District of Columbia Health Organizations

District of Columbia (DC) Department of Health
DC Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
DC Department of Health and Human Services
DC Public Schools
DC Employee Health Services
DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services
DC Department of Mental Health
DC Emergency Management Agency
Metropolitan Police Department

Maryland State and Local Health Organizations

Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services Systems
Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Maryland State Police

Montgomery County Hospital Groups
Prince George's County Hospital Groups
Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
Prince George's County Health Department
Frederick County Health Department
County Public Schools

Virginia State and Local Health Organizations

Virginia Department of Emergency Management
Local Emergency Management Agencies
Virginia Department of Health
Virginia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
Arlington County Health Department
City of Alexandria Health Department
Fairfax County Health Department
Loudoun County Health Department
Prince William County Health District
County Public Schools
County and State Employee Health Services
County Emergency Medical Services
Northern Virginia Emergency Medical Services Council

Federal Government Organizations

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Food and Drug Administration
National Institutes of Health
Department of Defense
Veterans Health Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Capitol, Office of the Attending Physician
Federal Police Forces

Private-sector Health Organizations

DC Hospitals (including military hospitals)
National Capital Region—Emergency Response (NCR-ER)
Maryland Hospitals (including military hospitals)
Virginia Hospitals (including military hospitals)
Northern Virginia Emergency Response Coalition
American Red Cross (National Capital Chapter)
Clinical Pastoral Resources
Mental Health Crisis Network (Metro Chapter NASW)
State Pharmaceutical Associations
Free-standing Emergency Clinics

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) Annex facilitates the ability of each jurisdiction to communicate and coordinate with the other jurisdictions across state lines during a regional health emergency that necessitates a request for the NPS to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

B. Scope

1. The NPS Annex focuses on the need for requesting, distributing and dispensing the NPS in response to a large, unusual disease outbreak or other public health emergency with local, state and federal impact and requiring inter-jurisdictional coordination across the region.
2. If a terrorist attacks using a weapon of mass destruction (biological, chemical, explosive, nuclear, or radioactive) or a major natural disaster or technological accident occurs, state and local jurisdictions will probably deplete their supplies of pharmaceuticals and other medical items quickly. Congress, anticipating this situation, established the NPS Program and assigned it the mission of providing large quantities of essential medical items to states and communities during an emergency.
3. Managed by the CDC, the NPS Program has built its response on the assumption that state or local authorities would know they had a problem in the early hours of an emergency due to increases in patient volumes, but would not necessarily be able to immediately identify the specific problem.
4. The first shipment (known as a 12-hour Push Package) would arrive in 12 hours or less of the federal decision to deploy and would contain a broad range of materiel that authorities could use to protect and treat several hundred thousand people for an ill-defined threat.
5. Movement of the NPS throughout the region will use the best available route and mode of transportation available. If the roads or bridges are congested this may include Metro, Amtrak, CSX, VRE and MARC trains.
6. Security for the storage and transportation of the NPS will be a cooperative effort between local, state and federal agencies.
7. Following the identification of the specific threat, subsequent shipments from vendors (known as vendor-managed inventory) would contain quantities of specific drugs to combat that threat.

II. Policies

- A. The NPS Annex will not override the authority, policies or inter-jurisdictional agreements of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination between member organizations to ensure the NPS Annex procedures are maintained and in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C. Essential Elements of Information (EIs) will be shared through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) as required by the incident.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

- 1. Recognition of the presence of an emerging disease outbreak by the jurisdictions through their bio-surveillance systems or the announcement of the intentional or accidental release of a biological agent will alert the region to a possible public health emergency.
- 2. Terrorists' use of a weapon of mass destruction that results in large numbers of casualties exceeding the resources currently available in the region and creating an area-wide shortfall will prompt the use of the procedures contained in the NPS Annex to bring more supplies to the national capital area.

B. Planning Assumptions

- 1. The NPS Annex will specifically address the actions of the jurisdictions in the National Capital Region. The District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia comprise the three primary jurisdictions in the NCR. The local jurisdictions within the NCR include the Maryland counties (and incorporated areas) of Montgomery, Prince George's and Frederick; the Virginia counties (and incorporated areas) of Arlington, Fairfax, Prince William, and Loudoun; and the City of Alexandria. In addition to these jurisdictions, several components of the federal government may be involved.
- 2. Although the NCR plan for the distribution of the stockpile does not currently include Frederick County, COG will include the county in its coordination efforts in the National Capital Area.

3. Knowledge of a terrorism-related event in one jurisdiction will spread quickly to other jurisdictions.
4. The worst-case scenario that must be accommodated will be the release of a communicable agent such as plague or smallpox that affects all jurisdictions and produces the need to provide preventive therapy and treatment to a large number of citizens, while attempting to control the spread of disease by human contact.
5. The Mayor of DC or the Governor of MD or VA, or their designee(s), can request the NPS based on a problem in their respective jurisdiction(s). Coordination of that request with the other primary NCR jurisdictions will be effected through the individual emergency operation centers/emergency communications centers and the RICCS.
6. All NCR jurisdictions will have to work together to share the NPS. CDC will likely not have enough materiel or personnel to support each jurisdiction individually.
7. The NPS that arrives for the NCR will not have to support simultaneous events in other parts of Maryland or Virginia that are outside the NCR (e.g., Annapolis, Baltimore, Richmond, or Norfolk). CDC will separately support such events.
8. Governments and treatment facilities (e.g., hospitals) in all jurisdictions will be responsible for using existing drug and other medical supplies to protect those who will initially respond to an event (e.g. EMS, fire, police, medical, government) for approximately 24 to 36 hours and to treat initial victims until delivery of NPS supplies to dispensing, treatment, and other delivery sites begins.
9. NPS authorities at CDC will coordinate the time and location of the delivery of the NPS with representatives of the primary NCR jurisdictions who will jointly decide where to centrally receive, stage, and distribute the NPS. If the Federal Response Plan is activated, NPS arrival will be coordinated with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials.
10. The decision where to locate central receiving will depend on an assessment of the jurisdictions that will need NPS materiel as well as the suitability, readiness, and proximity of available sites in the NCR.

11. The contents and quantities of the NPS shipments that arrive will depend on the nature and scale of the problem. However, the initial shipment will include two high-capacity drug-repackaging machines that CDC personnel will operate and eight electronic machines for pill counting that CDC personnel will help NCR personnel use.
12. The requirement for CDC to operate or assist in the operation of electronic pill counting and automated drug repackaging equipment, the relatively small number of machines in the NPS, and the limited number of CDC personnel accompanying the NPS require placement of all equipment at one centralized repackaging site.
13. It is intended that requests from each jurisdiction for NPS materiel will be coordinated through the RICCS.
14. The distribution of all NPS materiel will occur based on the best available epidemiological and surveillance data in the NCR that is communicated through the RICCS in coordination with the Disease Surveillance Annex and R-ESF #8.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. The NPS function will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information pertinent to the deployment of the NPS in conjunction with R-ESF #5 and the RICCS.
2. An event requiring the request and distribution of the NPS will necessitate timely and critical coordination between local, state and federal governments.
3. Local jurisdictions that participate in the NPS request and distribution will coordinate and execute their respective authorities and program responsibilities during the regional emergency.
4. Requests for information through RICCS regarding emergency regional materiel requirements will be referred to the NPS Task Force, which is the liaison to RICCS for the coordination of matters related to NPS request and distribution throughout the region.

B. Organization

Request, receipt and distribution of the NPS in the NCR will be coordinated under the auspices of the NCR NPS Task Force with support from the COG Health Officials Committee and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Emergency Preparedness. The task force, which comprises representation from primary and local jurisdictions, has developed the *National Capital Region Plan for Receiving and Distributing the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile* and continues to work on the design of an effective command structure, which is necessary for coordinating this effort regionally.

C. Notification

Upon notification by any jurisdiction of a potential or actual regional emergency, RICCS will provide a communication platform to support the coordinated response of the participating agencies. RICCS provides for the multi-directional flow of communications. Communications will be made in cooperation with R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure.

1. RICCS notification is for informational purposes only. RICCS is designed to facilitate the ability of all pieces of the medical community to communicate with one another and with the public in an emergent situation.
2. RICCS is not intended to usurp regular channels of communication but rather to facilitate the coordination of communication when the system must be expanded to deal with an unusual situation.
3. RICCS can provide the mechanism for coordinating an effective response across agencies and local and primary jurisdictions and provide critical information to the public on dispensing of medications and to healthcare providers on clinical protocols.

D. Coordination

1. Initial Actions

The first local or primary jurisdiction that identifies a potential problem related to the release of a weapon of mass destruction will inform other NCR jurisdictions through normal channels of communication and, if it believes it necessary, initiate a request for the NPS through the primary jurisdiction.

If request of the NPS is deemed necessary, communication among the affected areas will be coordinated and information shared through RICCS.

The primary jurisdictions will decide where to centrally receive, stage, and repackage the NPS for the NCR. This will require a 10,000- to 15,000-square-foot location that is within 25 miles of the Capital, provides controlled room temperatures, and has convenient access to highways and other forms of transportation.




Fig 1. Requesting the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
 Courtesy CDC: "Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile"
 Version 9, April 2002.

2. Continuing Actions

Pill counting equipment will be located in one central repackaging location but will be supplemented with manual repackaging by volunteers from each of the primary jurisdictions at the central repackaging site.

Material will be delivered from the central repackaging site to primary jurisdictions for distribution to local jurisdictions.

Local jurisdictions will also provide manual repackaging using bulk antibiotics in the NPS that will be delivered from the centralized receiving and staging facility.

- The location, number, and operation of dispensing and treatment sites will be a local jurisdiction responsibility. Local health departments will be responsible for dispensing medications and/or administering vaccines.

3. Stand Down

At the point where the regional emergency is no longer affecting more than one jurisdiction, nor requires inter-jurisdictional communication and coordination, a notification will be made through RICCS and a stand-down debriefing conference call will take place.

As there may be many long-term secondary effects that require regional attention (large numbers of ventilator-dependent patients, or individuals requiring long-term antibiotic support), there may need to be regional communication on an ongoing basis for some incidents.

4. After-action Critique

Within four weeks of stand-down of the regional health emergency, information for an after-action critique will be gathered by the participating organizations, and the NPS Task Force (in conjunction with the Health Officials' Committee) will convene a meeting of interested persons to share lessons learned.

V. Responsibilities

A. Participating and Supporting Agencies

All healthcare entities in the region (both public and private), emergency management agencies and other participating organizations will, to the best of their ability, contribute information to RICCS as required by the incident and RECP policy.

B. Essential Elements of Information

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during emergency situations. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEs, which have been determined as the minimum essential information categories to satisfy coordination needs among the R-ESFs and with RICCS.

2. In addition to regional EEs covered in R-ESF #5, other EEs to be exchanged may include, but not be limited to:

- Availability of necessary drugs and pharmaceutical supplies;
- Status of transportation systems;
- Status of storage location of stockpiles;
- Status of security of stockpile locations;
- Number of current casualties;
- Projected needs considering demographics;
- Communicable versus non-communicable disease;
- Hospital capacities to include number of intensive care beds and ventilators;
- State resources—pharmacy distribution, oxygen availability and transport capacity;
- The number of locations that central receiving/staging will need to supply;
- The materiel requirements for each site;
- Security requirements for facilitating movement of vehicles to transport the NPS, controlling crowds and protecting personnel, equipment and materiel; and
- Overall resource shortfalls, response needs and priorities.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

A. Planning

1. Planning includes a comprehensive review of existing capabilities and an analysis of strengths and gaps.
2. Roles and responsibilities during an incident are defined and communications interfaces developed so that all sectors of the healthcare and emergency management community can exchange information concerning the need for, and subsequent receipt and distribution of, the NPS. This enables effective decision-making and communication thereof to all necessary parties and identifies the processes needed to respond quickly.
3. The NCR NPS Task Force, Health Officials Committee and COG are responsible for maintaining the NPS preparedness cycle.

B. Training

1. Train all parties to understand and use their jurisdictions' correct channels of communication when requesting the NPS;
2. Use the NPS video to train members to understand the NPS contents and methods of operation;
3. Use of the CDC's Training, Education, and Demonstration (TED) package is highly recommended and will provide an opportunity for jurisdictions to train together in deployment of the NPS. It includes Logistics, Repackaging, Distribution and Dispensing;
4. Cross-train personnel to work in different functional areas;
5. Provide orientation (basic understanding) and individual training (staff roles and responsibilities); and
6. Ensure training is ongoing.

C. Exercises

1. Exercises, both local and regional, are conducted on a regular basis and the participation of COG and the different local and primary jurisdictions is solicited to create a coordinated regional response structure;
2. Exercises will be tabletop, functional, and/or field exercises that will cover all elements of the healthcare community in conjunction with their counterparts in other emergency response in requesting, receiving and distributing the NPS; and
3. Ensuring multi-disciplinary, multi-agency participation as cooperation is a key component of an effective response mechanism.

D. Evaluation

After-action reports (AARs) will be developed for both real and notional events.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured and entered into a database where they are available on request by the member jurisdictions.

Protective Actions Annex (To Be Developed at a Later Date)



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Solid Waste and Debris Management Support Annex (To Be Developed at a Later Date)



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Terrorism Support Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

Local Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George County
Prince William County
Rockville
Takoma Park

State Government Organizations

District of Columbia
Commonwealth of Virginia
State of Maryland

Federal Government Organizations

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Homeland Security
Office of Personnel Management

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

This annex provides additional communication and coordination mechanisms that apply to all R-ESFs and Annexes when the cause of the emergency is determined by the federal government to be a terrorist act and when that determination is made, the authorities of the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) and Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) 39 and 62 are invoked by the FBI and/or FEMA.

Coordination and communication processes outlined in this annex do not supercede or replace existing local operational systems, but instead provide supplemental mechanisms to insure timely and complete links from the lead federal agencies to key decision makers in each participating jurisdiction.

B. Scope

The Terrorism Annex is intended to focus on enhancing existing communications and coordination processes for potential or actual terrorist events in the Metropolitan Washington region that require inter-jurisdictional coordination and information sharing.

II. Policies

- A. The Terrorism Annex will not override the authority, policies, or inter-jurisdictional agreements of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) will facilitate coordination among member organizations to ensure that the Terrorism Annex procedures are maintained in concert with the stated missions and objectives of the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).
- C. Jurisdictions agree to respect the existing contractual arrangements between jurisdictions and their contractors so that there will be no competition for resources that are already under contract to a jurisdiction.
- D. Essential elements of information (EEIs) will be coordinated through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the regional emergency. For federally designated terrorist incidents, the FBI and/or FEMA will determine the most appropriate mechanism for informing state, district and local officials of critical information; to the extent possible, this will include coordination with R-ESF #5.

III. Situation

A. Regional Emergency Condition

A regional emergency condition or other significant event involving a terrorist act will potentially be of such severity and magnitude as to require immediate and comprehensive communication and coordination among regional decision makers to facilitate a synchronized, effective response. This annex will support the communication of timely and appropriate incident information before, during, and after an incident to support local jurisdictions and organizations in determining appropriate actions based on the collective regional knowledge of the situation. The Terrorism Annex will also support information sharing among jurisdictions related to the need for local, regional, state, or federal assistance.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. A terrorist attack would likely affect the entire Metropolitan Washington region and require the resources of a number of jurisdictions, agencies, or organizations.
2. The metropolitan Washington region is unique in that the high concentration of federal agencies and the nation's capitol located here heightens the need for local, state, regional, and federal coordination of response and protective action decisions.
3. The FBI is fully integrated at the operational level with local first response organizations and provides direct federal law enforcement support to local incident commanders, who participate in the FBI-managed Joint Operations Center (JOC).
4. The FEMA WMD National Capital Region Plan states that should a WMD event occur the NCR Team may be activated by the Director of FEMA. The Team will be responsible for coordinating and facilitating Federal Resources as outlined in the Federal Response Plan (FRP) with the District of Columbia and the states of Maryland and Virginia. Should a Presidential Disaster Declaration be made by the President, one disaster field office (DFO) would be established for the National Capital Region and one Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) named.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

A terrorist event within the Metropolitan Washington region will necessitate timely and comprehensive coordination among local, state, and federal governments and agencies.

B. Organization

1. The FBI will be the principal federal agency responsible for disseminating information through RICCS regarding Crisis Management. If the FBI declines to exercise its authorities under the PDDs, R-ESF #13 agencies will coordinate Crisis Management actions.
2. FEMA is the principal Federal agency that will be responsible for coordinating Consequence Management. If FEMA does not activate the FRP, R-ESFs will help coordinate consequence management activities in accordance with the RECP.

C. Notification

1. When the FBI determines that terrorist response authorities are to be exercised, this determination will be distributed via the RICCS. To the extent possible, and with consideration of national security issues, FBI will utilize RICCS to provide critical information to state and local jurisdictions.
2. When FEMA determines that terrorist response authorities for consequence management are to be exercised, this determination will be conveyed to and distributed by RICCS. FEMA will manage Consequence Management operations through the FRP, and, to the extent possible, utilize RICCS for conveying critical information to affected state and local jurisdictions.

D. Coordination

The Office of Homeland Security will be responsible for coordinating the non-FRP activities and information from Federal agencies, such as determinations to evacuate federal buildings or to exercise continuity of operations plans.

V. Responsibilities

- A. To ensure the policies in PDD 39 and 62 are implemented in a coordinated manner, the CONPLAN is designed to provide overall guidance to local, state and federal agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Together, these documents define “Crisis Management” as the law enforcement operations before, during, and after a terrorist incident. “Consequence Management” covers the civil operations related to response and the recovery from the impact of the incident.
- B. PDD 39 validates and reaffirms existing Federal Lead Agency responsibilities for counter terrorism. The FBI acts as the lead for Crisis Management while FEMA (with the support of all agencies in the FRP) has responsibility for Consequence Management.
- C. PDD 62 is a classified document. State and local officials should understand that PDD 62 reaffirms PDD 39, "United States Policy on Counter terrorism," signed June 21, 1995. As such, the FBI will continue to serve as the Lead Federal Agency for Crisis Management and FEMA will continue to serve as the Lead Federal Agency for Consequence Management.
- D. Exercise of these executive authorities is discretionary, and, if not exercised, the normal RECP roles of participating agencies will continue.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through a continuous improvement cycle. This cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing operational plans and concludes with exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining plans, and the cycle repeats. The Terrorism Annex working group and COG are responsible for maintaining the preparedness cycle.

A. Planning

1. The Terrorism Annex working group is responsible for coordinating planning under the Terrorism Annex, including review and revisions of the Terrorism Annex. All Metropolitan Washington agencies and/or organizations that could be potentially involved in a terrorism response will contribute to this planning effort.

2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of the current capabilities of the Metropolitan Washington jurisdictions to respond to and recovery from a terrorist attack.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and the Terrorism Annex responsibilities will be developed and carried out by local, regional, state, and federal agencies and/or organizations.

C. Exercise

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of simulations/exercises are to be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series is comprised of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

To ensure continuous improvement in this Annex and in the RECP, the plans, policies, and procedures are evaluated through real world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.



Water Supply Support Annex

Regional Coordinating Organizations

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
Northern Virginia Regional Commission

Local Jurisdictions

Alexandria
Arlington County
Bowie
College Park
District of Columbia
Fairfax
Fairfax County
Falls Church
Frederick County
Gaithersburg
Greenbelt
Loudoun County
Montgomery County
Prince George's County
Prince William County
Rockville County
Takoma Park

State Government Organizations

District of Columbia Department of Health
Maryland Department of the Environment
Maryland Department of Natural Resources
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
Virginia Department of Health
Virginia Department of Emergency Response

Federal Government Organizations

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Geological Survey

Independent and Public Water/Sewer Agencies/Authorities

Alexandria Sanitation Authority
District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority
Fairfax County Water Authority
Loudoun County Sanitation Authority
Prince William County Service Authority
Virginia-American Water Company
Washington Aqueduct Division, USACE
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission

Power/ Telecommunications Utilities

PEPCO
Verizon
Potomac Electric Power Company
Dominion Power
Washington Gas
Allegheny Power

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

The Water Supply Support Annex is the capstone of the actions of the 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan. The Annex is intended to facilitate communication and coordination among regional jurisdictions to ensure an effective and timely communications and coordination before, during, and after a regional incident or regional emergency concerning regional water supply. The plan will provide guidance in the case of a disruption, outage, or threat to regional water supplies that could adversely affect fire protection, sanitation, and potable water services. When activated, the Water Supply Emergency Plan will enable local jurisdictions to set up conference calls, develop a common message, and distribute information amongst themselves.

B. Scope

The Water Supply Support Annex will focus on the communication and coordination related to situations involving:

1. A drought affecting two or more jurisdictions in the region;
2. Biological/chemical/radiological contamination of the area's water supply;
3. Potential or actual disruptions of water supply and wastewater systems that have regional impacts;
4. Threats, either manmade or by environmental causes, to the regional water supply and wastewater systems and their conveyance systems; and
5. Coordination of monitoring, tracking, and modeling of water, wastewater, and solid waste stream events that may affect water supply and waste systems.

II. Policies

- A.** The Water Supply Annex will not usurp or override the authority, policies or inter-jurisdictional agreements of any federal agency, state government, or local government or jurisdiction.
- B.** The Water Supply Support Annex includes the 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan which also includes the Metropolitan Washington Water Supply and Drought Awareness Response Plan: Potomac River System. The 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan is divided into five basic sections:

incident detection, notification, coordination/actions, communication, and termination.

- C. The Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement will be implemented as required during extreme low flow regional public emergencies.
- D. Essential elements of information (EEIs) will be coordinated through the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) based on the regional incident or regional emergency.

III. Situation

A. Emergency Condition

A regional incident or regional emergency affecting water supply, be it small or large-scale, would warrant significant regional attention. A small shortage or contamination in one jurisdiction could adversely impact the surrounding jurisdictions, causing a need for regional coordination and communication. Likewise, a region-wide drought or contamination would necessitate immediate coordination and communication throughout the region. A threat of disruption to the water supply, water distribution systems and/or wastewater collection and treatment plants would constitute a regional incident.

B. Planning Assumptions

1. The water supply and wastewater management activities may be hampered by damaged facilities, equipment, and infrastructure, as well as disrupted communications, and transportation.
2. Resources including equipment, materials, and skilled personnel are available within the region or can be obtained from outside the Washington Metropolitan area. A Mutual Aid Emergency Equipment Contacts list is located in the 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan.
3. There may be increasing and conflicting demands for water for firefighting, potable water, and sanitation which exceed available resources during a regional emergency.
4. If severe water use restrictions are needed or imposed, the public may need to be informed on ways to conserve water. Water use restriction messages are under development in the 2002 Water Supply Emergency Plan. These restrictions will require vigilant enforcement to ensure compliance.

5. Local governments may need to coordinate hygienic measures due to impaired wastewater systems.
6. Emergency water supply points may need to be established and supported for the distribution of potable water.
7. Lack of water may be so severe and sustained that relocation to residents of some communities may be required.
8. The water supply or wastewater treatment infrastructure may be temporarily or permanently inoperable, causing raw sewage to run into receiving waters, including the Potomac River.
9. A lack of water supply entering the water and/or wastewater treatment plants may significantly impair or shut down these plants.

IV. Concept of Coordination

A. General

1. Regional incidents or regional emergencies involving water supply, and/or wastewater treatment and disposal, will be cause for utilization of the Water Supply Support Annex.
2. The Water Supply Annex will establish a capability to collect, analyze, synthesize, and disseminate information concerning regional water supply, wastewater management, and solid waste related issues with the RICCS.
3. The Water Supply Support Annex representative will work with the R-ESF #3 representative within the RICCS regarding all water supply and wastewater regional issues.
4. A Water Supply Annex liaison will be provided to R-ESF #5 as necessary.

B. Organization

Coordination of regional water supply and wastewater issues will be handled by the Special Water Utility Group.

C. Notification

1. Upon detection of a water supply or wastewater emergency, the detecting utility will first conduct an internal notification. If necessary, they would then convene a conference call via the RICCS to alert other area water/wastewater utilities as well as any other organization/official directly involved in the incident. During the call, affected participant(s) will report their own incident assessment.

D. Coordination

1. General

There will be coordination with other Regional Emergency Support Functions:

R-ESF #1—Transportation

- Coordination of the transportation of potable water

R-ESF #2—Communications Infrastructure

- Coordination of the Common Message

R-ESF #4—Firefighting

- Coordination of water supplies for firefighting

R-ESF #5—Information Planning

- Coordination and communication with RICCS

R-ESF #7—Resource Support

- Coordination of needed resources

R-ESF #12—Energy

- Coordination of energy supplies needed to run water utilities, water distribution systems, and wastewater plants

R-ESF # 8—Health

R-ESF # 13—Law Enforcement

R-ESF # 14—Media

2. Water and Wastewater Groups

Initial Actions

- Upon detection of a water supply or wastewater regional incident or regional emergency, COG or any participating water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction will first make an internal assessment of the situation. If that organization, COG, or any other water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction determines that the event is of regional significance, they may contact the RICCS concerning the regional emergency and ask that the CAOs, Water Utility Group, and/or Wastewater Utility Group be notified of the regional incident/emergency.

- Based on the nature and extent of the regional incident or regional emergency, COG or any participating water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction may request a conference call to be convened through the RICCS to discuss the regional incident/emergency.
- The conference call would be used to determine the type and extent of the regional incident/emergency, ongoing actions, responses and public messages, identify the next steps, and discuss any other key regional issues.

Continuing Actions

- Additional conference calls may be scheduled by conference call participants or may be requested by COG or any participating water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction as required by the ongoing regional incident/emergency.
- There will be continuous monitoring, coordination, communication, and response for each incident/emergency with information facilitated through the RICCS.
- Subject-matter experts from any participating water or wastewater organization, agency, or jurisdiction will provide the appropriate analysis of the regional impact of the regional incident/emergency to the CAOs, Water Utility Group, and Wastewater Utility Group through the RICCS to facilitate the regional response.

Stand Down

Every incident/emergency will necessitate continuous monitoring, coordination, communication and response. Members of the water or wastewater utility groups will be responsible for determining when the regional incident/emergency will be terminated. With their consensus as appropriate, a formal declaration of termination will be issued through local government, state government, utility, or COG Public Information Officers (PIOs).

After-action Critique

Once the regional incident/emergency has been terminated, the Water/Wastewater Utility Group will prepare an Incident Assessment Summary Report on the lessons learned and will present this at a regularly scheduled meeting.

V. Responsibilities

A. Water Supply Annex Participating and Supporting Agencies

Agencies participating in a regional response will contribute EEIs to RICCS based on the regional incident/emergency.

B. Essential Elements of Information

Participating agencies are responsible for providing information concerning water and wastewater activities to RICCS and to their respective group, in regional public incidents/emergencies with regional implications as stated in the planning assumption for the Water Supply Annex.

1. One of the primary purposes of the RECP is to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatory agencies during regional public emergencies. R-ESF #5—Information and Planning is responsible for the exchange, analysis, reporting and dissemination of regional information. R-ESF #5 contains detailed information about the process of information exchange and describes regional EEIs that have been determined as the minimum essential information categories, to satisfy coordination needs across the R-ESFs and with RICCS.
2. From the perspective of the Water Supply Annex, the agencies listed are responsible for providing the following EEI concerning regional public incidents/emergencies involving regional water and wastewater functions:

- Status of transportation network;
- Location and status of potable water supplies;
- Status of key contractor support;
- Communication process and procedures;
- Location of the water and/or wastewater regional incident/emergency;
- Jurisdictions involved;
- Description of significant disruptions in the water and/or wastewater system in any jurisdiction that has the potential for regional impacts;
- Status of resources, personnel, equipment and facilities impacted by the regional incident/emergency/threat of regional incident/emergency;
- Actual/potential (social, economic, political) impacts on the function and/or jurisdiction;
- Other R-ESFs and Annexes potentially impacted;
- Relevant historical and demographic information;
- Short term, medium and long-range response and recovery plans;
- Recommendations for emergency ingress/egress for responders;
- Access points to emergency areas;
- Hazard-specific information;
- Overall priorities for response;

Status of Annex activation;
Status of energy systems;
Status and analysis of initial assessments (needs assessments and damage assessments, including Preliminary Damage Assessments);
Injuries and medical emergencies; and
Logistical problems.

VI. Preparedness Cycle

The Preparedness Cycle is a means of assuring a high level of readiness for the RECP through continuous improvement in the plans and procedures. The cycle begins with sound planning practices, followed by training of personnel who will be engaged in executing those plans. When personnel have been trained, plans and procedures are tested through exercises or simulations designed to check planning assumptions against a range of scenarios. The performance of the respective organizations is evaluated as a means of refining the plans, and the cycle repeats.

A. Planning

1. Representatives from the Special Water Utility Group are responsible for coordinating planning under the Water Supply Annex, including review and revisions of the Water Supply Annex. All participating Water Supply Support Annex supporting agencies will contribute to the planning of the Water Supply Support Annex.
2. Planning will include a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in the water and wastewater sector, and identification of unfunded regional water and wastewater emergency response and coordination needs.

B. Training

Ongoing and scheduled training related to the RECP and the Water Supply Annex responsibilities will be developed and carried out.

C. Exercise

In order for the RECP to be effective, a series of water and wastewater simulations/exercises are to be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis. The exercise series is comprised of tabletop exercises, functional communications and coordination drills, and field exercises conducted by COG and/or other organizations.

D. Evaluation

In order to assure continuous improvement in the water and wastewater function in the RECP, the plans, policies and procedures that support operational proficiency are evaluated through real world experience and exercises.

E. Corrective Action

Lessons learned from exercises and real world experiences will be captured in a corrective action system and the issues tracked to ensure that they are resolved and incorporated into plan revisions as appropriate.

APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)—A public service organization of licensed amateur radio operators who have voluntarily registered their qualifications and equipment to provide emergency communications for public service events as needed.

Capital Wireless Integrated Network (CapWIN)—A project managed by the University of Maryland, Engineering Center for Advanced Transportation Technology, demonstrating interoperability related to data sharing among public safety agencies in Maryland, Washington D.C., and Virginia.

Consequence Management—Measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism. (Source: Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, page TI-2, April 1999.)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been designated the lead federal agency (LFA) for consequence management to ensure that the Federal Response Plan is adequate to respond to terrorism. Additionally, FEMA supports the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in crisis management.

Contingency Plan—Targets a specific issue or event that arises during the course of disaster operations and presents alternative actions to respond to the situation.

Council of Governments (COG)—The Metropolitan Washington COG is a regional organization of 17 metropolitan Washington area local government's surrounding the nations capital, plus area members of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives

Crisis Management—Predominantly a law enforcement function that includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat of terrorism. The FBI is the LFA for crisis management for such an incident. (Source: FBI.)

During crisis management, the FBI coordinates closely with local law enforcement authorities to provide successful law enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also coordinates with other federal authorities, including FEMA. (Source: FRP Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999)

CONPLAN—U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan. The CONPLAN was designed to provide overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Six federal agencies are signatories to the plan: Department of Justice, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services. The CONPLAN was created to implement Presidential Decision Directive 39 (1995), which sets forth U.S. policy on counter-terrorism.

Emergency—As defined in the Stafford Act, an emergency is any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property, public health, and safety, and includes emergencies other than natural disasters.

Emergency Alert System (EAS)—A system established by the FCC in November of 1994 to replace the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) as a tool the President and others might use to warn the public about emergency situations.

Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)—A system replaced by the EAS that was composed of AM, FM, and TV broadcast stations; low-power TV stations; and non-government industry entities operating on a voluntary, organized basis during emergencies at national, state, or operational (local) area levels.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)—A secure location to determine situational status, coordinate actions, and make critical decisions during emergency and disaster situations.

Federal Response Plan (FRP)—The FRP establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S. Code [USC], et seq.). The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex defines the organizational structures used to coordinate crisis management with consequence management. (Source: FRP Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999.)

Incident Command System (ICS)—A model for disaster response that calls for the use of common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, unified command structure, action planning, manageable span-of-control, pre-designated facilities, and comprehensive resource management.

Homeland Security—A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur. (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002.)

Major Disaster—As defined under the Stafford Act, any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.

Mitigation—Those actions (including threat and vulnerability assessments) taken to reduce the exposure to and detrimental effects of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident.

Preparedness—Establishing the plans, training, exercises, and resources necessary to achieve readiness for all hazards, including WMD incidents.

Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN)—Joint Department of Justice and Department of Treasury program that promotes federal and local government communications interoperability and sponsors innovative pilot projects.

Shelter in place—To stay where one is in the event of an emergency. Requires that people stay inside a building away from windows. All windows and air intake systems should be closed. Wet towels or tape may be used to seal cracks. If there is a danger of explosion windows should be covered.

Satellite-based Technology—Communication systems that are not prone to the same outages as terrestrially based systems.

Terrorism—The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and U.S. territories without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. government or population.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)—Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas; bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces; missile having an explosive incendiary charge of more than 0.25 ounce; mine or device similar to the above; weapon involving a disease organism; or weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. (Source: 18 USC 2332a as referenced in 18 USC 921.)

ACRONYMS**A**

ARC	American Red Cross
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services

B

BWI	Baltimore Washington International Airport
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C

CapWIN	Capital Wireless Integrated Network
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CAR	Capability Assessment for Readiness
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
COG	Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
COGMARS	Council of Governments Mutual Aid Radio System
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan

D

DC	District of Columbia
DC EMA	District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
DDOT	District Department of Transportation
DMV	Department of Motor Vehicles
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOH	Department of Health
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice

DPW	Department of Public Works
DRP	District Response Plan
E <hr/>	
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EBS	Emergency Broadcast System
ECC	Emergency Communications Center
EMA	District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPAC	Energy Policy Advisory Committee
ER	Emergency Response
ESP	Essential Service Protection
F <hr/>	
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMARS	Fire Mutual Aid Response System
FRP	Federal Response Plan
FTS	Federal Telecommunications System
G <hr/>	
GETS	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
GSA	General Services Administration
GWBOT	Greater Washington Board of Trade
H <hr/>	
HazMat	Hazardous Materials
HHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

H-MARS Hospital Municipal Aid Radio System

HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System

I

ICS Incident Command System

IMS Incident Management System

M

MARC Maryland Area Rail Commuter

MDOT Maryland Department of Transportation

MDW Military District of Washington

MECC Mobile Emergency Communications Center

MEMA Maryland Emergency Management Agency

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MTA Maryland Transit Administration

MWAA Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

N

NAWAS National Warning System

NCR National Capital Region

NCS National Communications System

NEMA National Emergency Management Association

NG National Guard

NPS National Park Service

NSEP National Security Emergency Preparedness

O

OPM Office of Personnel Management

P

PIO Public Information Officer

PMARS Police Mutual Aid Response System

POTS Plain Old Telephone Services

R

RECP	Regional Emergency Coordination Plan
R-ESF	Regional Emergency Support Function
RICCS	Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System

S

SHA	State Highway Administration
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

T

TPB	Transportation Planning Board
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U

USDOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
USPP	U.S. Park Police

V

VDOT	Virginia Department of Transportation
VDRPT	Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation
VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters
VRE	Virginia Rail Express

W

WAWAS	Washington Area Warning Alert System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

APPENDIX B: CATALOG OF AGREEMENTS

The following is a list of mutual aid agreements developed among COG's member jurisdictions. These agreements have effectively guided communication, coordination, and activities of member jurisdictions to meet the needs of the Washington metropolitan region:

1. Public Safety

Police Mutual Aid Agreement (1971)—Provides guidance for the provision of inter-jurisdictional police aid when an emergency is declared.

The Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Police Mutual Aid Operations Plan (2001)—Provides guidance for cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the regional metropolitan area during a state of emergency.

2. Fire/Rescue

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Mutual Aid Agreement for Fire and/or Rescue or Ambulance Services (1973)—Provides guidance for the provisions of inter-jurisdictional fire/rescue/ambulance aid during a state of emergency.

First Amendment to the Mutual Aid Agreement for Fire and/or Rescue or Ambulance Services (1978)—Adds Fairfax City, VA, as a signatory to the mutual aid agreement.)

The Greater Metropolitan Washington Area Fire/Rescue Services Mutual Aid Operations Plan (2001)—Adopts the Incident Command System and makes local jurisdictions responsible for ensuring that their respective local incident management plans encompass the ICS in structure and terminology.

3. Energy

Regional Alert Plan for Short-term Natural Gas Supply Emergency Operations within the Washington Gas Light Service Area (1978)—Provides a regional alert plan for short-term natural gas supply emergency situations.

Metropolitan Washington Energy Conservation and Management Plan (1979)—Describes 13 energy conservation and community assistance measures for dealing with the current petroleum shortfalls within the Washington Metropolitan Area.

Metropolitan Washington Power Emergency Alert Plan (1988)—Establishes a coordinated procedure between electric utility companies and local governments to promptly alert and coordinate response with local governments when there is a potential or existing power outage.

Metropolitan Washington Natural Gas Supply Emergency Alert Plan (1985 and 1988)—Provides for timely and coordinated notification to local governments in the event of a natural gas supply deficiency or cutoff.

Points of Agreement on Emergency Motor Fuel Sales Restrictions for the Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. “Tri-State” Area (1988)—Provides for coordination of emergency energy policies at the state level in the Washington region.

4. Transportation/Metro

Fire Protection, Equipment, and Life Safety Agreement for the Metropolitan Washington Area Metro Rapid Rail Transit System (1976)—Provides measures and guidance specifically dealing with incidents involving the regional rapid rail system.

Transportation Contingency Plan for the Metropolitan Washington Area (1980)—Addresses area-wide response to a total stoppage of public transit service in the event Washington Metro Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is unable to provide such service.

Addendum to Metropolitan Washington COG Mutual Aid Operations Plan Woodrow Wilson Bridge Operational Plan (1987)—Provides for coordinated emergency response to incidents involving the inter-jurisdictional, Federally-owned Woodrow Wilson Bridge.

Metro Rapid Rail Transit Fire/Rescue Operations Procedures Guidelines (1993)—Provides basic guidance and direction to fire and rescue service personnel responding to incidents occurring on the Metro rapid rail transit system.

Metro Rail Transit Fire/Rescue Emergency Procedures Policy (1997)—Provides procedures for the coordination and performance of specific duties to safely mitigate rail emergencies in the WMATA system.

Memorandum of Understanding for the Development and Coordination of a Transport Emergency Preparedness Plan and communications system for the national capital region (2002.)

5. Weather

Memorandum of Agreement between the National Weather Service Washington Forecast Office and Local Jurisdictions of the Metropolitan Washington Area for the Dissemination of Severe Weather Information (1976 and 1988)—Delineates emergency-related responsibilities of the National Weather Service (NOAA) and FEMA.

COG Notification Procedure for the Early Release of Government Employees In Response to Severe Weather Conditions in the Metropolitan Washington Area (1982 and 1984)—Provides procedures for effective notification of other governmental authorities of early federal employee release actions.

Unified Regional Snow Emergency Plan for the Washington Metropolitan Area (1997)—Provides a regional response to snow and ice emergencies in the metropolitan Washington region.

6. Emergency Alert System

DRAFT Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Emergency Alert System (EAS) Area Plan (1996)—Outlines the organization and implementation of the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Emergency Alert System.

7. Water

Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement (1978)—Provides for the equitable allocation of Potomac River water for public water supply in the metropolitan area during low flow conditions.

Metropolitan Washington Water Supply Emergency Agreement (1979)—Provides inter-jurisdictional assistance and coordination to conserve water and provide for necessary curtailment of water use during critical water supply situations.

Metropolitan Washington Water Supply Emergency Plan including Washington Aqueduct Water Emergency Plan, Region-wide Potomac River Emergency Plan, the Drought Plan, and Public Information Response Plan (1994)—COG's Drinking Water Emergency Agreement Task Force recommendations coordinating the actions to be taken by local, state, and federal government agencies and water supply utilities in the event of a regional water emergency.

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Potomac River Public Safety Agreement (1985 and 1998)—Provides for cooperation between the National Park Service and other parties in the enhancement of Potomac River safety through public education.

Metropolitan Washington Water Supply and Drought Awareness Response Plan: Potomac River System (2000)—Calls for updates of existing agreements to increase cooperation, communication, and coordination among responsible regional entities and requests the development of a system of response for future droughts in the Potomac River Basin.

8. Health

Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to a Bioevent in the National Capital Region (2001)—Improves the capability of the jurisdictions within the National Capital Region to cooperatively manage the health consequences associated with a bioevent.

Metropolitan Medical Strike Team—Defines the Medical Strike Team and its scope/concept of operations.

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APPENDIX C: AUTHORITIES

The following are the authorities that provide the legal basis for the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan.

Federal

1. Pub. L. 81-873, approved September 30, 1950.
2. Pub. L. 81-875, 1950, Disaster Relief Act—Federal aid to state and local governments.
3. Chapter 686, Pub. L. 81-686, approved August 11, 1950.
4. Pub. L. 81-920, 1950, as amended, The Federal Civil Defense Act.
5. Pub. L. 83-343, approved April 22, 1954.
6. Pub. L. 96-342, approved September 8, 1980, Improved Civil Defense.
7. Pub. L. 99-145, Title 14, Part B, Section 1412, 1986, Department of Defense Authorization Act.
8. Pub. L. 93-288, 1974, as amended by Pub. L. 100-107, 1988, The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
9. Pub. L. 106–390, October 30, 2000, Disaster Mitigation Act.
10. 42 U.S.C., Chapter 103, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), December 11, 1980, as amended by Pub. L. 99-499, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), October 17, 1986.
11. Executive Office of the President, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.
12. 42 U.S.C 9605, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.
13. Title 44, Code of Federal Regulations, 44 CFR, Emergency Services and Assistance.

Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)

1. PDD 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, June 21, 1995.

2. PDD 62, Combating Terrorism, May 22, 1998.
3. PDD 63, Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure, May 22, 1998.
4. PDD 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations, October 21, 1998.

Homeland Security Presidential Directives

1. HSPD – 1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. (2001)
2. HSPD – 2, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies. (2001)
3. HSPD – 3, Homeland Security Advisory System. (2001)

District of Columbia Official Codes Related to Emergency Planning and Operations

1. § 1-204.11b. Chairman of Council shall act as Mayor when the office is vacant
2. § 1-204.22. Executive powers and duties
3. § 1-204.23. Municipal planning
4. § 1-204.50a. Emergency Cash Reserve Fund
5. § 1-207.31. Services between the U.S. Government and District Government
6. § 1-303.01-.03. Police regulations
7. § 1-303.42. Expenditures for emergencies
8. § 1-319.01-.02. Use of volunteer services
9. § 2-303.12. Emergency procurements
10. § 2-904. Establishes the District's Office of Energy
11. § 2-1105. Washington Metropolitan Region defined
12. § 5-127.04. Police to have power of constables
13. § 5-123.03. Authority of Mayor to appoint citizen police

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14. § 5-133.05. Preservation of peace and order at public buildings and grounds belonging to the U.S. within the District
 15. § 5-133.17. Authorizes agreements between Metropolitan Police Department and Federal agencies
 16. § 5-301. Powers and duties of Federal law enforcement officers
 17. § 5-414a,b,&c. Reciprocal agreements for mutual aid
 18. § 5-417.01. Fire and arson investigation
 19. § 5-1307. Protection of emergency 2-way radio communication
 20. § 7-131.–140. Prevention of spread of communicable diseases
 21. § 7-2201.–2209. Office of Emergency Preparedness
 22. § 7-2301.–2308. Public emergencies

Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Laws Under Title 44, Military and Emergency Laws

Chapter 3.2 Emergency Services and Disaster Law

1. § 44-146.13. Title: Emergency Services and Disaster Law
2. § 44-146.14. Findings of General Assembly
3. § 44-146.15. Construction of chapter
4. § 44-146.16. Definitions
5. § 44-146.17. Powers and duties of Governor
6. § 44-146.17:1. Transmittal to General assembly of rules, regulations, and orders
7. § 44-146.18. Department of Emergency Services continued as Department of Emergency Management; administration and operational control; coordinator and other personnel; powers and duties
8. § 44-146.18:1. Virginia Disaster Response Funds disbursements; reimbursements

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9. § 44-146.18:2. Authority of Coordinator of Emergency Management in undeclared emergency
 10. § 44-146.19. Powers and duties of political subdivisions
 11. § 44-146.20. Joint action by political subdivisions
 12. § 44-146.21. Declaration of local emergency
 13. § 44-146.22. Development of measures to prevent or reduce harmful consequences of disasters
 14. § 44-146.23. Immunity from liability
 15. § 44-146.24. Cooperation of public agencies
 16. § 44-146.25. Certain persons not to be employed or associated in emergency services organizations; loyalty oath required
 17. § 44-146.26. Duties of emergency management organizations
 18. § 44-146.27. Supplementing Federal funds; assistance of Federal agencies; acceptance of gifts and services; appropriations by local governing bodies
 19. § 44-146.28. Authority of Governor and agencies under his control in declared state of emergency
 20. § 44-146.28:1. Compact enacted into law; terms
 21. § 44-146.29. (Expired)

Chapter 3.3 Transportation of Hazardous Radioactive Materials

22. § 44-146.30. Department of Emergency Management to monitor transportation of hazardous radioactive materials

Chapter 3.4 Funding for State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Preparedness

23. § 44-146.31. Definitions
24. § 44-146.32. One-time and annual fees
25. § 44-146.33. Radiological Emergency Preparedness Fund

Chapter 3.5 Virginia Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Program

- 26. § 44-146.34. Purpose; definitions
- 27. § 44-146.35. Powers and duties of the Department of Emergency Management
- 28. § 44-146.36. Coordinator to enter into agreements with political subdivisions; immunity from liability
- 29. § 44-146.37. Disbursements made from Virginia Disaster Relief Fund
- 30. § 44-146.38. Political subdivisions to appoint hazardous materials coordinator
- 31. § 44-146.39. State Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Advisory Council created; membership; responsibilities
- 32. § 44-146.40. Virginia Emergency Response Council created; membership; responsibilities; immunity for local councils

Maryland Authorities

- 1. Article 16A: Maryland Emergency Management Agency
- 2. Article 41: Governor—Executive and Administrative Departments
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- 4. Governor's Executive Order .01.01. 1990

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APPENDIX E: HAZARDS AFFECTING THE REGION

The National Capital Area has some special characteristics, including varied terrain and geography; the international prominence of the major buildings and monuments in and around Washington, DC; and the mixed distribution of industrial, commercial and office complexes (government and civilian) in the member jurisdictions. Consequently, many types of threats and hazards, with varying probabilities and intensities, may affect the area. For example, meteorological hazards, such as a hurricane, may affect the entire region, but industrial accidents/incidents are more likely to affect those areas within the member jurisdictions that have concentrations of industrial and commercial activity. Although Washington, DC has little industry, and is subject to relatively few natural hazards, it is target-rich for possible civil disorder and terrorist events because of its significant and symbolic structures and monuments.

Hazards and threats may be clustered in the following categories:

Natural Hazards – include naturally occurring phenomena, such as winter storms, thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, viral epidemics, and extreme heat or cold. The natural hazards most likely to occur locally include urban floods, winter storms, thunderstorms, and hurricanes. Although naturally occurring phenomena, each of these hazards has the potential to cause loss of lives and significant disruption in one or more localities. Further, natural disaster also can cause secondary emergencies, such as hazardous materials releases.

Human-Induced Hazards – include hazardous materials incidents, major traffic accidents, urban fires or explosions, infrastructure disruptions, workplace violence, and civil disobedience or riots. Typically, hazardous materials are present in quantities require to service the residents (e.g., water treatment facilities, dry cleaning establishments, petroleum products, hardware stores, ammunition storage). Illegal storage and use of hazardous materials, such as clandestine drug labs, also may occur.

Major rail line and rail yards are located at the edge of the District. Most motor vehicles carrying hazardous materials in transit to other destinations pass outside the District boundaries, but go through other jurisdiction in the National Capital Region.

Terrorist Hazards – include conventional weapons, incendiary devices, arson, bio-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist hazards are deliberate and malicious; consequently, the crisis or disaster that results is likely to become an intergovernmental matter more quickly than any other type of disaster.

For not only individual jurisdictions but also for COG, planning for terrorist events has taken on greater urgency since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. The creation of the Homeland Security Office at the national level, the recent increase in federal funding assistance to states and localities for terrorism planning and preparations, and the plans for the new federal Homeland Security Dept. all have heightened interest in and capabilities of emergency management.

Some aspects of terrorist events are different from natural and industrial hazards/disasters and will require special emergency planning and management; they include predictability, preventability, controllability, intent/motive/ and identification of the responsible party.

Local Threats and Hazards

The following chart provides a partial listing of the most likely potential hazards that the region faces. Assessments of the vulnerabilities, risks, and likely impacts of each of these hazards/threats pose should be done by each jurisdiction in the NCR as well as collectively for regional planning purposes.

Local Threats and Hazards

Type of Hazard	Likelihood of Occurrence	Potentially Devastating Impact on People	Potentially Devastating Impact on Structures
<i>Natural Hazards</i>			
Floods			
Winter Storms			
Tornadoes			
Thunderstorm			
Hurricanes			
Extreme Heat/Cold			
Viral Epidemics			
<i>Human-Induced Hazards</i>			
Hazardous Materials Incidents			
Transportation Accidents			
Infrastructure Disruptions			
Workplace Violence			
Civil Disorder/ Disobedience			
<i>Terrorist Hazards</i>			
Conventional Weapons			
Incendiary Devices			
Biological and Chemical Agents			
Radiological			
Cyber-Terrorism			
Weapons of Mass Destruction			

Source: *Hazard Analysis and Vulnerability Study*, done under contract to DC Emergency Management Agency, (May 2002)

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APPENDIX F: LIABILITY and INDEMNIFICATION

Emergency management is a necessary function of all levels of government that relies on an integrated partnership between federal, state, and local government and the private sector. It is a comprehensive effort to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from natural, technological, and manmade disasters or emergencies. If an emergency incident is serious enough, other state governments, as well as the federal government, may provide additional assistance to supplement local and state resources in the affected area. In offering such assistance, the aiding state governments and/or Federal government will not assume total responsibility for fixing disaster damages.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 1974

The Robert T. Stafford Act, as amended by Public Law 106-390, provides an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal government to state and local governments in carrying out their disaster or emergency recovery and mitigation responsibilities.

Nonliability

Sec. 305. The Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions of this Act.

Under Public Law 106-390, The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000:

A State or local government shall not be liable for reimbursement or any other penalty for any payment made under this Act if—

“(1) the payment was authorized by an approved agreement specifying the costs;

“(2) the costs were reasonable; and

“(3) the purpose of the grant was accomplished.”

Repair, Restoration, and Replacement of Damaged Facilities

Sec. 406. (a) Contributions. The President may make contributions—

(1) to a State or local government for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a public facility which is damaged or destroyed by a major disaster and for associated expenses incurred by such government; and

(2) to a person who owns or operates a private nonprofit facility damaged or destroyed by a major disaster for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or

replacement of such facility and for associated expenses incurred by such person.

(b) Minimum Federal Share. The Federal share of assistance under this section shall be not less than—

(1) 75 percent of the net eligible cost of repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement carried out under this section;

(2) 100 percent of associated expenses described in subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2); and

(3) 75 percent of associated expenses describe in subsections (f)(3), (f)(4), and (f)(5).

(c) Large In Lieu Contributions

(1) For Public Facilities. In any cases where a State or local government determines that the public welfare would not be best served by repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing any public facility owned or controlled by such State or local government, it may elect to receive, in lieu of a contribution under subsection (a)(1), a contribution of not to exceed 90 percent of the Federal share of the Federal estimate of the cost of repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing, such facility and of associated expenses. Funds contributed under this subsection may be used to repair, restore, or expand other selected public facilities, to construct new facilities, or to fund hazard mitigation measures which the State or local government determines to be necessary to meet a need for governmental services and functions in the area affected by the major disaster.

(2) For Private Nonprofit Facilities. In any case where a person who owns or operates a private nonprofit facility determines that the public welfare would not be best served by repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing such facility, such person may elect to receive, in lieu of a contribution under subsection (a)(2), a contribution of not to exceed 90 percent of the Federal share of the Federal estimate of the cost of repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing such facility and of associated expenses. Funds contributed under this subsection may be used to repair, restore, or expand other selected private nonprofit facilities owned or operated by such person, to construct new private nonprofit facilities to be owned or operated by such person, or to fund hazard mitigation measures which such person determines to be necessary to meet a need for its services and functions in the area affected by the major disaster.

(3) Restriction on Use for State or Local Contributions. Funds provided under this subsection shall not be used for any State or local government cost-sharing contribution required under this Act.

(d) Flood Insurance

(1) Reduction of Federal Assistance. If a public facility or private nonprofit facility located in a special flood hazard area identified for more than 1 year by the Director pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4001, et seq.) is damaged or destroyed, after the 180th day following the date of the enactment of the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, by flooding in a major disaster and such facility is not covered on the date of such flooding by flood insurance, the Federal assistance which would otherwise be available under this section with respect to repair, restoration, reconstruction, and replacement of such facility and associated expenses shall be reduced in accordance with paragraph (2).

(2) Amount of Reduction. The amount of a reduction in Federal assistance under this section with respect to a facility shall be the lessor of—

(A) the value of such facility on the date of the flood damage or destruction, or

(B) the maximum amount of insurance proceeds which would have been payable with respect to such facility if such facility had been covered by flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 on such date.

(3) Exception. Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to a private nonprofit facility which is not covered by flood insurance solely because of the local governments failure to participate in the flood insurance program established by the National Flood Insurance Act.

(4) Dissemination of Information. The President shall disseminate information regarding the reduction in Federal assistance provided for by this subsection to State and local governments and the owners and operators of private nonprofit facilities who may be affected by such a reduction.

(e) Net Eligible Cost.

(1) General Rule. For purposes of this section, the cost of repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing a public facility or private nonprofit facility on the basis of the design of such facility as it existed immediately prior to the major disaster and in conformity with current applicable codes, specifications, and standards (including floodplain management and hazard mitigation criteria required by the President or by the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)) shall, at a minimum, be treated as the net eligible cost of such repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement.

- (2) Special Rule. In any case in which the facility being repaired, restored, reconstructed, or replaced under this section was under construction on the date of the major disaster, the cost of repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing such facility shall include, for purposes of this section, only those costs which, under the contract for such construction, are the owners responsibility and not the contractors responsibility.
- (f) Associated Expenses. For purposes of this section, associated expenses include the following:
- (1) Necessary Costs. Necessary costs of requesting, obtaining, and administering Federal assistance based on a percentage of assistance provided as follows:
 - (A) For an applicant whose net eligible costs equal less than \$100,000, 3 percent of such net eligible costs.
 - (B) For an applicant whose net eligible costs equal \$100,000 or more but less than \$1,000,000, \$3,000 plus 2 percent of such net eligible costs in excess of \$100,000.
 - (C) For an applicant whose net eligible costs equal \$1,000,000 or more but less than \$5,000,000, \$21,000 plus 1 percent of such net eligible costs in excess of \$1,000,000.
 - (D) For an applicant whose net eligible costs equal \$5,000,000 or more, \$61,000 plus 1/2 percent of such net eligible costs in excess of \$5,000,000.
 - (2) Extraordinary Costs. Extraordinary costs incurred by a State for preparation of damage survey reports, final inspection reports, project applications, final audits, and related field inspections by State employees, including overtime pay and per diem and travel expenses of such employees, but not including pay for regular time of such employees, based on the total amount of assistance provided under sections 403, 404, 406, 407, 502, and 503 in such State in connection with the major disaster as follows:
 - (A) If such total amount is less than \$100,000, 3 percent of such total amount.
 - (B) If such total amount is \$100,000 or more but less than \$1,000,000, \$3,000 plus 2 percent of such total amount in excess of \$100,000.
 - (C) If such total amount is \$1,000,000 or more but less than \$5,000,000, \$21,000 plus 1 percent of such total amount in excess of \$1,000,000.
 - (D) If such total amount is \$5,000,000 or more, \$61,000 plus 1/2 percent of such total amount in excess of \$5,000,000.
 - (3) Cost of National Guard. The costs of mobilizing and employing the National Guard for performance of eligible work.

- (4) Costs of Prison Labor. The costs of using prison labor to perform eligible work, including wages actually paid, transportation to a worksite, and extraordinary costs of guards, food, and lodging.
- (5) Other Labor Costs. Base and overtime wages for an applicants employees and extra hires performing eligible work plus fringe benefits on such wages to the extent that such benefits were being paid before the disaster.

The Emergency Management Association Compact

The Emergency Management Association Compact (EMAC) is an interstate mutual aid agreement that allows states to assist one another in responding to emergencies and disasters. Requests for EMAC assistance are legally binding agreements in which the affected state in need of help is responsible for reimbursing all out-of-state costs and are liable for out-of-state personnel.

Article VI—Liability. Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes; and no party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith. Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness.

Article VII—Compensation. Each party state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the emergency forces of that state and representatives of deceased members of such forces in case such members sustain

injuries or are killed while rendering aid pursuant to this compact, in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or death were sustained within their own state.

Article IX—Reimbursement. Any party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving such aid for any loss or damage to or expense incurred in the operation of any equipment and the provision of any service in answering a request for aid and for the costs incurred in connection with such requests; provided, that any aiding party state may assume in whole or in part such loss, damage, expense, or other cost, or may loan such equipment or donate such services to the receiving party state without charge or cost; and provided further, that any two or more party states may enter into supplementary agreements establishing a different allocation of costs among those states. Article VIII expenses shall not be reimbursable under this provision.

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