

# 2009 Presidential Inauguration Regional After-Action Report Update

Senior Policy Group  
Chief Administrative Officers' (CAO)  
Homeland Security Executive Committee

4 February 2009



# Vision for Regional After-Action Report

- Develop a **regionally focused**, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (**HSEEP**)-**compliant** after-action report (AAR)
  - **Regionally Focused:** Centered on regional observations and the interplay among regional planning and operational activities
  - **HSEEP-Compliant:** Employs the methodology and format established by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) HSEEP
    - Structured data collection
    - Root-cause analysis of strategic and tactical issues and observations
    - Identification of areas of strength and areas for improvement
    - Identification of concrete, actionable corrective actions
    - Common AAR/improvement plan (IP) format



# Regional AAR Methodology Overview

## 1. Initial Data Collection (completed)

- Deployed 28 observers at 11 regional locations to observe regional operations and capture data

## 2. Follow-On Data Collection (underway)

- Conducted National Capital Region (NCR) hotwash
- Attending hotwashes of regional partners
- Collecting plans and other supporting documents from regional partners
- Distributing data collection survey
- Conducting additional interviews with regional partners

## 3. After-Action Analysis (to be completed)

- Reconstruct regional events and develop a timeline
- Conduct an analysis of regional plans versus operations
- Conduct root-cause analysis on strengths and areas for improvement
- Draft regional AAR/IP
- Conduct regional after-action conference
- Finalize regional AAR/IP



# Regional AAR Timeline of Deliverables

Deliverable	Due Date
✓ Regional Hotwash	30 January 2009
Quick-Look Report	10 days after hotwash
Initial Findings	30 days after hotwash
Timeline of Events	45 days after hotwash
Maximum Data Collection – Appendix to Final AAR/IP	25 March 2009
Analysis of Plans vs. Operations	60 days after hotwash
Draft AAR/IP	70 days after hotwash
After-Action Conference	90 days after hotwash
Final AAR/IP	120 days after hotwash



# NCR AAR Observer Deployment

**The NCR AAR Contractor Team deployed 28 observers to 11 regional locations to observe and collect data on regional Inauguration-related operations**

## **District of Columbia**

- DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (16-21 January)
- Health Emergency Coordination Center (HECC) (20 January)
- RFK Transportation Operations Center (18-20 January)

## **Maryland**

- Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) EOC (21 January)
- Montgomery County EOC (20 January)
- Prince George's County EOC (20 January)

## **Virginia**

- Alexandria City EOC (20 January)
- Arlington County EOC (19-20 January)
- Fairfax County EOC (20 January)
- Prince William County EOC (20 January)
- Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) EOC (18-20 January)



# NCR AAR Hotwash

**The NCR AAR Contractor Team conducted a regional hotwash with 90+ participants from over 50 regional agencies**

## District of Columbia

- DC Department of Health
- DC Fire & EMS
- DC Hospital Association
- DC HSEMA
- DC Metropolitan Police
- DC Office of the Chief Technology Officer
- DC Office of the City Administrator
- DC Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters
- ServeDC

## Maryland

- Charles County Health Department
- MD Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
- MD Department of Transportation
- MD Emergency Management Agency
- MD Institute for EMS Systems
- MD State Highway Administration
- MD State Police
- Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services
- Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative
- Montgomery County Police Department
- Prince George's County Fire/EMS
- Prince George's County Health Department
- Prince George's County Police Department

## Virginia

- Alexandria City Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
- Arlington County OEM
- Fairfax City OEM
- Fairfax County OEM
- Fairfax County Police
- Falls Church City Council
- Falls Church Department of Public Safety
- Inova Health System
- Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance
- Prince William County OEM
- VA Department of Emergency Management
- VA Department of Health
- VA Department of Transportation
- VA Office of the Governor
- VA Railway Express
- VA State Police

## Federal

- CIA Police
- FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination
- Federal Highway Administration
- U.S. Capitol Police
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Emergency Communications
- U.S. Park Police
- Joint Forces HQ/National Capital Region

## Regional

- Capital Wireless Information Network (CapWIN)
- Council of Governments
- Greater Washington Board of Trade
- Humane Society
- National Capital Region Radio Cache
- Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
- WMATA Transit Police



# Initial Regional Observations: Regional Coordination

- **Regional governments had an important role in maintaining steady-state operations throughout the Inaugural period**
  - Governments throughout the region performed critical steady-state tasks, including traffic management, security, and activating their EOCs
  - Many regional governments, including Virginia, Maryland, Arlington, and Fairfax, placed emergency liaison officers in the DC HSEMA EOC and other regional EOCs
  - Regional governments provided DC resources to support unanticipated needs
    - e.g., additional warming buses from Alexandria
- **Regional pre-planning activities set the stage for a cooperative approach to managing Inauguration activities**
  - Relationships developed through the planning process facilitated EOC operations
    - e.g., strong relationship between DC HSEMA and WMATA representatives on public transit management
  - Regional governments used pre-existing structures and processes to share information during Inauguration planning and operations
    - e.g., CAO conference calls brought all the regional decision makers together in a single venue
    - e.g., NCR and other transportation conference calls also provided situational awareness during the planning phase
  - However, in some cases, planning either started late or the process lacked transparency for some regional partners



# Initial Regional Observations: Regional Coordination (cont.)

- **DC HSEMA provided access to WebEOC to partners throughout the region, which provided visibility into Inaugural operations**
  - Regional partners made a concerted effort to use WebEOC to inform regional situational awareness and were largely successful
  - Despite the use of electronic systems, such as WebEOC, some regional governments struggled with a common operating picture
    - e.g., regional information was entered into WebEOC, but outputs (e.g., SITREPs) did not always reach regional partners
- **Regional partners dedicated significant resources during Inaugural planning and operations regardless of whether they would be reimbursed**
  - Inauguration-related disaster declaration focused on DC only—leaving Virginia and Maryland partners with no recourse for federal reimbursement
  - Despite reimbursement challenges, regional governments and private sector partners worked toward a common vision for a successful Inauguration





# Initial Regional Observations: Transportation and Crowd Management

- **Managing the arrival and departure of attendees from the opening ceremonies and the Inauguration presented some of the greatest challenges for regional governments**
  - Given the sophistication and complexity of transportation and crowd management plans, these plans worked well overall
  - Some problems arose that posed potential dangers to citizens
    - e.g., overcrowding, particularly near Capitol checkpoints and L'Enfant Plaza Metro, risked injury to citizens
  - There was confusion over closure of bridges or the use of bridges/tunnels for pedestrians
    - e.g., repeated confusion over status of 14<sup>th</sup> Street Bridge and Memorial Bridge
  - The fragmentation of crowd management responsibilities contributed to on-the-ground challenges
    - e.g., the ability of MPD, WMATA, Park Police, Capitol Police and Secret Service to uniformly coordinate crowd management activities rapidly was limited



# Initial Regional Observations: Public Information and External Affairs

- **Region-wide pre-Inaugural public information provided key information to visitors and residents**
  - Region-wide public information consistently stressed information on transportation planning and personal preparedness
    - e.g., regional ESF-15 partners linked to the DC Inauguration webpage which ensured common messaging
  - Regional governments employed a range of high-tech and low-tech methods to communicate important information to visitors and residents
    - e.g., DC employed Twitter, a web-based communication network, to disseminate updated public information about checkpoints, shuttles, and other issues ([twitter.com/Inauguration\\_DC](https://twitter.com/Inauguration_DC))
- **Region-wide public information on Inauguration Day was not always coordinated or successful in adapting to dynamic, on-the-ground changes**
  - Regional governments did not always communicate changes to transportation plans consistently or quickly
  - The Inauguration indicates that regional governments may need to augment public information capabilities at “mega-events” to ensure the safety of attendees



# Next Steps

- **Continue interviews with regional partners to augment data collected from regional EOCs**
- **Collect and analyze planning documents and qualitative and quantitative data from regional partners**
- **Draft quick-look report**

